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HOW ABSOLUTE IS THE ABSOLUTE PRIORITY
RULE IN BANKRUPTCY? THE CASE FOR
STRUCTURED DISMISSALS
BRUCE GROHSGAL*
ABSTRACT
This Article challenges the view that the absolute priority rule
applies to a “structured dismissal” in a chapter 11 bankruptcy case,
namely a court-approved settlement of certain claims by or against
the debtor followed by the dismissal of the case. Under that view,
the bankruptcy court cannot approve a settlement that makes a
distribution to holders of junior claims unless it also provides for
payment of all senior claims in full. The Supreme Court considered
the question in the fall of 2016 in Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp.
(In re Jevic Holding Corp.). The question before the Court is: “Whether
a bankruptcy court may authorize the distribution of settlement
proceeds in a manner that violates the statutory priority scheme.”
The argument that a structured dismissal always must follow
the absolute priority rule, even when a chapter 11 plan is not confirmable, overstates the current statutory reach of the rule. In
1939, the rule reached its zenith by judicial launch in Case v. Los
Angeles Lumber Co., when the Court construed the statutory term
“fair and equitable” as synonymous with “absolute priority.” Congress has circumscribed the rule repeatedly since: in 1952 by
amending the Bankruptcy Act, in 1978 with enactment of the
Code, and in 1986 and 2005 by amending the Code.
* Helen S. Balick Visiting Professor in Business Bankruptcy Law, Delaware
Law School, Widener University, Wilmington, Delaware. The author, prior to
joining the full-time faculty of the Delaware Law School in July 2014 and while
at his former firm, participated in the In re Jevic Holding Corp. case cited in
this Article. The author resigned from his former firm on June 30, 2014. He
gratefully acknowledges the insightful comments of the Honorable Thomas L.
Ambro, the Honorable Laurie Selber Silverstein, Professor Lawrence A.
Hamermesh, and Michael L. Temin, who read a draft of this Article. The author
also thanks Janet Lindenmuth at the Delaware Law School library for her valuable research assistance. The views expressed and any errors are solely those
of the author.

439

440 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:439
As a result of these statutes, the absolute priority rule is a special, limited rule that does not pervade the current Code. Indeed,
the very reorganization plan—a consensual chapter 11 plan—that
the Court held was not confirmable in Los Angeles Lumber Co.
would be confirmable under the current Code.
This Article concludes that Congress has authorized a bankruptcy court to approve a structured dismissal in chapter 11 when
it is in the best interest of creditors—such as when a plan is not
confirmable—even if distributions do not follow the absolute priority rule. Accordingly, the Court should resolve the current circuit
split by affirming Jevic.
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INTRODUCTION: STRUCTURED DISMISSALS AND THE ABSOLUTE
PRIORITY RULE UNDER THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
The Supreme Court will soon decide whether the absolute priority rule applies to the “structured dismissal” of a chapter 11 case.1
The bankruptcy court in Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp. (In re Jevic
Holding Corp.) approved a structured dismissal that was not in
accordance with the absolute priority rule because it provided for
payments to holders of junior claims without full payment of senior
claims. The district court and the court of appeals affirmed.2
The losing creditors in Jevic sought certiorari based on a circuit court split on the issue.3 The Second Circuit in In re Iridium
Operating LLC held that a court could authorize a structured dismissal that does not make distributions to unsecured creditors in
accordance with the absolute priority rule if there are specific and
credible grounds to justify the deviation.4 The Fifth Circuit in In
re AWECO, Inc., by contrast, stated a per se rule under which all
settlements outside of a plan, reached at any time in the case,
must comply with the absolute priority rule.5 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari in Jevic and will resolve the issue.6
A structured dismissal of a chapter 11 case is a settlement of
certain claims asserted by or against the debtor that the bankruptcy
court approves contemporaneously with its dismissal of the case
pursuant to the applicable sections of the Bankruptcy Code.7 Unlike an “old-fashioned,” one sentence dismissal order, an order approving a structured dismissal typically contains or incorporates
The Supreme Court heard arguments for this case on Dec. 7, 2016. See
Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corporation, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com
/case-files/cases/czyzewski-v-jevic-holding-corporation/ [https://perma.cc/VU5M
-LP9Z].
2 In re Jevic Holding Corp., 787 F.3d 173, 175 (3d Cir. 2015), aff’g, Bank.
No. 08-11006, 2014 WL 268613 (D. Del. 2014).
3 See id. at 186.
4 In re Iridium Operating LLC, 478 F.3d 452, 466 (2d Cir. 2007).
5 See In re AWECO, Inc., 725 F.2d 293 (5th Cir. 1984).
6 See Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp. 136 S. Ct. 2541 (2016).
7 See 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(1) (2012); id. § 349. The term the “Bankruptcy
Code,” or the “Code” when used in this Article, refers to the Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978, as amended, which is the current bankruptcy law in the United
States and is codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–1532.
1
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the substantive settlement terms agreed to by the parties.8 Those
terms may include releases of the claims settled, an agreed “gifting”
of the funding for the settlement by one or more secured creditors
from the proceeds of their collateral, and procedures for reconciling and paying certain claims.9 A structured dismissal resolves a
chapter 11 case, typically one in which a plan is not confirmable.10
At the heart of a structured dismissal is the court’s approval
of the settlement that will not always adhere to the absolute priority rule. Parties settle numerous claims and disputes over the
course of a chapter 11 bankruptcy case. Bankruptcy Rule 9019
authorizes the bankruptcy court to approve settlements and compromises in chapter 11 and in cases filed under other chapters of
the Code.11 The Rule provides no standard by which a court should
grant or deny its approval of a settlement. Rather, Rule 9019(a)
provides simply: “On motion by the trustee and after notice and a
hearing, the court may approve a compromise or settlement.”12
The Supreme Court requires a bankruptcy court to take a multifaceted approach when deciding whether to approve a compromise
or settlement.13 This method focuses on the complexity, expense,
and likely duration of the litigation as well as the probability of
success and collection—weighing the terms of the settlement
The grounds for dismissal of a chapter 11 case are set forth in section 1112.
See 11 U.S.C. § 1112. The ordinary effects of the dismissal and the court’s authority to alter those effects “for cause” are set forth in section 349. See § 349.
9 In re Jevic Holding Corp., 787 F.3d 173, 177 (citing In re Strategic Labor,
Inc., 467 B.R. 11, 17, n.10 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2012)).
10 See id.
11 See FED. R. BANKR. P. 9019. Bankruptcy Rule 9019 is one of the Federal
Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, which are the procedural rules applicable in
bankruptcy cases (the “Rules” or the “Bankruptcy Rules”). The Supreme Court
prescribes the Bankruptcy Rules, pursuant to the power given to it under 28
U.S.C. § 2075. The Rules are regularly revised even if there have been no intervening amendments to the Bankruptcy Code. The current Rules became effective
on December 1, 2016.
12 Id. 9019(a).
13 Id. 9019. In addition, the Code contains provisions for settlements made
as part of a plan of reorganization or liquidation. Code section 1123(b) (“Contents of plan”) states that a proposed plan may provide for “the settlement or
adjustment of any claim or interest belonging to the debtor or to the estate.”
11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(3) (2012).
8
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against the risks and the possible rewards of the litigation.14 The
Supreme Court set forth this doctrine in the TMT case in 1968,15
prior to enactment of the Code and the adoption of the current Rule
9019.16 The courts continue to apply this rule today.17
The absolute priority rule in present parlance requires that the
holders of junior claims and interests receive no payment until all
senior claims and interests receive payment in full—in those circumstances to which the rule applies.18 Thus, for example, if a
class of unsecured creditors has voted to reject a chapter 11 plan,
the shareholders cannot retain or receive shares in the reorganized entity or receive other value on account of their shares,
unless the plan pays the creditors in the rejecting class in full.19
The question before the Supreme Court in Jevic is: “Whether
a bankruptcy court may authorize the distribution of settlement
proceeds in a manner that violates the statutory priority
scheme.”20 The petitioners in Jevic and the detractors of structured dismissals say “no,” and they make several arguments in
support of their position.
Critics of structured dismissals assert that the absolute priority rule is “considered sacrosanct,”21 and that any reordering of the
Protective Comm. for Indep. Stockholders of TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc. v.
Anderson (TMT), 390 U.S. 414, 424 (1968).
15 Id. at 424–25 (discussing the 1898 Bankruptcy Act, as amended, setting
forth the multifactor test for evaluating settlements).
16 FED. R. BANKR. P. 9019.
17 See, e.g., In re Martin, 91 F.3d 389, 393 (3d Cir. 1996) (setting forth the
multifactor test for evaluating settlements under Bankruptcy Rule 9019 following TMT).
18 See, e.g., § 1129(b) (applying this rule to a chapter 11 “cramdown” plan).
A cramdown plan is a plan in which one or more impaired classes have voted
to reject, and at least one impaired class has voted to accept. See George W.
Kuney, Cram Down: An Impaired Class of Claims Says “No” but the Plan is
Confirmed Anyway, COM. BANKR. LITIG. (Mar. 12, 2014), https://www.daily
dac.com/commercialbankruptcy/litigation/articles/cram-down-an-impaired-class
-of-claims-says-no-but-the-plan-is-confirmed-anyway [https://perma.cc/5N7G
-D4FW]. A cramdown plan is confirmable if it complies with the absolute priority rule. § 1129(b).
19 § 1129(b).
20 Brief for Petitioner at i, In re Jevic Holding Corp., 787 F.3d 173 (3d Cir.
2015) (No. 15-649).
21 JAYNA PARTAIN LAMAR, THE CONTINUING EVOLUTION OF CHAPTER 11 IN
CHAPTER 11 BANKRUPTCY AND RESTRUCTURING STRATEGIES, 87 (Thomas Reuters
ed. 2016).
14
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priorities listed in section 507 through “the alchemy of a ‘structured
dismissal’” lacks textual support in the Code.22 These detractors
argue that “Congress has set out a detailed framework of dispute
resolution in bankruptcy, coupled with substantive rules—principally the absolute priority rule and the best interest test—that govern decision making in cases in which consent cannot be obtained.”23
Under this view, a settlement in a chapter 11 case must adhere
to the absolute priority rule, as the court held in In re AWECO.
These commentators contend that the resolution reached in Jevic
“provides yet one more way to circumvent the Code’s priority
structure, upon justifications that do not stand under close scrutiny.”24 The American Bankruptcy Institute Commission on Bankruptcy Reform appears to have leaned toward this position without
completely embracing it. The Commission recently recommended,
in its carefully drafted section on structured dismissals, that bankruptcy courts require “strict compliance with the Bankruptcy
Code in terms of orders ending the chapter 11 case,” and that a
“requested dismissal and the dismissal order satisfy the applicable provisions of, and do not permit the parties to work around,
the Bankruptcy Code.”25
Detractors make several arguments closely related to this core
issue. Chapter 11, they assert, “does not specifically provide for
dismissals that include orders that conclude a case.”26 A structured
dismissal, they continue, is not a “traditional” exit strategy. Instead, it “seem[s] to fall outside the three paths for concluding a
chapter 11 case under the Bankruptcy Code—confirming a plan,
converting to chapter 7 or dismissing without ‘bells and whistles.’”27
22 Frederick F. Rudzik, A Priority is a Priority—Except When It Isn’t, 34 AM.
BANKR. INST. J. 16, 16 (2015).
23 Christopher W. Frost, Structured Dismissals: Smooth Off-Ramp or Artful
Dodge?, 35 BANKR. L. LETTER 1 (2015).
24 Id.
25 American Bankruptcy Institute Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter
11: 2012–2014 Final Report and Recommendations, 23 AM. BANKR. L. REV. 1, 296
(2015). This Article argues that a structured dismissal of a chapter 11 case that is
in the best interest of creditors, in which a plan is not confirmable, does strictly comply with and is not a “work around” the applicable provisions of the Bankruptcy
Code, including the absolute priority rule, the reach of which Congress purposively
contracted since Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Co. 308 U.S. 106, 117, 123 (1939).
26 Frost, supra note 23.
27 Nan Roberts Eitel et al., Structured Dismissals, or Cases Dismissed Outside of Code’s Structure?, 30 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 20, 20 (2011).
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These critics further argue that Congress intended a bankruptcy
court to dismiss a case by a plain vanilla court order that would
“undo” the bankruptcy and restore all property rights to the positions of the parties found at the commencement of the case, including by unwinding settlements and other postpetition transactions.28
Finally, they demand a narrow construction of the Code provision
that authorizes a court to alter ordinary revesting of property of
the estate on dismissal “for cause” under Code section 349(b)—
one that precludes a deviation from the absolute priority rule that
they assert is foundational to the structure of the Code.29
Supporters of structured dismissals begin from the premise
that—in a chapter 11 case in which the estate has minimal or no
cash remaining—the debtor cannot confirm a plan or the costs of
obtaining confirmation will use up any funds that might be available for distribution to creditors.30 They urge that a structured
dismissal in that case may be in the best interest of creditors.31
Does the absolute priority rule preclude a structured dismissal
in chapter 11 that provides for payments to unsecured creditors other
than in accordance with the rule yet is in the best interest of creditors? This Article concludes it does not, for several reasons.
First, the rule was never absolute.32 The rule was not absolute
in the equity receiverships used for corporate reorganizations prior
to the extensive amendments made to the Bankruptcy Act in the
1930s.33 Congress did not make the rule generally or absolutely
applicable in the 1930s amendments to the Bankruptcy Act either. The Chandler Act and other 1930s amendments comprehensively authorized confirmation of bankruptcy plans under chapters
Frost, supra note 23; see also Eitel et al., supra note 27, at 21 (citing H.R.
Rep. No. 95-595, at 338 (1977); S. Rep. 95-989, at 48–49 (1978)).
29 See 11 U.S.C. § 349(b) (2012); see also Eitel et al., supra note 27, at 59;
Christopher H. Frost, Settlements, Absolute Priority, and Another Look at InterClass Give-Ups, 27 BANKR. L. LETTER 1 (2007) (“[A]ll settlements should be
subject to the absolute priority rule .... ‘Gifts’ to junior claimants while more
senior classes remain unpaid violates the basic principles of priority and should
be prohibited.”).
30 See, e.g., Brent Weisenberg, Expediting Chapter 11 Liquidating Debtor’s
Distribution to Creditors, 31 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 36, 106–07 (2012); Norman L.
Pernick & G. David Dean, Structured Chapter 11 Dismissals: A Viable and
Growing Alternative After Asset Sales, 29 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 1, 56 (2010).
31 See Pernick & Dean, supra note 30, at 57.
32 See infra Part II.
33 See infra Part II.
28
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X (corporate reorganizations), XI (arrangements), XII (real property arrangements for persons other than corporations), and XIII
(wage earners’ plans), in addition to chapter IX (for municipalities) and section 77 of the Railroad Reorganization Act of 1935.34
The term “absolute priority rule” appears nowhere in the Chandler
Act or the 1930s amendments.35 Rather, the Supreme Court in
Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Co. and other judicial opinions in the
dozen years that followed the effective date of the Chandler Act
established the rule and gave the rule its greatest reach.36 The
Supreme Court accomplished this by construing “fair and equitable,” which was one requirement for confirmation of a corporate
reorganization plan, as synonymous with a doctrine of “absolute
or full priority.”37
Since the Court’s Los Angeles Lumber decision, Congress repeatedly has dialed back those decisional extensions and has restricted
applications of the rule that led to undesirable outcomes.38 In 1952,
Congress amended the Bankruptcy Act to expressly excise the
“fair and equitable” requirement—and thus the absolute priority
rule—from chapters XI and XII, to which chapters the Supreme
See generally 1934 Amendments to Bankruptcy Act, ch. 424, Pub. L. No.
73-486, 48 Stat. 911 (1934) (enacting corporate reorganization provisions including § 77B for plan confirmation) (referred to in text as “1934 Amendments”); Chandler Act of 1938, ch. 575, Pub. L. No. 75-696, 52 Stat. 840 (1938)
(incorporating the 1934 Amendments and comprehensively enacting reorganization and plan provisions for business entities and individuals) (referred to in
text as “Chandler Act”); Municipal Reorganizations, ch. 657, 50 Stat. 653
(1937); Railroad Reorganization Act of 1935, ch. 774, 49 Stat. 911 (1935).
35 1934 Amendments to Bankruptcy Act, ch. 424, Pub. L. No. 73-486, 48
Stat. 911 (1934); Chandler Act of 1938, ch. 575, Pub. L. No. 75-696, 52 Stat.
840 (1938).
36 See Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Co., 308 U.S. 106, 117, 123 (1939); see
also Consol. Rock Prods. Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U.S. 510, 520–21, 525 (1941);
Ecker v. W. Pac. R.R. Corp., 318 U.S. 448, 484, 515 (1943).
37 Los Angeles Lumber, 308 U.S. at 122–24. Unlike the present Code, the
Bankruptcy Act, as amended by the Chandler Act and other 1930s amendments,
did not define “fair and equitable” to mean “absolute priority,” even though prior to
1952 one requirement for plan confirmation under chapters IX, X, XI, XII, and
XIII and under section 77 of the Railroad Reorganization Act was that the plan
was “fair and equitable.” See id. The present Code provides that a cramdown
plan must be “fair and equitable,” and defining that term to mean the absolute
priority rule in that limited context but in no broader context. Id.
38 Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United
States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5, 31, 31 nn.221–22 (1995).
34
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Court had extended it, and from chapter XIII to preclude its application in that chapter, thereby keeping the rule to chapter X of
the Act.39 The Code that Congress enacted in 1978 combined the
old chapters X, XI, and XII into a new chapter 11.40 The 1978 Code
removed the requirement of absolute priority from consensual plans
in chapter 11.41 The Code also confined the rule’s application to
the holders of claims or interests in a voting class that rejected
the plan, and thus deprived dissenters within any accepting class
of the treatment afforded by the rule.42 In 1986, Congress enacted
chapter 12 to permit family farmers to confirm a plan without
complying with the rule,43 which chapter Congress expanded to
include family fishermen in 2005.44
Second, the absolute priority rule does not pervade the current
Code’s structure or even chapter 11 of the Code, as is often suggested.45 In light of the history of congressional enactments summarized above, this is not a legislative accident or a drafting
glitch. The absolute priority rule does not apply at all to a consensual chapter 11 plan, i.e., a plan that all voting classes have accepted by the requisite majorities in each class. It does not apply
to the dissenting creditors in an accepting class of a cramdown
plan, i.e., a plan that at least one voting class has accepted and at
least one voting class has rejected.46 It does not apply in chapter 9
1952 Amendments to the Bankruptcy Act, ch. 579, Pub. L. No. 82-456,
§§ 35, 43, 50, 66 Stat. 420, 433, 435, 437 (1952).
40 See Tabb, supra note 38, at 35.
41 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (2012); Tabb, supra note 38, at 35.
42 See § 1129(a)(1)–(9), (11)–(16) (2012) (consensual plan); § 1129(a)(10)–(b)
(cramdown plan).
43 Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, § 255, 100 Stat. 3088, 3105 (1986) (the
chapter 12 confirmation requirements are codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1225).
44 Chapter 12 was made permanent and was amended to apply to family
fishermen by the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act
(BAPCPA), Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23.
45 See infra Part III.
46 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)–(b). Both a consensual plan and a cramdown plan
must provide for full payment of priority unsecured claims ultimately. Id. However, even dissenters within an accepting class of a higher priority unsecured
claims can be required to accept deferred payments made after full payment to
lower priority unsecured claims if the higher priority class has accepted by the
requisite majorities. § 1129(a)(9)(B)(i).
39
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(for municipalities),47 chapter 12 (for family farmers and family
fishermen),48 chapter 13 (for individuals with regular income),49
or chapter 15 (for cross-border cases).50
Rather, the Code requires application of the absolute priority
rule in only two places. The rule applies to a chapter 7 liquidation
pursuant to section 726 (which by express provision of the Code
does not apply in chapter 11)51 and to a chapter 11 cramdown plan,
and then it applies only to the members of the rejecting class. 52
The Code does not require that distributions follow the absolute
priority rule in any other situation. The absolute priority rule under
the current Code is a special, limited rule. It is not a rule that operates substantively throughout the Code.
Third, Congress has given the bankruptcy courts wide discretion in approving compromises and settlements.53 The Code does
not require the court to determine that a compromise or settlement comports with the absolute priority rule.54 Indeed, the Code
does not list the criteria for court approval of a settlement in a
chapter 11 case outside of a plan. In the absence of congressional
direction, the Supreme Court has required a settlement to be fair
and equitable based on the court’s determination of the value of
the compromise as compared with the likely risks and rewards of
pursuing the litigation.55
Fourth, Congress has directed the bankruptcy courts to resolve
a chapter 11 case in which a plan is not confirmable on consideration of the best interest of debtor’s creditors—and not to resolve
the case by adhering to the absolute priority rule. Section 1112
provides that a bankruptcy court shall dismiss the case or convert
it to chapter 7, “whichever is in the best interests of creditors and
§§ 901–46.
§§ 1201–31.
49 §§ 1301–30.
50 §§ 1501–32.
51 § 726(a)(1). Section 507 says nothing of distribution, and only section 726
requires distributions in accordance with the absolute priority rule in chapter 7.
Section 726 does not apply in chapter 11. Section 103(b) expressly provides that
subchapter II, in which section 726 is found, applies only in chapter 7. §103(b).
52 § 1129(b).
53 See infra Part IV.
54 See FED. R. BANKR. P. 9019.
55 See id.; see, e.g., Protective Comm. for Indep. Stockholders of TMT Trailer
Ferry, Inc. v. Anderson, 390 U.S. 414, 424–26 (1968).
47
48
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the estate, for cause ....”56 “Cause” under section 1112 expressly
includes the inability to confirm or consummate a chapter 11 plan.57
Congress has underscored this directive and policy in Code
section 349, which governs the effects of dismissal.58 Section 349
does not require adherence to the absolute priority rule or refer to
distributional priorities.59 It does not direct a court to unwind settlements approved or other transactions authorized prior to the
dismissal.60 Section 349 provides that on dismissal, estate property revests in the debtor or other entity in which the property
vested immediately prior to the commencement of the case, unless
the court orders otherwise.61 The property that revests on dismissal
is that remaining in the estate at the time of the dismissal, both
pursuant to the better reading of the text of section 349 and by
well-reasoned precedent.62 The revesting provision of section 349
does not require a court, expressly or by implication, to reverse a
settlement approved by the court or any of the numerous other
transactions that the debtor and other parties entered into, whether
on the first day of the case or the last day prior to the dismissal.63
Congress, moreover, has given bankruptcy courts additional,
wide discretion in Code section 349 to order “for cause” that the
property of the estate vest in different parties on dismissal.64 This
authority underscores the congressional policy favoring a resolution
of a chapter 11 case in which a plan is not possible based on what
is in the best interest of creditors.
§ 1112(b)(1). The court also may make the intermediate decision, if it is
in the best interest of creditors, to appoint a chapter 11 trustee to administer
the estate, and the trustee may later propose a chapter 11 plan or move to convert
to chapter 7. See id.
57 § 1112(b)(1). “Cause” under section 1112(b) includes that there exists a
“substantial or continuing loss to or diminution of the estate and the absence
of a reasonable likelihood of rehabilitation,” or that the debtor is unable to substantially consummate a plan. § 1112(b)(4).
58 § 349.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 § 349(b)(3).
62 See infra Part VI.B.
63 § 349(b)(3).
64 § 349(b). The Code does not provide illustrative examples of what might
constitute “cause” in section 349(b), underscoring the congressional grant of broad
discretion to the bankruptcy courts in this section.
56
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The dismissal provisions of the Code highlight a more foundational principle of the Code than absolute priority—the best interest of creditors and the estate.65 Bankruptcy is not always a
pretty or predictable place. Congress has recognized this feature
of failure in the numerous sections of the Code that expressly authorize a bankruptcy court to make its decision and grant relief
based on the best interest of creditors66 and to exercise its discretion
for cause when determining the relief that it will grant.67 This
Article does not suggest that Congress has given the bankruptcy
court unbridled discretion to resolve a chapter 11 case in which a
plan is confirmable by a structured dismissal that does not follow
the absolute priority rule. To the contrary, the Code’s design points
to confirmation of a plan of reorganization or liquidation, if that is
See, e.g., § 349(b)(3); § 1307(c) (“[W]hichever is in the best interests of
creditors and the estate ....”).
66 See, e.g., § 327(d) (establishing that trustee or debtor in possession may
employ lawyers, accountants, and other professionals if in the best interest of
the estate); § 521(i)(4) (stating court may decline to dismiss individual case in
which debtor failed to make required filings, if the best interest of creditors
would be served by the continued administration of the estate); § 521(j)(2)
(providing that if the debtor fails to file a tax return that becomes due after the
commencement of the case, the court may convert or dismiss the case, whichever is in the best interest of creditors and the estate); § 546(h) (noting that
trustee or debtor in possession may return goods, if in the best interests of the
estate); § 726(a)(1) (providing that the trustee shall close the estate as expeditiously as is compatible with the best interest of parties in interest); § 721 (stating
that the court may authorize chapter 7 trustee to operate the debtor’s business
if in the best interest of the estate and consistent with the orderly liquidation
of the estate); § 943(b)(7) (requiring that chapter 9 plan must be found to be in
the best interests of creditors for the court to confirm it); § 1170(a)(1) (allowing
a court to authorize abandonment of a railroad line if abandonment is in the
best interest of the estate and essential to formulation of a plan); § 1307(c), (e)
(establishing that court may convert a chapter 13 case to chapter 7, or may
dismiss the case, whichever is in the best interest of creditors); § 1324 (allowing
a court to hold a chapter 13 confirmation hearing less than 20 days after the meeting of creditors, if in the best interests of the creditors). The Code, in section
1129(a)(7), also requires that any chapter 11 plan satisfy the “best interest of
creditors test.” Under the test, all holders of claims and interests who vote
against a plan, even those in an accepting class, must do no worse under the plan
than they would in a chapter 7 liquidation. The absolute priority rule by comparison
protects only those in a class that votes against the plan. § 1129(a)(7).
67 See infra notes 458–66 for Code provisions in which “for cause” is the statutory standard under which the bankruptcy court is authorized to grant relief.
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possible, as a primary goal of chapter 11.68 However, in a chapter
11 case in which a plan is not confirmable, a structured dismissal
that benefits creditors is not an end run around the plan process
or the absolute priority rule to which Congress has given limited
application in the current Code. Rather, the best interest of creditors (which is a more pervasive policy and goal under the current
Code than the absolute priority rule that Congress has persistently
circumscribed) specifically and expressly governs the court’s decision
whether to dismiss or convert. The Code, moreover, specifically and
expressly empowers the court to exercise its discretion “for cause”
by ordering dismissal on terms that best achieve that end.69
This Article concludes that a bankruptcy court has authority
under the Code to approve a settlement and structured dismissal
in a chapter 11 case when it is in the best interest of creditors,
even if distributions among unsecured creditors are not in accordance with the absolute priority rule.
I. WHY STRUCTURED DISMISSALS?
A structured dismissal remains the exception rather than the rule
in chapter 11. Chapter 11 cases more often conclude by the confirmation of a chapter 11 plan of reorganization or liquidation,70
or, if no party is able to confirm a plan, by a conversion of the
chapter 11 case to chapter 7.71 Still, the use of structured dismissals
to resolve chapter 11 cases likely has increased as of late72 and has
drawn mostly negative views.
Bankruptcy court approval of a structured dismissal is most
often sought by parties in a case in which the prepetition secured
creditor has a blanket lien against nearly all of the debtor’s property, but the value of the debtor’s collateral is less than the
See § 1129.
See In re Jevic Holding Corp., 787 F.3d 173, 182 (3d Cir. 2015); see also
Pernick & Dean, supra note 30, at 56.
70 The provisions for obtaining confirmation of a chapter 11 plan are set
forth in Code §§ 1121–29. Though chapter 11 is titled “Reorganization,” a chapter 11 plan may be a liquidating plan. See § 1129(a)(11).
71 The provisions for converting a chapter 11 case to chapter 7 are set forth
in section 1112. Chapter 7 is titled “Liquidation” and contemplates only the
liquidation of the debtor’s property for distribution to creditors. § 1112.
72 See, e.g., In re Jevic Holding Corp., 787 F.3d at 181 (citing Pernick &
Dean, supra note 30).
68
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amount of the claim, i.e., the creditor is undersecured.73 A secured
creditor’s lien or security interest continues in the proceeds of any
sale of the collateral, both under state law and by court order as
adequate protection of the creditor’s interest on a free and clear
sale in the bankruptcy case.74 If the proceeds of the sale are less
than the amount of the secured claim, the secured lender also remains undersecured after the sale.75
In such a situation, the debtor must pay the sale proceeds to
the secured creditor in partial satisfaction of the claim, leaving the
debtor and other creditors with nothing.76 The debtor thus will
not be able to pay the costs of preparing, proposing, soliciting votes
for, and seeking and obtaining confirmation of a chapter 11 plan.77
73 The second, far less common situation is one in which the key constituencies reach agreement regarding a comprehensive settlement of the case, and
there are sufficient funds available to pay the settling parties and any other
claimants in full. In such a case, rather than seeking dismissal under Code
section 1112, the parties may ask the court to abstain from hearing the bankruptcy case and to dismiss the case under Code section 305. That section provides: “The court, after notice and a hearing, may dismiss a case under this
title, or may suspend all proceedings in a case under this title, at any time if—
(1) the interests of creditors and the debtor would be better served by such
dismissal or suspension ....” § 305(a)(1). A dismissal under section 305(a) generally is not appealable, and courts accordingly treat abstention and dismissal
under section 305(a) as an “extraordinary remedy”—that is, appropriate only
if both the debtor and its creditors would be better served by the court’s abstention and dismissal of the case. In re Monitor Single Lift I, Ltd., 381 B.R.
455, 462 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008); see also In re Colonial Ford, Inc., 24 B.R. 1014,
1023 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982) (“Where … the workout is comprehensive, and designed to end, not perpetuate, the creditor-company relations, dismissal under
section 305(a)(1) is appropriate. One ‘reorganization,’ under these circumstances, is
enough. Section 305(a)(1) precludes an encore, thereby furthering the policies
of expedition, economy, and good sense.”). A motion for abstention under section 305(a) raises concerns, since in such a case a plan might be confirmable.
But, because all creditors and equity holders typically will have agreed to the
treatment afforded or will be paid in full, those resolutions do not implicate the
absolute priority rule and are thus not considered further in this Article.
74 See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-315(a) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2010) (stating
that security interest in personal property attaches to proceeds on sale); § 363(e)
(stating that the holder of lien against estate property that is sold in the bankruptcy case free and clear of interests is entitled to adequate protection of its interest, typically accomplished by the court’s attaching the lien to the proceeds).
75 See § 506.
76 Id.
77 See generally Pernick & Dean, supra note 30.

456 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:439
Most crucially, the debtor will have no funds with which to make the
payments to priority unsecured creditors required to confirm a plan
or to make any distributions to general unsecured creditors.78
A conversion to chapter 7 is an equally bleak prospect in such
a case. The chapter 7 case will be a “no asset” case. The secured
creditor’s lien will continue in effect, and the chapter 7 trustee
will not be able to pay anything to other creditors.79
It is against these unpromising alternatives that some or all
of the major constituencies in the case—typically the debtor and
some or all of the secured creditors and unsecured creditors—may
negotiate for a structured dismissal. In a typical structured dismissal, the secured creditor will agree to fund a settlement that will
result in some payment to some creditors prior to the dismissal.80
The secured creditor who agrees to fund the structured dismissal
rarely does so purely from altruism. In exchange, the creditor will
secure a release of any claims that the debtor or other settling
parties have asserted or may assert against the creditor and will
put an end to the costs the creditor is incurring.81 The settlement
typically will exclude a party that is unwilling to agree to a release
or from whom the secured creditor determines it needs no release.82
As a result, a structured dismissal negotiated by willing parties
in chapter 11 may provide for payment of claims, which deviate
from the absolute priority rule that applies to distributions in
chapter 783 or that applies to the holders in a rejecting class under
a chapter 11 cramdown plan.84 Critics urge that in such a case,
the structured dismissal violates the absolute priority rule and
thus the court cannot approve it.85
See § 507.
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HANDBOOK FOR CHAPTER 7 TRUSTEES (2012),
https://www.justice.gov/ust/handbook-chapter-7-trustees [https://perma.cc/L9WU
-A4YC]. A case in which no assets will be available for distribution to creditors
is a “no-asset” or “no-distribution” case. See id. ch. 8. There is no deadline for
the filing of proofs of claims by creditors, and the chapter 7 trustee is not required to review or seek to disallow any claims that are filed because doing so
would be a pointless exercise. Following the closing of the case, the chapter 7
trustee receives a sixty dollar fee. Id.
80 See Frost, supra note 23.
81 See id.
82 Pernick & Dean, supra note 30, at 57–58.
83 § 726.
84 § 1129(b).
85 Frost, supra note 23.
78
79
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II. THE ORIGINS OF THE ABSOLUTE PRIORITY RULE AND
CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSES TO JUDICIAL EXTENSIONS AND
UNDESIRABLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE RULE
One narrative of structured dismissals and the dynamics of
reorganization practice describes a “wondrously talented” bar of
bankruptcy lawyers who “manage to continually resurrect practices that are manifestly inconsistent with positive law, sometimes
even in the face of outright prohibitions of said practices by Congress and the Supreme Court.”86 Bankruptcy counsel, the story
goes, succeed in obtaining questionable results for their clients by
asserting little more than that expediency is required.87 For these
commentators, settlements and structured dismissals are an “end
run” around the absolute priority rule and are a case in point.88
Implicit in this critique is that bankruptcy judges, swayed by
expediency arguments, make exceptions to pervasive and immutable requirements expressly set forth in the Bankruptcy Code,
such as the absolute priority rule. These critics conclude that
courts instead need to follow the congressional directive even when
it is not convenient to do so.
This account is simply and materially inaccurate. The terms
“absolute priority rule” or “absolute priority” do not appear anywhere
in the Bankruptcy Code.89 Congress likewise mentioned nothing
of an absolute priority rule in the 1934 Amendments that established
a regime for corporate reorganization,90 or in the 1938 Chandler
Act,91 which are the bankruptcy statutes that preceded the Code.
Rather, section 77B of the 1934 Amendments merely required
a corporate reorganization plan to be “fair and equitable” for the
Ralph Brubaker, Taking Chapter 11’s Distribution Rules Seriously: “InterClass Gifting Is Dead! Long Live Inter-Class Gifting!,” 31 BANKR. L. LETTER 1
(2011).
87 Id.
88 Eitel et al., supra note 27, at 59 (“Desire to make an end run around a
statute is not an adequate reason .... It is not part of the judicial office to seek
out creative ways to defeat statutes.”); Frost, supra note 23.
89 See generally 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (2012); Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust Ass’n v.
203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship, 526 U.S. 434, 442 (1999) (“The latter condition [in
section 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii)] is the core of what is known as the ‘absolute priority rule.’”).
90 1934 Amendments to Bankruptcy Act, ch. 424, Pub. L. No. 73-296, 48
Stat. 911 (1934).
91 Chandler Act of 1938, ch. 575, Pub. L. No. 75-695, 52 Stat. 840 (1938).
86
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bankruptcy court to confirm it.92 The 1938 Chandler Act and
other 1930s bankruptcy enactments that extensively amended
the 1898 Bankruptcy Act also did not require bankruptcy plans
to comply with an absolute priority rule. Instead, the Supreme
Court in 1939, in Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., embedded the rule into the corporate reorganization confirmation
provisions of the Chandler Act when it interpreted the textual requirement that a confirmable plan be “fair and equitable” to require
compliance with a rule of “full and absolute priority.”93
Subsequent congressional enactments contradict any argument
that Congress acquiesced in this interpretation. Congress, since
Los Angeles Lumber, has consistently reduced the reach of the absolute priority rule.94 First, in 1952, Congress severely contracted
the judicial interpretation of the Bankruptcy Act by which the
courts had extended the requirement of absolute priority to confirmation of all consensual and cramdown plans in chapters X, XI,
and XII of the Act. By the same amendment, Congress preemptively removed the requirement from chapter XIII.95 In 1978, Congress made absolute priority in chapter 11 applicable only to the
holders in a dissenting class of cramdown plan.96 In 1986 and
2005, Congress acted again to make the rule inapplicable to plans
proposed by family farmers and family-owned commercial fishing
operations.97 Congress, by these numerous enactments, made the
absolute priority rule inapplicable to chapter 9 plans, consensual
chapter 11 plans, chapter 12 plans, and chapter 13 plans. The rule
today has only two applications: first, to the holders of claims or
equity interests in a class that has voted against a chapter 11
cramdown plan, and second, in a chapter 7 liquidation case.
1934 Amendments to Bankruptcy Act, ch. 424, § 77B(f), 52 Stat. at 919.
Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106, 114 (1939).
94 See infra notes 95–107 and accompanying text.
95 The House in its report explained that, first,
the fair and equitable rule, as interpreted in Boyd and Los Angeles Lumber, “cannot realistically be applied in a chapter XI,
XII, or XIII proceeding. Were it so applied, no individual debtor
and, under chapter XI, no corporate debtor where the stock
ownership is substantially identical with management could
effectuate an arrangement except by payment of the claims of
all creditors in full …. Nor is it practicable or realistic to apply
the rule in a proceeding under chapter XI, XII, or XIII.”
H.R. REP. NO. 2320, ¶ 43, at 21 (1952).
96 See CHARLES JORDAN TABB, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY 1157–58 (2d ed. 2009).
97 See, e.g., Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 198 (1988).
92
93
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As Congress acted on these occasions to severely constrict the
reach of the absolute priority rule following expansive judicial interpretations and to address other undesirable consequences arising
from those decisions, it is simply untrue that a wayward bankruptcy
bench and bar ran end runs around the absolute priority rule or
sidestepped congressional requirements. To the contrary, Congress
consistently and on numerous occasions reined in the decisional
law that raised and then extended the rule.
This section of the Article begins with a brief account of the
origins and extent of the “absolute” priority rule in the equity receiverships by which most railroads reorganized prior to the enactment of reorganization legislation by Congress in the 1930s.
The rule, even in those cases, more often commanded “relative”
rather than “absolute” distributional priority. Next, this section
summarizes the construction of the “fair and equitable” requirement for confirmation of plans under the 1930s amendments to
the Act and the Supreme Court’s expansive construction of the
rule in Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co. Finally, this section
considers the congressional enactments that followed Los Angeles
Lumber, in 1952, 1978, 1986, and 2005, that severely narrowed
the application of the absolute priority rule.
A comprehensive analysis of the scope of the rule prior to Los
Angeles Lumber and the arc of congressional enactments since that
opinion demonstrate that the absolute priority rule does not pervade the bankruptcy law. Rather, the rule never was absolute prior
to Los Angeles Lumber. Further, Congress has consistently restricted
the scope of the rule since the Court’s decision in that case.
A. The Origins of the Absolute Priority Rule
The rules of distributional priorities in reorganization cases have
their origins in the equity receivership cases by which insolvent
railroads reorganized across state lines in the 1800s.98 The absolute priority rule, strictly applied, requires payment first to secured
creditors and then payment to unsecured creditors of an insolvent
enterprise, prior to shareholders receiving any stock in the reorganized entity or other value on account of their shares in the old
98

Tabb, supra note 38, at 21–23 (discussing equity receiverships).
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entity.99 However, the rule underlying equity receiverships appears
to have been one of relative or weighted distributional priorities
from the start.100 The doctrine of equity receiverships can best be
characterized as one designed to prevent overreaching by the secured bondholders, managers, and shareholders acting in concert
to deprive unsecured creditors of any distribution in the reorganization of the business enterprise.
The use of the equity receivership rather than a bankruptcy
statute to reorganize a railroad arose out of necessity.101 The Constitution authorizes Congress to establish uniform bankruptcy
laws.102 Though Congress enacted bankruptcy or insolvency laws
pursuant to this power in 1801, 1841, and 1867,103 it repealed each
after several years without replacement; so, for most of the 19th
century, no federal bankruptcy law was in effect.104 Further, none
of the 19th century Bankruptcy Acts enabled a corporation to reorganize.105 Rather, they merely provided for the liquidation of
the bankrupt’s assets for distribution to creditors.106
The equity receivership enabled a troubled railroad to reorganize
and thus preserve its business as a going concern, as opposed to
Id.
Id.
101 Id.
102 Congress has the authority to “establish ... uniform laws on the subject
of bankruptcies throughout the United States.” U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
103 See infra note 106 (discussing relevant statutes).
104 Tabb, supra note 38, at 13–14.
105 See generally id. at 14–29.
106 Bankruptcy Act of 1800, ch. 19, 2 Stat. 19 (1800), repealed by Bankruptcy
Act of 1803, ch. 6, 2 Stat. 248 (1803); Bankruptcy Act of 1841, ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440
(1841), repealed by Bankruptcy Act of 1843, ch. 82, 5 Stat. 614 (1843); and
Bankruptcy Act of 1867, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517 (1867), repealed by Bankruptcy
Act of 1878, ch. 160, 20 Stat. 99 (1878). Though none of those 19th century Bankruptcy Acts enabled a corporation to reorganize or provided for the confirmation of bankruptcy plans as under current law, an 1874 amendment to the 1867
Act did briefly allow for compositions of creditors until the 1867 Act was repealed in 1878. Act of June 22, 1874, ch. 390, 18 Stat. 178, § 18 at 182–84. See,
e.g., DAVID A. SKEEL, DEBT’S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN
AMERICA 54–60 (2001); see also In re Jeppson, 66 B.R. 269, 272 (Bankr. D. Utah
1986) (“Until the enactment in 1933 and 1934 of Sections 77 and 77B of the
Bankruptcy Act, there was no statutory machinery generally available to facilitate the reorganization of insolvent corporations. The Bankruptcy Act of 1898
had concerned itself almost entirely with liquidation of the debtor’s assets and
distribution of the proceeds among creditors ....”).
99

100
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a piecemeal liquidation of the enterprise’s assets.107 Maintaining
the railroad as a business enterprise maximized values for stakeholders and benefitted the public and the economy.108 The equity
receiverships for most of the 1800s filled the void left by the nonexistence of a federal bankruptcy act and, until the 1930s, by the absence of reorganization provisions in the federal bankruptcy acts.
The debt and capital structures of 19th century railroads were
highly developed, with secured bondholders (often holding several
issues and classes of bonds), unsecured creditors, and shareholders
(typically holding several classes of both preferred and common
shares) each holding a stake in the enterprise.109 The insolvent
railroad’s assets were extensive, consisting of real estate interests,
rolling stock, and other tangible and intangible personal property
located in several states.110
A creditor upon the railroad’s default, or the railroad itself in
contemplation of such default, would initiate the equity receivership by seeking and obtaining the appointment of a receiver for the
railroad’s assets in federal district court.111 Usually various committees of creditors were formed, which would negotiate a restructuring of the debt and the capital structure for the new, reorganized
entity.112 Once the committees reached an agreement, they combined into a single reorganization committee authorized to credit
bid up to the face value of the secured bonds at the foreclosure
sale.113 Competing bidders willing to pay more than the face amount
of the secured debt were rare.114 As a result, the reorganization
committee usually purchased all or most of the railroad’s assets
at the foreclosure sale and transferred those assets to the new corporation in which the old holders of debt or equity were given the
agreed upon debt and/or equity in the new, reorganized railroad.115
Sometimes, though, a creditor or other senior stakeholder would
object that it was receiving nothing (or not enough) on account of
SKEEL, supra note 106, at 57.
See id.
109 See id. at 58.
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 SKEEL, supra note 106, at 59.
114 Id.
115 Id.
107
108
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its claim against the old entity, and that a junior stakeholder,
such as a shareholder, was receiving too much. The courts began
to develop rules for distributional priorities—the purpose of which
was to enable a court to determine the fairness of the value proposed to be given on reorganization to creditors and shareholders
on account of their claims against the old entity.116
The aim of these distributional rules was to protect creditors
from overreaching by the managers and shareholders who negotiated the restructuring with the secured bondholders.117 The Supreme Court in 1868 in Railroad Co. v. Howard set down the rule
that the proceeds of the sale of a business corporation are “assets
of the corporation, and as such constitute a fund for the payment
of its debts”; if the plan distributed proceeds to stockholders but
left any debts of the corporation unpaid, then the “established
rule in equity” was that the stockholders took the funds “charged
with the trust in favor of creditors,” which a court of equity would
order paid in satisfaction of the creditors’ claims.118 The existence
of a mortgage lien against the assets sold did not change this:
“whatever interest remained after the lien of the mortgages was
discharged belonged to the corporation, and as the property of the
corporation when the bonds were discharged, it became a fund in
trust for the benefit of their creditors.”119
The Supreme Court visited the issue again in Louisville Trust
Co. v. Louisville, N.A. & C. Ry. Co. in 1899. The Court asked whether
the mortgagor and mortgagee could enter into an agreement “by
which[,] through the form of equitable proceedings[,] all the right”
of an “unsecured creditor may be wiped out, and the interest of both
mortgagor and mortgagee in the property preserved and continued?
The question carries its own answer. Nothing of the kind can be
tolerated.”120
The rule established by Howard and Louisville Ry. Co. was a
safeguard against abuse of unsecured creditors by the secured
creditors, managers, and shareholders who took the lead in negotiating the restructuring. In late nineteenth-century equity receiverships, the doctrine took into account the relative priorities
See id. at 67.
Id.
118 Chi., R.I. & P.R. v. Howard, 74 U.S. 392, 410 (1868).
119 Id. at 414.
120 Louisville Tr. Co. v. Louisville, N.A. & C. Ry. Co., 174 U.S. 674, 684 (1899).
116
117

2017]

STRUCTURED DISMISSALS

463

of the secured and unsecured debt and of the shares of preferred
and common stock in the old railroad’s debt and capital structure.121 It restrained managers and shareholders from misappropriating all the residual value or control premium value in the
enterprise unless the reorganization plan paid a reasonable amount
to all creditors.122
The rule, though, did not require distributions of value in
strict accordance with an absolute priority rule. Instead, the reorganization plans allocated and distributed values in the new
entity in a way that gave everyone something in rough proportion
to the seniority of their claims and interests in the insolvent enterprise.123 Further, participation in the new enterprise of old equity holders, who were the most junior stakeholders in the insolvent
enterprise, often was conditioned on their paying “assessments,”
i.e., making cash contributions to the reorganized entity.124
A reorganization plan would provide, for example, that senior
secured bondholders would receive new bonds equal to most or all
of the value of their claims against the assets (e.g., the holder of
$1,000 first priority secured bonds against the assets of the old
railroad would receive $1,000 first priority secured bonds against
the assets of the new railroad).125 Junior secured bondholders
would receive a combination of secured debt in a reduced amount
and preferred shares in the new entity.126 Old preferred and common shareholders would receive new shares and/or bonds, provided they were willing to pay cash assessments.127 The funds
raised by assessments paid dissenting security holders and the
expenses incurred by the railroad during the receivership, and
funded new capital expenditures.128
Notably absent from this typical restructuring were general
unsecured creditors—the vendors of goods and services and others
See SKEEL, supra note 106, at 58–59.
See id. at 60.
123 See id. at 59.
124 Peter Tufano, Business Failure, Judicial Intervention, and Financial
Innovation: Restructuring U.S. Railroads in the Nineteenth Century, 71 BUS.
HIST. REV. 1, 14 (1997).
125 See, e.g., SKEEL, supra note 106, at 58–59.
126 Id.
127 Tufano, supra note 124, at 14.
128 Id.
121
122
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who had done business with the railroad day-to-day, extending credit
in the ordinary course of business. In 1913, Northern Pacific Railroad
Co. v. Boyd “threw a monkey wrench into all of this.”129 Boyd, an
unsecured creditor, objected to a reorganization under which he
received nothing.130 The railroad had sold for $61 million at a sale
“where there was no competition.”131 The encumbrances against
it were $157 million.132 Yet, the reorganization agreement stated
that the value of the railroad was $345 million.133 Further, the purchaser immediately following the sale issued $190 million of new
bonds and $155 million of stock on property that a month before
had been bought for $61 million.134
The Supreme Court stated that a “transfer by stockholders
from themselves to themselves” could not defeat the claim of a
non-assenting creditor such as Boyd.135 “As against him the sale
is void in equity, regardless of the motive with which it was made,”
and the subordinate interest of the old stockholders remained
“subject to his claim in the hands of the reorganized company.”136
Boyd further complicated matters for reorganizers.137 Even
Boyd, though, did not establish an absolute priority rule in reorganization cases. Shareholders still could participate in the reorganization but “only if unsecured creditors were given ‘a fair and
timely offer of cash, or a fair and timely offer of participation in
such corporation.’”138
The Supreme Court in Kansas City Terminal stated 15 years
later that all parties to a reorganization, including the public, “are
best served by [cooperation] between bondholders and stockholders.”139 If creditors decline a fair offer, “they are left to protect
themselves. After such refusal they cannot attack the reorganization
SKEEL, supra note 106, at 67.
N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482, 492 (1913).
131 Id. at 508.
132 Id. at 507.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Boyd, 228 U.S. at 502.
136 Id.
137 SKEEL, supra note 106, at 67.
138 Id. (citing 1 ROBERT T. SWAINE, THE CRAVATH FIRM AND ITS SUCCESSORS
173 (1946)).
139 Kan. City Terminal Ry. Co. v. Cent. Union Tr. Co., 271 U.S. 445, 455 (1926).
129
130
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in a court of equity.”140 Further, if it was impossible to obtain new
value from shareholders unless they were “permitted to contribute
and retain an interest sufficiently valuable to move them,” then “[i]n
such or similar cases the chancellor may exercise an informed discretion concerning the practical adjustment of the several rights.”141
Bonbright and Bergerman, reviewing case law in the late 1920s,
concluded that the courts showed a distinct leaning toward relative
priority.142 Courts were “reluctant to upset a plan, when accepted
by a substantial majority of interested bond-holders, merely on the
Id. (citing N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482, 502 (1913)) (“Unsecured
creditors of insolvent corporations are entitled to the benefit of the values which
remain after lienholders are satisfied, whether this is present or prospective, for
dividends or only for purposes of control. But reasonable adjustments should
be encouraged. Practically, it is impossible to sell the property of a great railroad
for cash and, generally, the interests of all parties, including the public, are
best served by co-operation between bondholders and stockholders. If creditors
decline a fair offer based upon the principles above stated, they are left to protect themselves. After such refusal they cannot attack the reorganization in a
court of equity.”); see also Jameson v. Guar. Tr. Co., 20 F.2d 808, 811 (7th Cir.
1927) (quoting N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. at 508) (“The Boyd decision does
not require that in the reorganization each interest must be accorded the same
rank in every particular it formerly held. The most it holds is that the stockholder’s interest in the old company may not, as against unsecured creditors,
be carried into the reorganized company, and these creditors wholly disregarded. The court said: ‘This conclusion does not, as claimed, make it necessary
to pay an unsecured creditor in cash as a condition of stockholders retaining an
interest in the reorganized company. His interest can be preserved by the issuance, on equitable terms, of income bonds or preferred stock. If he declines a fair
offer, he is left to protect himself as any other creditor or a judgment debtor,
and, having refused to come into a just reorganization, could not thereafter be
heard in a court of equity to attack it.’”); Douglas G. Baird, Present at the Creation:
The SEC and the Origins of the Absolute Priority Rule, 18 AM. BANKR. INST. L.
REV. 591, 597 (2010) [hereinafter Present at the Creation] (stating that the rule
in Boyd “merely insists that, in whatever priority regime existed, everyone participate. The question of exactly what priority rights each investor enjoyed was
actively debated in the law reviews over the next twenty-five years.”); but see
Samuels v. Ne. Pub. Serv. Co., 174 A. 127, 131 (Del. Ch. 1934) (citing N. Pac.
Ry. Co. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. at 510) (“It is inequitable for the court to appropriate
to stockholders rights in assets which belong to creditors.”).
141 Kan. City Terminal Ry. Co., 271 U.S. at 455.
142 See James C. Bonbright & Milton M. Bergerman, Two Rival Theories of
Priority Rights of Security Holders in a Corporate Reorganization, 28 COLUM.
L. REV. 127 (1928) [hereinafter Two Rival Theories].
140
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ground that it violate[d] absolute priorities in favor of approximate
relative priorities.”143
In sum, though many courts and commentators have referred
to the distributional doctrine in equity receiverships as an “absolute
priority rule,”144 it was not. Instead, the courts in the 1800s and
early 1900s often applied a rule of “relative” (rather than absolute)
priority.145 The rule prevented the secured creditors, managers,
and stockholders from freezing out the company’s unsecured creditors and paying them nothing while equity retained an interest.146
However, under the pre-1930s case law under which some of the
largest business enterprises of the time were reorganized, those
unsecured creditors only had a right to participate on fair terms
in the reorganized company in which old equity would have an
interest.147 They were not entitled to insist that a plan conformed
to an absolute priority rule.148
143 Id. at 154; see also John D. Ayer, Rethinking Absolute Priority after Ahlers,
87 MICH. L. REV. 963, 974–76 (1989) (citing Two Rival Theories) (“Fifteen years
after Boyd, two scholars were able to argue that corporate practice recognized
two priority rules—a rule of absolute priority, à la Boyd, and a rule of ‘relative’
priority, functioning in practice much like the informal ‘share’ scheme that obtained before Boyd.”); Randolph J. Haines, The Unwarranted Attack on New
Value, 72 AM. BANKR. L. J. 387, 401 (1998) (“Boyd did not adopt an absolute
priority rule. In simplest terms, the Boyd rule was that equity could not receive
anything for its old interests unless unsecured creditors received something
too. Although Boyd required that a fair offer be made to unsecured creditors,
it did not say how the fairness of any offer would be determined, and it certainly
did not require payment in full.” Even “the seminal Howard case ... suggested
that creditors would only be entitled to the sixteen percent fund reserved for
stockholders, not necessarily to be paid in full. Thus, instead of adopting the
absolute priority rule, Howard and Boyd merely set the stage for the debate
between two possible views of priority, one which is absolute and one which is
relative. Those rules were not even given those names until fifteen years later”
by Bonbright and Bergerman.); SKEEL, supra note 106, at 67–68 (stating that
railroad reorganizers after Boyd “offered general unsecured creditors a continuing interest in the reorganized firm so long as they, like the stockholders, paid
a cash assessment”).
144 Haines, supra note 143, at 387 n.3.
145 Id.
146 Ayer, supra note 143, at 964.
147 See Present at the Creation, supra note 140, at 605.
148 See, e.g., id. at 597 (“The [Boyd] opinion itself, however, does not confront
the question of whether receivership law could continue to accept a regime of
relative priority analogous to the rule of the general average. It merely insists
that, in whatever priority regime existed, everyone participate. The question
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B. “Fair and Equitable” Under the Chandler Act
Congress, in the early years of the Great Depression and in
response to its effects, enacted a series of amendments to the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898.149 The 1934 amendments added a new section, 77B, to the Act, entitled “Corporate Reorganizations.”150 Under
Section 77B, a court could confirm a corporate reorganization plan
if it determined that the plan was “fair and equitable” and fulfilled certain other requirements.151 Widespread municipal bond
defaults152 caused Congress to enact a municipal bankruptcy
chapter, chapter IX, in the same year.153 The reorganization of
insolvent railroads under the Bankruptcy Act was the subject of
amendments in 1935.154 In 1938, Congress passed the Chandler
Act, which extensively overhauled U.S. bankruptcy law, making
further changes to and incorporating many of those earlier Depression era amendments in the 1898 Act.155
of exactly what priority rights each investor enjoyed was actively debated in
the law reviews over the next twenty-five years.”).
149 See 1933 Amendments to Bankruptcy Act, ch. 204, 47 Stat. 1467 (1933);
1934 Amendments to Bankruptcy Act, ch. 424, Pub. Law. No. 73-296, 48 Stat.
911 (1934) (“1934 Amendments”); Railroad Reorganization Act of 1935, ch. 774,
49 Stat. 911 (1935). Congress during this period also enacted the FrazierLemke Act for bankruptcy relief to financially distressed farmers, which the
Supreme Court held unconstitutional. See generally Louisville Joint Stock
Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935).
150 1934 Amendments to Bankruptcy Act § 77B(f).
151 Id.
152 See Solicitor General Jackson’s statements in United States v. Bekins,
304 U.S. 27, 34 (1938), that “[c]ities as large as Detroit and Miami and Asheville
were in default” and, by 1938, “over 3,000 units of government were found to
be in default.”
153 1934 Amendments to Bankruptcy Act, ch. 345, 48 Stat. 798 (1934). The
1934 municipal bankruptcy chapter was declared unconstitutional in Ashton
v. Cameron Cty. Water Improvement Dist., 298 U.S. 513 (1936). In 1937, Congress enacted a new municipal act, which the Court held as constitutional. See
1937 Amendments to Bankruptcy Act, ch. 657, 50 Stat. Ann. 653 (1937); accord
United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27 (1938). The 1937 municipal bankruptcy
act contained sunset provisions, and Congress several times reenacted it. The
municipal bankruptcy chapter was originally chapter X. The Chandler Act designated it as chapter IX, which parallels its present place as chapter 9 of the Code.
154 Railroad Reorganization Act of 1935, ch. 774, 49 Stat. 911 (1935).
155 Chandler Act of 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840 (1938); see also Tabb, supra
note 38, at 29–30; Vincent L. Leibell, Jr., The Chandler Act—Its Effect Upon
the Law of Bankruptcy, 9 FORDHAM L. REV. 380, 380–406 (1940); Herman M.
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The Chandler Act established for the first time a comprehensive statutory regime for the restructuring of the financial affairs
of a corporation or the rehabilitation of an individual debtor by a
plan confirmed by the court.156 The statutory provisions for these
plans appeared in four chapters of the Chandler Act’s amendments
to the Bankruptcy Act: chapter X (corporate reorganizations);157
chapter XI (arrangements);158 chapter XII (real property arrangements for persons other than corporations);159 and chapter XIII
(wage earners’ plans).160 The acts that provided for municipal arrangements (chapter IX) and railroad reorganizations continued
in effect.161
Each of chapters X–XIII required the court to confirm a proposed plan if it was “fair and equitable” and fulfilled the other
conditions set forth in that chapter.162 The Chandler Act, though,
did not define “fair and equitable,” and it remained for the Supreme Court to do so.163
Knoeller, Reorganization Procedure Under the New Chandler Act, 24 MARQ. L.
REV. 12, 12 (1939).
156 The Chandler Act amended and incorporated section 77B into chapters
X–XIV of the Chandler Act. See generally Chandler Act of 1938, ch. 575, Pub.
Law No. 75-696, 52 Stat. 840 (1938). It amended, but did not repeal or incorporate, the provisions of the Railroad Reorganization Act of 1935 or the provisions of the 1937 municipal bankruptcy law, Ch. 657, 50 Stat. Ann. 653 (1937),
though it designated the municipal chapter as chapter IX. Id. § 3(a). For business enterprises, the reorganization provisions of the Chandler Act “embodie[d]
the new social economic concept of reorganization and the rehabilitation of the
debtor and his business as a going concern, instead of the liquidation, distribution, and stoppage of business with the consequent loss to the debtor, creditors, employees, and the public generally.” Knoeller, supra note 155, at 14. For
wage earning individuals, the provisions of the Act provided relief “from harassments of garnishments and attachment proceedings.” Id.
157 Chandler Act of 1938, ch. 575, Pub. Law No. 75-696, §§ 101–276, 52 Stat.
840, 883–905 (1938).
158 §§ 301–99.
159 §§ 401–526.
160 §§ 601–86.
161 Railroad Reorganization Act of 1935, ch. 774, 49 Stat. 911 (1935); Municipal Reorganizations, ch. 657, 50 Stat. Ann. 653 (1937).
162 Chandler Act of 1938, § 221(2) (chapter X); § 366(3) (chapter XI); § 472(3)
(chapter XII); § 656 (chapter XIII).
163 See generally Chandler Act of 1938, ch. 575, Pub. Law No. 75-696, 52
Stat. 840 (1938).
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C. The Supreme Court in Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Defines
“Fair and Equitable” to Require Absolute Distributional Priority
in a Plan
The debtor in Los Angeles Lumber was a holding corporation that
owned six subsidiary corporations; only one of which, a dry dock company, had substantial assets.164 In early 1938, the debtor petitioned
for corporate reorganization under the 1934 Amendments.165 The
trustee proposed a plan, which the bankruptcy court, with some
modifications, confirmed.166 The plan provided for the organization of
a new corporation to which the trustee would transfer all of the assets
of the subsidiary dry dock company free and clear of liens.167 Bondholders would receive preferred stock in the reorganized entity,
additional preferred stock would be sold to generate additional working capital, and common stock would be issued to the holders of
old equity.168
The plan was “properly approved in writing” by all of the following
affected classes of creditors and shareholders, and by overwhelming majorities in each:
(a) The owners and holders of 92.81 per cent face value
of debtor’s outstanding bonds;
(b) 100 per cent, in amount, of other creditors;
(c) The owners and holders of 99.75 per cent of debtor’s
outstanding Class A capital stock;
(d) The owners and holders of 90 per cent of debtor’s outstanding Class B capital stock.169
The district court sitting in bankruptcy confirmed the plan over
the objection of dissenters who held $18,500 of the bonds. 170 The
court determined that the plan was “fair and equitable” and that old
equity could receive the new shares.171 The dissenting bondholders
In re Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 100 F.2d 963, 964 (9th Cir. 1939).
Id.
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 In re Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 24 F. Supp. 501, 507 (S.D. Cal. 1938).
170 Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106, 112 (1939).
171 In re Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 100 F.2d at 965.
164
165
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appealed to the Ninth Circuit.172 They asserted, among other
claims, that the plan was neither fair nor equitable as to them, and
that “the trial court erred in allowing the present stockholders of
the insolvent debtor to participate in the reorganization.”173
The Ninth Circuit accepted the district court’s findings that
the present shareholders, by cooperating in the plan, had given
new value that exceeded the value of their new stock under the
plan.174 The shareholders had modified a prepetition forbearance
agreement, and their cooperation and participation in the new
company preserved the going concern value of the dry dock company, avoided further litigation, and enhanced the value of the
enterprise because of their familiarity with the business of the
dry dock subsidiary and their financial standing and influence in
the community.175
The objecting bondholders sought and obtained certiorari from
the Supreme Court.176 The Supreme Court per Justice Douglas
held that the Ninth Circuit had erred in at least three material
respects.177
First, the Supreme Court determined that “fair and equitable”
in section 77B(f) were “words of art” that “had acquired a fixed
meaning through judicial interpretations in the field of equity receivership reorganizations.”178 The words “fair and equitable” in
Douglas’s view meant that a bankruptcy plan needed to satisfy
the rule of “full or absolute priority,” at least insofar as it kept
shareholders from receiving anything prior to full payment to
creditors.179 Douglas reasoned that the Supreme Court’s equity
receivership decisions had “dealt with the precedence to be accorded creditors over stockholders in reorganization plans.”180 The
Los Angeles Lumber, 308 U.S. at 106.
In re Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 100 F.2d at 965.
174 Id.
175 Id.
176 Los Angeles Lumber, 308 U.S. at 106.
177 Id. at 122–24.
178 Id. at 115.
179 Id. at 115–17.
180 Id. at 115–16 (citing Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Co. v. Howard, 74 U.S. 392
(1868); see also Louisville Tr. Co. v. Louisville, N.A. & C. Ry. Co., 174 U.S. 674
(1899); N. Pac. Ry. Cent. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482 (1913); Kan. City Terminal Ry.
Co. v. Cent. Union Tr. Co. of N.Y., 271 U.S. 445 (1926)).
172
173
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stockholder’s interest in the property “is subordinate to the rights
of creditors; first, of secured and then of unsecured creditors.”181
Second, the Court held that the requirement that the plan
must be “fair and equitable” applied even to a consensual plan,
such as the Los Angeles Lumber plan, which had been accepted
by all affected classes of creditors and shareholders.182 The court
was “not merely a ministerial register of the vote of the several
classes of security holders.”183 Consent of all affected classes by
the majorities required by section 77B was not a substitute for the
court’s determination that the plan was fair and equitable,184 and
absent such determination, the court could not confirm the plan.185
Third, the Court held that the absolute priority rule shielded the
holder of each claim or interest, without regard to how the holder or
its class voted.186 Thus, the absolute priority rule applied regardless of whether the holder was in an accepting class or was in a
rejecting class.187 “All those interested in the estate are entitled
to the court’s protection,” and specifically to the shelter of the “absolute or full priority doctrine” that the court had established.188
The Court found that the debtor was insolvent on a balance sheet
basis, and thus that there was no value in the enterprise beyond
that available for partial payment to creditors.189 The distributions
of shares in the reorganized debtor to the old shareholders of the
debtor violated the absolute or full priority doctrine.190 Thus, the
plan was not fair and equitable and could not be confirmed.191
It is fair to say that the Court’s determination in Los Angeles
Lumber that “fair and equitable” were words of art requiring absolute
Id. at 116 (quoting Louisville Tr. Co. v. Louisville, N.A. & C. Ry. Co., 174
U.S. 674 (1899)). It has not gone unnoticed that Justice Douglas, who wrote
the opinion, had joined the court less than a year earlier from serving as chair
of the Securities and Exchange Commission, and that his opinion adopted
“much of the substance of an amicus brief filed by the SEC” in the case. Ayer,
supra note 143, at 974.
182 Los Angeles Lumber, 308 U.S. at 114.
183 Id.
184 Id.
185 Id.
186 Id.
187 See id.
188 Id. at 114, 123.
189 Id. at 119–21.
190 Id. at 131–32.
191 Id.
181
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priority in distributions—and from which its second and third
holdings flowed—was something of a reach. The term “fair and
equitable” was not defined in section 77B or elsewhere in the 1898
Act as amended, and the term “absolute or full priority doctrine”
was not used in the Act at all, either before or after the 1930s
amendments.192 Further, the Chandler Act and the other Depression Era amendments to the Bankruptcy Act used the term “fair
and equitable” elsewhere, in several different contexts that
clearly meant much different things.193
Moreover, Douglas’s statement that the term “fair and equitable” had acquired a fixed meaning in the equity receivership cases
was, as Ayer has put it, “poppycock, and Justice Douglas knew it.
None of the Supreme Court’s absolute priority cases had used that
particular phrase in that particular way.”194 Specifically, the Supreme Court had not used the term “fair and equitable” in any of
the cases which Douglas cited.195
Regardless, the decision stood. Congress had enacted the
Chandler Act shortly before the Supreme Court’s opinion in Los
Angeles Lumber, though section 77B of the 1934 Amendments,
and not the Chandler Act, applied to the case. The Chandler Act
required a plan to be “fair and equitable” under all four of its chapters enabling reorganizations or arrangements,196 which opened
the door to further extensions of the absolute priority rule to several
chapters of the Act.
D. The Courts Extend the Absolute Priority Rule to Plans Under
Chapters X, XI, and XII of the Chandler Act
The Chandler Act incorporated the 1930s amendments and
made other changes to the Bankruptcy Act. The Chandler Act’s
provisions required a plan to be fair and equitable in chapter X
(corporate reorganizations), chapter XI (arrangements), chapter
Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 424, sec. 77B, § 1, 48 Stat. 911, 912 (1934).
See infra notes 407–08.
194 Ayer, supra note 143, at 975.
195 See Los Angeles Lumber, 308 U.S. at 115–16 (citing Chi., R.I. & P.R. Co.
v. Howard, 74 U.S. 392 (1868); Louisville Tr. Co. v. Louisville, N.A. & C. Ry.
Co., 174 U.S. 674 (1899), N. Pac. R. Co. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482 (1913); Kan. City
Terminal Ry. Co. v. Cent. Union Tr. Co. of N.Y., 271 U.S. 445 (1926)).
196 Chandler Act of 1938, ch. 575, Pub. Law No. 75-696, § 221, 52 Stat. 840,
897 (1938).
192
193
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XII (real property arrangements for persons other than corporations), and chapter XIII (wage earners’ plans) for the court to confirm it.197 The fair and equitable requirement also applied to
plans under chapter IX (municipal arrangements)198 and under
section 77 of the Railroad Reorganization Act.199
It is not surprising, then, that in the several years following
the decision in Los Angeles Lumber, the Supreme Court and lower
courts applied the absolute priority rule to chapter X (corporate
reorganizations),200 chapter XI (arrangements),201 chapter XII (real
property arrangements for persons other than corporations),202
and section 77 of the Railroad Reorganization Act.203 The Court
in Los Angeles Lumber held that the absolute priority rule was
“firmly embedded” in the “fair and equitable” requirement for
plan confirmation in section 77B.204 It followed that the rule
would apply to chapters X through XII of the Chandler Act and to
the Railroad Reorganization Act of 1934, because those chapters
also expressly required a plan to be “fair and equitable” for it to
be confirmed.205
Id. §§ 221(2), 366(3), 472(3), 656.
Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 657, § 83(e), 50 Stat. Ann. 653, 655 (1937);
Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 438, § 83(e), 54 Stat. 667, 669 (1940); Bankruptcy
Act of 1898, ch. 434, Pub. Law No. 77-622, § 84, 56 Stat. 377 (1942); Bankruptcy
Act of 1898, ch. 532, § 83(e), 60 Stat. 409, 410 (1946). As noted above, the absolute priority rule was never applied in chapter 9 cases.
199 Railroad Reorganization Act of 1935, ch. 774, § 77B(e), 49 Stat. 911 (1935).
200 See, e.g., Marine Harbor Props. v. Mft.’s Tr. Co., 317 U.S. 78, 86–87 (referring to the “full priority rule” of Boyd and Los Angeles Lumber), aff’g 125
F.2d 296, 298 (2nd Cir. 1942).
201 SEC v. U.S. Realty & Improvement Co., 310 U.S. 434, 452 (1940) (“‘Fair
and equitable,’ taken from § 77B and made the condition of confirmation under
both Chapter X or Chapter XI are ‘words of art’ having a well understood meaning
in reorganizations in equitable receiverships and under § 77B which is incorporated in the structure of both Chapters X and XI.”).
202 See, e.g., In re Hamburger, 117 F.2d 932, 936 (6th Cir. 1941).
203 Grp. of Institutional Inv’rs v. Chi., M., St. P. & Pac. R.R. Co., 318 U.S.
523, 541–42 (1943).
204 Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106, 118–19 (1939).
The Supreme Court decided Los Angeles Lumber after the 1938 effective date
of the Chandler Act, but because the case was filed prior to that effective date,
section 77B applied. Id. at 119–20 n.14; Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 424,
§ 77B(f), 48 Stat. 911, 919 (1934).
205 Chandler Act of 1938, §§ 221(2), 366(3), 472(3), 52 Stat. 840, 897, 911, 923
(1938); Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 424, sec. 77B(f), § 1, 48 Stat. 911, 918–19 (1934).
197
198
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In chapter XIII (wage earners’ plans), the Los Angeles Lumber
interpretation of “fair and equitable” as “words of art” requiring
absolute distributional priority does not appear to have been considered in any published decision. The closest an opinion came to
considering the issue was Justice Owen Roberts’s dissent in a 5–3
decision in the chapter XI case of Securities and Exchange Commission v. United States Realty & Improvement Company.206 Roberts
suggested in dissent that the wholesale application of those words
of art to a chapter XIII (wage earners’ plans) case might not be an
appropriate reading of the Chandler Act.207 In chapter IX (for municipalities), the courts declined to interpret “fair” and “equitable”
to mean absolute priority with respect to confirmation of the municipality’s plan.208 The Supreme Court asked not whether the
plan satisfied the absolute priority rule, but whether the “plan in
its practical incidence embodie[d] a fair and equitable bargain
openly arrived at and devoid of overreaching, however subtle.”209
U.S. Realty, 310 U.S. at 461–69 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
Id. at 467. (“The short answer is that the phrase is used not only in chapter XI and chapter X but also in chapter XII respecting real property arrangements, and in chapter XIII respecting wage earners’ plans. Obviously the
phrase as used in the Chandler Act must be given the connotation appropriate
to the section in which it is used.”).
208 Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 657, sec. 83(e), 50 Stat. 653, 658 (1937);
Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 438, § 83(e), 54 Stat. 667, 669 (1940); Bankruptcy
Act of 1898, ch. 532, § 83(3), 60 Stat. 409, 414 (1946); see also Bankruptcy Act
of 1898, ch. 434, § 84, 56 Stat. 377 (1942).
209 Am. United Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. City of Avon Park, 311 U.S. 138, 146
(1940). The Court in City of Avon Park wasted no ink trying to reconcile its
interpretation of “fair and equitable” in that case with its reading of the same
words in Los Angeles Lumber, likely for two reasons. See generally id. First, a
court cannot force a municipality, as a subdivision of a sovereign state, to sell
its assets. Second, a municipality has no stockholders or other owners of equity
whose interests are junior to creditors. Today’s commentators follow this view,
noting that in “a municipal debt adjustment case the strict fair and equitable
rule of corporate reorganizations cannot be applied without some adjustments.”
6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 943.03(1)(f)(i)(A) (Alan N. Resnick & Sommer eds.,
16th ed., 1941). One adjustment is that the “fair and equitable rule” does not
prevent a municipality from retaining its property and continuing to operate,
even if the plan does not provide for payment in full to creditors. Id. But, the
City of Avon Park opinion frustratingly said nothing of any of this. See generally 311 U.S. 138, 1940.
206
207
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Circuit court decisions required a finding that the payments under
the plan were all that the municipality was “reasonably able to pay
in the circumstances.”210 The express statutory term “fair and equitable” simply did not mean absolute and full priority in chapter IX.
E. 1952—Congress Removes the Absolute Priority Rule from
Chapters XI, XII, and XIII of the Bankruptcy Act
In 1952, Congress cut back the absolute priority rule, little more
than a decade after Los Angeles Lumber.211 Congress used a sharp
knife, deleting the term “fair and equitable” from the plan confirmation requirements for chapter XI (arrangements),212 chapter
XII (real property arrangements for persons other than corporations),213 and chapter XIII (wage earners’ plans)214 of the Act. To
make matters clear, Congress further amended each chapter to
state expressly that plan confirmation “shall not be refused solely
because the interest of a debtor,”215 or if “the debtor is a corporation,
the interests of its stockholders or members will be preserved under
the arrangement.”216
Lorber v. Vista Irrigation Dist., 143 F.2d 282, 283 (9th Cir. 1944); see
also Lorber v. Vista Irrigation Dist., 127 F.2d 628, 639 (9th Cir. 1942) (citing
West Coast Life Ins. Co. v. Merced Irrigation Dist., 114 F.2d 654 (9th Cir.
1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 718 (1941)); Moody v. James Irrigation Dist., 114
F.2d 685, 689 (9th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 693 (1941); Bekins v. LindsayStrathmore Irrigation Dist., 114 F.2d 680, 685 (9th Cir. 1940); Jordan v. Palo
Verde Irrigation Dist., 114 F.2d 691 (9th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 693
(1941); COLLIER, supra note 209, ¶ 943.03(f)(1)(A).
211 Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106, 117 (1939).
212 Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 579, sec. 366, § 35, 66 Stat. 420, 433 (1952)
(amending § 366 of the Chandler Act by removing the requirement that an
“Arrangement” under Chapter XI be “fair and equitable”) [hereinafter 1952
Amendments].
213 1952 Amendments, sec. 472, § 43, 66 Stat. at 435 (amending section 472
of the Chandler Act by removing the requirement that a “Real Property Arrangement” under Chapter XII be “fair and equitable”).
214 1952 Amendments, sec. 656, § 50, 66 Stat. at 437 (amending section
656(a) of the Chandler Act by removing the requirement that a “Wage Earners’
Plan” under Chapter XIII be “fair and equitable”).
215 1952 Amendments, sec. 366, § 35, 66 Stat. at 437; see id. at sec. 472, § 43,
66 Stat. at 433.
216 1952 Amendments, sec. 366, § 35, 66 Stat. at 433 (applying only in chapter XI, because chapters XII and XIII were not applicable to corporations).
210
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The contraction of the absolute priority rule that the 1952 amendments accomplished was no accident. Critics of the rule asserted
that it was pointlessly impractical.217 The amendment was advisable, as was noted in the Senate Report, because the “fair and
equitable rule” as reaffirmed in Los Angeles Lumber could not be
applied in a chapter XI, XII, or XIII proceeding “without impairing, if not entirely making valueless, the relief provided” by those
chapters.218 The House Report similarly stated it was not “practicable or realistic to apply the rule in a proceeding under chapter
XI, XII, or XIII,” and that the “proposed amendment is designed
to remove the fair and equitable provision” and make “clear that
the rule of the Boyd and Los Angeles cases shall not be operative
under those three chapters.”219 Following the 1952 amendments,
the absolute priority rule applied only to corporate reorganization
plans in chapter X and to railroad reorganization plans under the
Railroad Reorganization Act.220
F. 1978—Congress Enacts the Code and Removes the Absolute
Priority Rule from the Requirements for Confirmation of a
Consensual Chapter 11 Plan
The 1970s witnessed a material reevaluation of U.S. bankruptcy
law. In 1970, Congress created the Commission on the Bankruptcy
Laws of the United States to reconsider the law.221 The Commission recommended a comprehensive revision of the bankruptcy
217 See, e.g., Note, Absolute Priority under Chapter X—A Rule of Law or a
Familiar Quotation, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 900, 921 (1952) (arguing absolute priority, as stated by the Supreme Court, left “no room for the by-play of equitable
factors”). It closed the door on the “pragmatic approach,” and “therein [lay] its
weakness. A rule of law which fails to recognize the uniqueness of each case
and the sense of justice of he who administers it, though universally reiterated,
is bound to be honored in the breach rather than in the observance.” Id.
218 S. REP. NO. 1395, at 11 (1952).
219 H.R. REP. NO. 2320, ¶ 43, at 21 (1952).
220 Chandler Act, ch. 575, sec. 221, 52 Stat. 840, 897–98 (1938); Railroad
Reorganization Act of 1935, ch. 774, sec. 77(e), 49 Stat. 911, 918 (1935). Junior
creditors and interest holders in chapters XI, XII, and XIII were protected by
the requirement, that the plan provide at least as much to creditors as they
would have received in a liquidation, i.e., the “best interests of creditors” test.
See Ralph A. Peeples, Staying In: Chapter 11, Close Corporations and the Absolute Priority Rule, 63 AM. BANKR. L.J. 65, 67–68 (1989).
221 S.J. Res. 88, 91st Cong., 84 Stat. 468 (1970).
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system in its 1973 report to Congress,222 including combining
chapters X, XI, and XII into a single, new business reorganization
chapter and a “more flexible” absolute priority rule.223
The Commission spelled out in detail its view of the deficiencies of the absolute priority rule. Criticisms included that the rule
did “not work well on a practical level,” it often led to “a large
amount of useless litigation,” and served “only to prevent reasonable compromises and to wipe out the interest of shareholders.”224
Absolute priority seemed to the Commission “to leave no room for
the by-play of equitable factors. It close[d] the door on the ‘pragmatic approach’—therein [lay] its weakness.”225
The decision in Los Angeles Lumber had rigidly required satisfaction of the absolute priority rule even for a consensual plan
that all classes had approved.226 Indeed, the Supreme Court in
Los Angeles Lumber had reversed confirmation of a reorganization
plan that 90 percent or more in each class, including 100 percent
of unsecured creditors, had voted to accept.227
The Commission recommended a new rule by which a trustee
could obtain confirmation of a consensual plan, such as the one in
Los Angeles Lumber, even if the plan did not comply with the absolute priority rule.228 If no publicly held securities were affected,
and the court found that the plan had been “knowingly and voluntarily accepted by all the creditors and equity security holders
materially and adversely affected by it after full disclosure,” then
no finding of valuation as a basis for applying the fairness doctrine
would be required.229 This modification would permit “the continuation of negotiated settlements by the debtor with small groups
of creditors,” as under chapter XI at the time.230 By these changes,
EXEC. DIR. OF THE COMM’N ON THE BANKR. LAWS OF THE U.S., REPORT OF
THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. DOC.
NO. 93-137 (1973) (Pts. I, II) [hereinafter 1973 BANKRUPTCY COMMISSION REPORT].
222

See Note, The Proposed Bankruptcy Act: Changes in the Absolute Priority Rule
for Corporate Reorganizations, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1786, 1786 n.1 (1974).
223 1973 BANKRUPTCY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 222, pt. I, at 248.
224 Id. pt. I, at 256.
225 Id. pt. I, at 256, 258.
226 In re Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 24 F. Supp. 501, 511 (S.D. Cal. 1938).
227 Id. at 507.
228 1973 BANKRUPTCY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 222, pt. I, at 257.
229 Id. pt. II, at 252.
230 Id. pt. I, at 258; see also id. pt. II, at 252.
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the “fairness test” would be “made more flexible and the so-called
‘absolute priority’ doctrine” would be “substantially modified.”231
Congress recognized that evolution in the capital structures of
companies also supported changing the Los Angeles Lumber rule.
The House Report accompanying the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978
noted that when Congress enacted the Chandler Act in 1938, most
public investors in bankrupt companies held unsecured claims in
the form of debentures in “corporations [that] were more often
privately held.”232 In that setting, “the absolute priority rule protected debenture holders from an erosion of their position in favor
of equity holders.”233 By the 1970s, if there were public security
holders in a bankruptcy case, they likely held either subordinated
debentures or shares.234 Thus, in chapter X, the application of the
absolute priority rule had lead “to the exclusion, rather than the
protection, of the public.”235 A House amendment permitted confirmation of a plan with respect to “a particular class without resort
to the fair and equitable test if the class ha[d] accepted or [was]
unimpaired under the plan.”236 A dissenting member of the class
would be protected not by the absolute priority rule, but instead
by the best interest of creditors test, by which the distribution under
the plan to a dissenter in the accepting class would need to be at
least as much as the dissenter would receive in a liquidation.237
231 Id. pt. I, at 258; see also id. pt. II, at 252 (“[I]f the court finds that the
plan has been knowingly and voluntarily accepted by all creditors and equity
security holders materially and adversely affected by it after full disclosure,”
then “the court need not make the findings” that the plan is fair and equitable.).
232 H.R. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, BANKRUPTCY LAW REVISION, H.R. REP.
NO. 95-595, at 222 (1983).
233 Id., as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6468. The First Circuit in
In re Continental Mortg. Investors noted concerns with the distinctions between chapter XI, “intended primarily to protect the rights of trade creditors,”
to which the absolute priority rule did not apply after the 1952 Amendments,
and chapter X, “intended primarily for the protection of public investors,” to
which the absolute priority rule still applied after the 1952 Amendments. 578
F.2d 872, 879 (1st Cir. 1978) (citing Protective Comm. for Indep. Stockholders
of TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc. v. Anderson, 390 U.S. 414, 441–44; SEC v. Am.
Trailer Rentals Co., 379 U.S. 594 (1965)).
234 H.R. REP. NO. 95-595 at 261, as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6468.
235 Id.
236 Id. at 6436.
237 Id. at 6473.

2017]

STRUCTURED DISMISSALS

479

The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 embraced the Commission’s recommendations by requiring the court to confirm a consensual plan that did not provide for distributions in accordance
with the absolute priority rule.238 Moreover, Congress adopted the
House amendment under which the absolute priority rule would
no longer apply to dissenters in an accepting class.239 Congress in
1978 thus rolled back two more aspects of the rule stated in Los
Angeles Lumber. Thereafter: (1) a consensual plan accepted by
majorities in all impaired classes was confirmable even if it did
not satisfy the absolute priority rule; and (2) dissenters in an accepting class of any plan, whether consensual or cramdown, were
not entitled to absolute priority.240
G. 1986 and 2005—Congress Rolls Back the Absolute Priority Rule
with Respect to Certain Family-Owned Businesses
Congress further reduced the reach of the rule in 1986 by enacting chapter 12.241 Prior to enactment of chapter 12, the absolute priority rule presented a formidable obstacle to bankrupt
family farmers retaining their farms.242 The problem posed was
simply that the family farmers’ ownership interest in the farm, or
ownership of stock in the farm if the business was held and operated
in corporate form, was junior to the senior interests of creditors. 243
Under the absolute priority rule, the debtors would need to pay
all creditors in full if they were to continue to own their farm.244
238 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 1129(a), (b) (1978),
92 Stat. 2549, 2635–36 (1978).
239 Id. § 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii).
240 Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106, 114 (1939). The
1977 House Report stated that an “important difference” from the rule in chapter X was that the new bill “permits senior classes to take less than full payment, in order to expedite or insure the success of the reorganization.” H.R.
REP. NO. 95-595 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6184.
241 Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986, ch. 12, Pub. L. No. 99-554, 100 Stat. 3088.
242 H.R. CONFERENCE REPORT, BANKRUPTCY JUDGES, UNITED STATES TRUSTEES,
AND FAMILY FARMER BANKRUPTCY ACT OF 1986, H.R. REP. No. 99-958, at 48–50
(1986) (Conf. Rep.).
243 Id.
244 Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 202 (1988), rev’g In re
Ahlers, 794 F.2d 388 (8th Cir. 1986). Ahlers is most often cited for the principle
that sweat equity is not new value for the purpose of a new value exception to
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The Supreme Court in Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers
confronted the issue in 1988, in a case filed by family farmers under
chapter 11, prior to enactment of the new chapter 12.245 The Ahlers
court unequivocally concluded that in chapter 11 there was “little
doubt that a reorganization plan in which respondents retain[ed]
an equity interest in the farm [was] contrary to the absolute priority rule.”246
Under the new chapter 12, compliance with the absolute priority
rule was not required.247 A plan was confirmable even over objections if it satisfied the best interest of creditors test, i.e., a creditor
would receive at least what it would have received in a chapter 7
liquidation, if the plan provided for the payment of the debtor’s
disposable income to creditors over the 3-year (or longer) term of
the plan.248 The debtor farmers could keep their farm even if the
plan did not pay unsecured creditors in full.249 The Bankruptcy
Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005250 made
chapter 12 applicable on the same terms to certain family-owned
commercial fishing operations.251
the absolute priority rule. The new value exception (though it has never been
unequivocally embraced by the Supreme Court), permits confirmation of a cramdown plan under which the debtor retains its equity ownership in exchange for
new value notwithstanding that creditors are not paid in full. The Eighth Circuit had held that “a farmer’s efforts in operating and managing his farm,” i.e.,
his sweat equity, was new value. In re Ahlers, 794 F.2d 388, 399, 402 (8th Cir.
1986). The Supreme Court disagreed and reversed, noting that Congress must also
have agreed with its analysis, else Congress would not have recently passed the
new chapter 12. See Norwest Bank Worthington, 485 U.S. at 202.
245 Norwest Bank Worthington, 485 U.S. at 198.
246 Id. at 202.
247 See 11 U.S.C. § 1225 (2012).
248 See Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family Farmer
Bankruptcy Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-554, sec. 255, § 1225, 100 Stat. 3090, 3105 (1986)
(inserting the new chapter 12). See chapter 12 provisions section 1225(a)(4),
the best interest of creditors requirement, and section 1225(b)(1)(B), the disposable income requirement.
249 Id. § 1228(b)–(c).
250 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005,
Pub. L. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23, 109th Cong. (2005) (“BAPCPA”).
251 See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005,
Pub. L. 109-8, § 1007, 119 Stat. 23, 187–88 (2005) (“BAPCPA”) (amending the
Code to include 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(19A), 109(f)).
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H. Summary—Congress Persistently and Severely Has Contracted
the Absolute Priority Rule Since Its Judicial Expansion in Los
Angeles Lumber
The Supreme Court made three material determinations construing section 77B in Los Angeles Lumber: first, “fair and equitable”
meant “full or absolute priority” in a bankruptcy plan;252 second,
the rule applied to reorganization plans, whether consensual such
as the plan before the court in Los Angeles Lumber, or otherwise;253
and third, the rule applied to each creditor.254 Subsequent decisions
in the dozen years after Los Angeles Lumber extended the rule beyond corporate reorganizations, to several chapters of the Chandler
Act which expressly required plans to be “fair and equitable.”255
Congress over the last sixty years steadily and severely has
limited the reach of the Los Angeles Lumber rule.256 In 1952, it
rolled back the requirement of absolute priority for plans under
chapters XI (arrangements) and XII (real estate arrangements), to
which the courts had extended it.257 Congress by the same enactment also expressly made the rule inapplicable in chapter XIII (wage
earners’ plans).258 By so doing, Congress sharply contracted the
reach of the first determination made by the Court in Los Angeles
Lumber, i.e., that the “absolute or full priority” doctrine extended
to all bankruptcy plans by virtue of the statutory requirement that
a plan be “fair and equitable.”259 The years leading to the Code’s
enactment in 1978 witnessed further criticisms of the rule, including
from the Commission authorized by Congress to recommend changes
to U.S. bankruptcy law.260 Congress in the 1978 Code made the
rule inapplicable to the confirmation of a consensual plan and to dissenting creditors in an accepting class, even in a cramdown plan,
Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106, 118, 122 (1939).
Id. at 106, 107, 115.
254 Id.
255 See Chandler Act of 1938, ch. 575, § 48, 52 Stat. 840, 863 (1938).
256 See Bankruptcy Act, 1958 Amendments, Pub. L. 456, 66 Stat. 420, 421,
437–38 (1958).
257 Id. § 2(c).
258 Id. § 54.
259 Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106, 118, 122 (1939).
260 See generally 1973 BANKRUPTCY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 222.
252
253
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completely negating the second and third determinations made by
the Court in Los Angeles Lumber.261 Finally, in 1986 and then in
2005, Congress reduced the applicability of the absolute priority
rule again, excluding certain family businesses from its reach.262
The absolute priority rule did not erode from creative lawyering against a stony legislative decree or a judiciary who side stepped
the rule to achieve expedient outcomes. Rather, Congress chiseled
away the rule over time to enable positive resolutions of failed
businesses and individuals that did not require application of the
absolute priority rule, yet were in the best interest of creditors.
III. THE RESULTING LIMITED TEXTUAL REACH OF THE ABSOLUTE
PRIORITY RULE UNDER THE CODE
The absolute priority rule requires that senior claims are paid
in full before junior claims receive anything, that junior claims
are paid in full before equity holders receive anything, and that
senior equity holders (such as preferred shareholders) are paid in
full before junior equity holders (such as common shareholders)
receive anything.263
Some commentators have called the absolute priority rule “the
cornerstone of reorganization practice and theory.”264 Others have
described it as “central” to chapter 11 under the Code 265 and to
the “bankruptcy bargain.”266 Yet the reach of the absolute priority
See 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (2012). Indeed, the plan in Los Angeles Lumber would
have been confirmed under the Code, because it was a consensual plan. See Los
Angeles Lumber, 308 U.S. at 109–10. Other statutory requirements for consensual
plan confirmation continued to apply under the Code, in particular the “best interest
of creditors test” of section 1129(a)(7) pursuant to which each dissenter must receive
under the plan at least what it would receive in chapter 7. See § 1129(a)(7).
262 See Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family Farmer
Bankruptcy Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-554, sec. 255, § 1225, 100 Stat. 3090, 3110–11
(1986); Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005,
Pub. L. 109-8, sec. 101, § 1007, 119 Stat. 23, 187–88 (2005).
263 See § 1129(b).
264 Bruce A. Markell, Owners, Auctions, and Absolute Priority in Bankruptcy
Reorganizations, 44 STAN. L. REV. 69, 123 (1991).
265 DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, ELEMENTS OF BANKRUPTCY 57 (6th ed. 2014).
266 Elizabeth Warren, A Theory of Absolute Priority, 1991 ANN. SURV. AM. L.
9, 11 (1992).
261
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rule under the current Code is surprisingly limited. The absolute
priority rule does not pervade chapter 11 or the other chapters of
the Code to the extent that many suggest.
The text of the Code does not expressly require absolute priority
with respect to all distributions in, or resolutions of, a bankruptcy
case. Rather, the Code expressly limits the rule to two circumstances: (1) distributions to unsecured creditors and equity holders in a chapter 7 liquidation case, and (2) distributions to the
holder of claims in a voting class that has rejected a chapter 11
cramdown plan.267
In chapter 11, the current Code does not require absolute priority for confirmation of a consensual plan.268 For confirmation of
a cramdown plan, the rule applies only to the holders of claims or
interests in a rejecting class of claims or interests.269
Compliance with the rule is not required for the confirmation
of plans under other chapters of the Code. Specifically, the rule does
not apply in chapter 9 (adjustment of debts of a municipality),270
chapter 12 (for family farmers and family fishermen),271 chapter 13
(for individuals with regular income)272 or chapter 15 (for crossborder cases).273 An analysis of the current Code’s text on a chapterby-chapter basis follows.
See generally §§ 701–84, 1129.
See § 1129(a). If all classes of claims and interests have accepted the plan
under § 1129(a)(8), the absolute priority rule in § 1129(b) does not apply.
§ 1129(a)(8). A plan must pay priority claims in full under § 1129(a), but even
a dissenter in an accepting class of priority claims can be required to take deferred payments, rather than payment in full on the effective date of the plan,
while the plan pays junior claims and interests in full on the effective date.
§ 1129(a)(9)(B)(i). “Under the 1978 Bankruptcy Code, consent can be given
through a classwide vote of creditors.” Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson,
Bargaining After the Fall and the Contours of the Absolute Priority Rule, 55 U.
CHI. L. REV. 738, 738 (1988) (“A single uncompromising creditor’s objection is
not sufficient to prevent the participation of shareholders.”).
269 See § 1129(a)(9).
270 § 943.
271 § 1225.
272 § 1325.
273 See generally §§ 1501–32 (demonstrating that nothing in chapter 15 authorizes a United States bankruptcy court to impose the absolute priority rule
on distributions).
267
268
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A. Chapter 7 (Liquidation)274—The Absolute Priority Rule Applies
The absolute priority rule applies, first, in chapter 7 liquidation.275 Both individuals and most business organizations such as
corporations are eligible to be a debtor in chapter 7.276
Decisions and commentators often cite section 507 as the basis
for the absolute priority rule, but the rule is not there. Section 507
merely defines ten priorities of unsecured claims, in descending
order of seniority and subordination from “first” to “tenth.”277 Section 507 says nothing of secured claims.278 It also does not direct
distributions to the holders of the listed unsecured priority
claims.279 Section 507 does not refer at all to general unsecured
claims or equity, and similarly says nothing of the place of those
more substantial and numerous claims and interests in the distribution scheme applicable in chapter 7.280
Rather, the distributional rules for chapter 7 begin with the
state law and other nonbankruptcy law that determine liens and
other interests in a debtor’s property and the recognition in decisional law that such liens and interests generally remain in effect
after the bankruptcy case has been filed.281 That rule is subject to
274 Code chapters 7, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 15, discussed below, contain the Code
provisions for six different types of bankruptcy cases. See §§ 701–1532. The
reference, “Liquidation,” is the Code chapter heading for chapter 7. See id. The
chapter headings for the other these six chapters are: “Chapter 9—Adjustment of Debts of a Municipality”; “Chapter 11—Reorganization”; “Chapter 12—
Adjustment of Debts of a Family Farmer or Fisherman with a Regular Annual
Income”; “Chapter 13—Adjustment of Debts of an Individual with Regular Income”; and “Chapter 15—Ancillary and Other Cross-Border Cases.” Id.
275 See § 726(a).
276 § 109(b). Notable exceptions are railroads, which are eligible to be debtors
only under chapter 11, and insurance companies, banks, and certain other financial institutions, which are subject to resolution under other federal and/or
state insolvency laws. Id.
277 See § 507.
278 See id.
279 See id.
280 Id.
281 “Property interests are created and defined by state law” in a bankruptcy
case, under the Supreme Court’s holding in Butner v. United States. 440 U.S. 48,
54–55 (1979) (1898 Act case). State law establishes the extent, validity, and priority
of liens and other interests in a debtor’s property. Id. State law recordation
acts, and related real property and contract law (such as that applicable to
subordination agreements) determine which lien or other encumbrance has
priority and which is subordinate. Id. Butner makes clear that the holder of a
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Code section 506 that provides that a secured claim is not allowed
beyond the value of the collateral securing it.282 Beyond this principle, the rules for payment to holders of unsecured claims and equity
holders in chapter 7 are set forth in Code section 726.283 The resulting
distributional rules, in order of descending priority, are as follows:
x

x

x
x

First, a secured creditor is entitled to receive the value
of its collateral, up to the amount of its claim secured
by that collateral. If the secured creditor is undersecured, i.e., the value of its collateral is less than the
amount of its claim, then the amount of the claim in
excess of the value of its collateral becomes a general
unsecured claim pursuant to Code section 506(b).284
Second, if value remains in the debtor’s estate, priority unsecured claims in chapter 7 are paid “in the
order specified in” section 507(a), such that holders
of claims in each tranche are paid in full prior to any
payment to the holders of claims in the next junior
tranche or priority unsecured claims.285
Third, if value remains in the debtor’s estate, general unsecured claims are paid.286
Finally, after all claims referred to in the prior paragraphs are fully paid, the remaining value is paid
to the debtor.287

prepetition lien should be “afforded in federal bankruptcy court the same protection he would have under state law had no bankruptcy ensued.” Id. at 49,
54–56. The secured creditor must perfect its lien under state law, such as by
filing a mortgage or financing statement or by obtaining a judgment lien. See
Nobelman v. Am. Sav. Bank, 113 S. Ct. 2106, 2109 (1993) (1978 Code case,
following Butner). If the lien is not perfected it will be subject to avoidance under
Code section 544. See § 544.
282 See § 506(a).
283 See generally § 726.
284 See § 506(a).
285 § 726(a)(1). When the music stops and the estate has insufficient value
with which to pay in full a tranche of priority claims, or to pay in full the
tranche of general unsecured claims after priority claims have been paid in
full, the remaining value is distributed to the holders in that tranche on a pro
rata basis. § 726(b).
286 § 726(a)(2).
287 § 726(a)(6).
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The chapter 7 distributional rules, as pure as they are, do not
extend to chapter 11 or to any other chapters of the Code. Code
section 103(b) makes this clear.288 Section 726 is part of subchapter II of chapter 7 of the Code.289 Section 103(b) unequivocally
states that the provisions of subchapter II of chapter 7 apply only
in chapter 7.290
B. Chapter 9 (Adjustment of Debts of a Municipality)—The
Absolute Priority Rule Does Not Apply
Chapter 9 applies to an insolvent municipality that “desires to
effect a plan to adjust” its debts.291 Chapter 9 presents a peculiar
situation and its text is frustratingly unclear.292
Though chapter 9 incorporates section 1129(b) and thus the
requirement that a cramdown plan be “fair and equitable,”293
chapter 9 does not require absolute distributional priority, for two
reasons. One is textual, and the other relates to the special nature
of a municipality.
First, chapter 9 does not require distributions to unsecured
creditors per the priorities listed in section 507(a).294 None of
those priorities listed other than administrative expense claims,
which are a second priority claim under section 507(a)(2), apply
in chapter 9 cases.295 The other priorities of section 507(a) simply
do not apply to chapter 9.296 At least two of those priorities—the
fourth regarding wages and salaries payable to employees, and the
§ 103(b).
See generally § 726.
290 § 103(b).
291 § 109(c)(4). Specifically, § 109(c) makes §§ 1129(a)(2), 1129(a)(3), 1129(a)(6),
1129(a)(8), 1129(a)(10), 1129(b)(1), 1129(b)(2)(A), and 1129(b)(2)(B) (and a number
of other sections that are not part of section 1129) applicable in a chapter 9
case. See also In re Stephens, 704 F.3d 1279, 1287 (10th Cir. 2013) (holding
that absent clear indication, amendments to the Bankruptcy Code do not impliedly exempt debtors from absolute priority rule).
292 See §§ 901–46.
293 § 901(a). Code section 103(f) states that, except as provided in section
901, only the provisions of chapter 1 (general provisions) and chapter 9 (adjustment of debts of a municipality) apply in a chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy
case. § 103(f).
294 § 901(a).
295 Id.
296 See id.
288
289
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fifth, regarding contributions to an employee benefit plan—would
have clear application in chapter 9 and to a cramdown plan proposed in the case but for the exclusionary text of section 901(a).297
The requirements for chapter 9 plan confirmation set forth in
section 943(b) are consistent with this analysis. Under section
943(b)(5), the plan must provide only for payment of section
507(a)(2) administrative expense claims.298 Chapter 9 imposes no
obligation on the municipal debtor to adhere to the absolute priority rule with respect to any other priority unsecured claims set
forth in of section 507(a).299
Second, a municipality has no stockholders or other owners who
would be subject to the absolute priority rule. Thus, by case law in
a municipal debt adjustment case, the “fair and equitable” requirement does not prevent the municipality from retaining its property and continuing to operate even if the plan does not provide for
full payment to creditors.300 A chapter 9 plan must only pay creditors
“all that they ‘can reasonably expect in the circumstances.’”301
The bankruptcy court in In re City of Detroit recently stated
the rule: “because municipalities have no junior class of shareholders, the absolute priority rule provides unsecured creditors with
no protection.”302 Instead, the plan must embody “a fair and equitable bargain openly arrived at and devoid of overreaching, however subtle.”303 The court in City of Detroit found that no viable
alternatives to the plan would solve the City’s problems and at the
same time pay more to the dissenting creditors.304 The cramdown
plan thus was “fair and equitable,” and the court confirmed it.305
See § 507(a)(4) (on wage claims); § 507(a)(5) (on employee benefit contribution claims); see also § 507(a)(8) (unsecured claims of governmental units).
298 § 943(b)(5).
299 See §§ 901(a), 943(b)(5).
300 COLLIER, supra note 209, ¶ 943.03(1)(f)(i)(A).
301 Id. ¶ 943.03(1)(f)(i)(B) (citing Lorber v. Vista Irrigation Dist., 127 F.2d
628, 639 (9th Cir. 1942)).
302 In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. 147, 260 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2014) (citing
In re Corcoran Hosp. Dist., 233 B.R. 449, 458 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1999)).
303 Id. at 210 (citing Am. United Mut. Life Insur. Co. v. City of Avon Park,
311 U.S. 138, 145–46 (1940)).
304 Id. at 262.
305 Id.
297
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In sum, confirmation of a chapter 9 plan does not require compliance with the absolute priority rule.306 Only the second priority
listed in section 507 (for administrative expense claims) applies
at all. And though the Code’s text requires the plan to be “fair and
equitable,” decisional law construes that term in chapter 9 to
mean an equitable process by which the bankruptcy court weighs
the benefits of confirmation to the citizenry and the creditor body
as a whole against the harm to dissenting creditors.
C. Chapter 11 (Reorganization)—The Absolute Priority Rule
Applies to Holders in Dissenting Class in a Cramdown Plan; The
Absolute Priority Rule Does Not Apply to Consensual Plans or to
Dissenters in Any Accepting Class; The Best Interest of Creditors
Test Protects Dissenters
Chapter 11 does not contain a provision corresponding to section 726.307 No section in chapter 11 requires distributions in a
chapter 11 case to accord with the priorities set forth in section
507 in all cases. Instead, the absolute priority rule applies only to
a cramdown plan and then only to the holders of claims in a voting
class that has rejected a plan.308
The proponent of the chapter 11 plan (most often the debtor in
possession) designates the classes of claims and interests in the
proposed plan.309 Voting for or against the plan is by class.310 A
class of claims generally accepts the plan if “at least two-thirds in
amount and more than one-half in number of the allowed claims
of such class held by creditors ... have accepted or rejected such
plan.”311 A class of interests, i.e., equity holders, generally accepts
See 11 U.S.C. § 901(a) (2012); see also § 943(b)(5); City of Detroit, 524
B.R. at 260 (citing Corcoran, 233 B.R. at 458).
307 §§ 1101–74.
308 § 1129(a)–(b).
309 § 1123(a)(1). The debtor in possession or other party in interest that proposes the plan has some leeway in classifying claims and interests under the
proposed plan, subject to section 1122. That section provides generally that “a
plan may place a claim or an interest in a particular class only if such claim or
interest is substantially similar to the other claims or interests of such class.”
§ 1122(a).
310 See § 1126(c)–(d).
311 § 1126(c).
306
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the plan if “such plan has been accepted by holders of such interests ... that hold at least two-thirds in amount of the allowed interests of such class held by holders of such interests ... that have
accepted or rejected such plan.”312
A “cramdown” plan in chapter 11 is a plan that one or more
impaired classes of claims voted to reject, but that at least one
impaired class of claims voted to accept.313 A “consensual” plan is
a plan that all impaired classes of claims and interests have voted to
accept.314 Both cramdown plans and consensual plans are confirmable by the bankruptcy court in a chapter 11 case.315 The primary difference is that a cramdown plan is confirmable only if the
plan follows the absolute priority rule with respect to each holder
in the dissenting class or classes.316 The absolute priority rule does
not apply, though, to the holders of claims in a consensual plan, or to
the dissenters in a voting class that has accepted a cramdown plan.317
1. The Absolute Priority Rule Applies to Holders in a Dissenting
Class in a Cramdown Plan
The absolute priority rule applies in chapter 11 only to a cramdown plan. The court may confirm a cramdown plan notwithstanding
the negative vote of a dissenting class, but only if the plan satisfies the absolute priority rule with respect to the holders in the
dissenting class.318
The rule in chapter 11 applies only to the holders of claims and
interests in a class that has voted against the plan, as follows:
x

With respect to a class of secured claims, the plan
must provide that each holder within the class will

§ 1126(d).
§ 1129(a)(10), (b).
314 § 1129(a)(8). A claim or interest generally is “impaired” unless it “leaves
unaltered the legal, equitable, and contractual rights to which such claim or
interest entitles the holder of such claim or interest,” i.e., an “impaired” class
of claims or interests essentially is a class the members of which will receive
less than they would be entitled to outside of the bankruptcy. § 1124(1). If, for
example, each of the holders in a class of unsecured creditors will be paid 7
percent rather than 100 percent of its allowed claim, then the class is impaired.
315 § 1129(a)(1)–(9), (11)–(16).
316 § 1129(b)(1).
317 § 1129(a)–(b).
318 § 1129(b)(1).
312
313
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x

x

receive the equivalent of its allowed secured claim,
i.e., the value of its collateral up to the amount of its
claim;319
With respect to a class of unsecured claims, the plan
must provide that each holder within the class will
receive or retain value on the plan effective date equal
to the allowed amount of such claim, or the holder of
a junior claim or interest will receive nothing under
the plan;320 and
With respect to a class of interests (i.e., shares or
other equity), the plan must provide that each holder
will receive the liquidation, redemption or actual value
of such interest, or the holder of a junior interest will
receive nothing under the plan.321

The gist of section 1129(b) as it applies to a cramdown plan is
the essence of the absolute priority rule. Unless each holder in the
senior rejecting class of, say, unsecured claims will receive the full
value of its claim under the plan, then the plan may not distribute
anything at all to any junior stakeholder on account of its claim
or interest.322 The rule applies to a cramdown plan even if all of
the other requirements for confirmation set forth in section
1129(a) have been satisfied.323 The simple reason is that the absolute priority rule set forth in section 1129(b) required for a
cramdown plan has not been satisfied.
2. The Absolute Priority Rule Does Not Apply to Consensual
Plans or to Dissenters in Any Accepting Class in a
Cramdown Plan
The absolute priority rule does not apply, though, to a consensual chapter 11 plan. Section 1129(b) expressly provides that the
absolute priority rule applies only if one or more impaired classes
§ 1129(b)(2)(A) (setting forth the various ways in which this may be accomplished under the plan).
320 § 1129(b)(2)(B).
321 § 1129(b)(2)(C).
322 See H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 413 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5963, 6370.
323 § 1129(b)(1).
319
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of claims or interests has voted against the plan, and thus the
plan fails to satisfy section 1129(a)(8).324 If all impaired classes of
claims and interests designated in the plan have voted to accept
under section 1129(a)(8), then the plan is a consensual plan and
section 1129(b) does not apply.325 The bankruptcy court “shall
confirm” a consensual plan that complies with the other requirements of section 1129(a), notwithstanding that it does not comply
with the absolute priority rule.326
Consider the following illustration. The Code provides that the
court shall confirm a consensual plan that pays pennies on the
dollar to the holders of classes of general unsecured claims and
gives all of the equity in the reorganized debtor to existing shareholders on account of their interests. If each voting class of claims
and interests has accepted the plan by the requisite majorities in
accordance with section 1129(a)(8), then the absolute priority rule
of section 1129(b) does not apply and the court shall confirm the
plan if it satisfies the other conditions of section 1129(a), even over
the dissenters’ votes and objections.
Even in a cramdown plan, the absolute priority rule only applies to the holders in the rejecting class.327 The requirement that
a cramdown plan must be “fair and equitable” by satisfying the
absolute priority rule applies only to “each class of claims or interests that is impaired under, and has not accepted, the plan.”328
The dissenters within any accepting class under a cramdown plan
may not avail themselves of the rule.
Consider a cramdown plan in which two classes of unsecured
claims are impaired and entitled to vote. One unsecured class has
accepted and the other unsecured class has rejected the plan. The
plan violates the absolute priority rule because it will pay pennies
on the dollar to the holders in each class of unsecured claims and the
shareholders in the old company will own the reorganized company.
The absolute priority rule applies, but only to the dissenting class,
§ 1129(a)(8), (b)(1).
Courts have split since the 2005 BAPCPA amendments regarding whether
the absolute priority rule applies to an individual’s chapter 11 plan. See In re
Maharaj, 681 F.3d 558, 563 (4th Cir. 2012). This question is beyond the scope
of this Article.
326 § 1129(a), (b)(1).
327 § 1129(b)(1).
328 Id. (emphasis added).
324
325
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because it “is impaired under, and has not accepted, the plan.”329
Section 1129(b) does not require compliance with the rule with
respect to holders in the accepting class, even if they dissented and
voted against the plan.
Moreover, even under the requirements for confirmation of a
chapter 11 plan, section 507 does not always apply. Under both a
consensual plan and a cramdown plan, the majority in a consenting class of section 507 priority unsecured employee wage or benefit plan claims, agricultural supplier claims, or consumer deposit
claims can bind dissenters within that class to accept deferred
payments.330 The court may confirm a plan even if it provides for
the deferral of payments to holders of priority claims in those classes
until after full payment of lower priority claims, and even after the
debtor has received its discharge and the court has closed the case.331
3. The Best Interest of Creditors Test Protects Dissenters in
Chapter 11
The limited reach of the absolute priority rule in chapter 11
does not mean that dissenting stakeholders are without protection. The “best interest of creditors” test, set forth in section
1129(a)(7), requires that each holder of a claim or interest that
has voted against the plan will receive at least as much as it
would receive if the debtor were liquidated under chapter 7. 332 If
Id. (emphasis added).
§ 507(a)(1), (4)–(7); § 1129(a)(9)(B); see TABB, supra note 96, at 733.
331 The bankruptcy court normally closes a chapter 11 case in which a plan
was confirmed by entry of a final decree under Rule 3022 once distributions
under the plan have commenced. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 3022 advisory comm.
n. (“[F]inal decree closing a chapter 11 case should not be delayed solely because the payments required by the plan have not been completed.”). Closing
a case after plan confirmation is not the same thing as dismissing the case
under section 1112, grounds for which include the failure to confirm or consummate a plan. § 1112(b)(4)(M) (emphasis added).
332 § 1129(a)(7)(A)–(B). The requirement of section 1129(a)(7)(A) is consistently referred to as the “best interest of creditors test,” though the Code does
not use that term. The designation predates the Code. See H.R. COMM. ON
JUDICIARY, Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 400 (1978),
as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6356; S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 126 (1978),
as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5913. The House Report in its sectionby-section analysis stated that section 1129(a)(7) “incorporates the former ‘best
interest of creditors’ test found in chapter 11, but spells out precisely what is
intended.” H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 412 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
329
330
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a dissenting creditor will receive less under the plan, then bankruptcy court may not confirm it.
In sum, the absolute priority rule is far from absolute in chapter 11. Chapter 11 does not require that distributions in chapter
11 must be made in accordance with the priorities listed in section
507 or otherwise must adhere to the absolute priority rule with
respect to all of the holders of claims or interests. The rule is limited to the holders in a class that has voted against the plan.
D. Chapter 12 (Adjustment of Debts of a Family Farmer or
Fisherman with a Regular Annual Income)—The Absolute
Priority Rule Does Not Apply
The absolute priority rule does not apply to chapter 12333 or to
a chapter 12 plan.334 The Code requires a chapter 12 debtor to file
a plan within ninety days.335 The plan is subject to confirmation
by the bankruptcy court, but there is no voting by holders of claims
or interests.336
Most significantly, a farmer or family fisherman may keep the
farm or fishing business even if the plan does not pay creditors in
full.337 If the debtor’s corporation or limited partnership owns the
farm or commercial fishing operation, then the debtor may retain
her corporate shares or partnership interests even if the plan does
not pay the debtor’s creditors in full.338
5963, 6368; see also Markell, supra note 264, at 88 (explaining the legislative
compromise that resulted in the requirement that a plan satisfy the best interest of creditors test rather than the absolute priority rule to safeguard the interests of dissenting creditors and shareholders in chapter 11). The directive
that that the bankruptcy court act “in the best interests of creditors and the
estate” in determining whether to convert or dismiss under section 1112(b) is
different from the “best interest of creditors” test of section 1129(a)(7)(A) which,
as set forth above, is a legal term of art.
333 See Chapter 12 and Family Farm Bankruptcies, FINDLAW (Dec. 21,
2016), http://corporate.findlaw.com/finance/chapter-12-and-family-farm-bank
ruptcies.html [https://perma.cc/W3L9-CVVZ] (noting the absence of any reference to the absolute priority rule in chapter 12); §§ 1201–31.
334 §§ 1222, 1225.
335 § 1221.
336 § 1325(a).
337 TABB, supra note 96, at 113.
338 § 1222(a)(4)–(d); see also TABB, supra note 96, at 113 (“[C]hapter 12 rules
are very different from the chapter 11 requirements in a number of ways that
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The chapter 12 plan also may pay unsecured priority claims
“in deferred cash payments,” temporally may pay priority claims
out of the order set forth in section 507, and may pay priority
claims prior to paying general unsecured claims.339 Further, notwithstanding the priority given to tax claims under section 507,
if a priority claim is “owed to a governmental unit that arises as a
result of the sale, transfer, exchange, or other disposition of any
farm asset used in the debtor’s farming operation,” then it is “treated
as [a general] unsecured claim that is not entitled to priority.”340
In sum, the absolute priority rule does not apply in chapter 12.
First, the debtor may retain its farm or fishing business even if it
does not pay the holders of claims in full. Second, chapter 12 permits
the debtor to pay priority unsecured claims over time, even if it
pays unsecured claims of lower priority in full on an earlier date.
E. Chapter 13 (Adjustment of Debts of an Individual with Regular
Income)—The Absolute Priority Rule Does Not Apply
The absolute priority rule similarly does not apply to chapter
or to a chapter 13 plan.342 A chapter 13 debtor shall file a
plan that provides for a three- to five-year payout to creditors.343
The plan is subject to confirmation by the bankruptcy court but,
like chapter 12, there is no plan voting.344

13,341

greatly benefit the farmer or fisherman debtor. For example, the ‘absolute priority’ rule in chapter 11, which prohibits the debtor from retaining any property (e.g., the farm) over the objection of a class of unsecured creditors unless
that class is paid in full, § 1129(b)(2)(B), is not included in chapter 12.”); Ayer,
supra note 143, at 1020 (“In each case [of chapters 12 and 13], the Code permits
the debtor to retain property that might otherwise go to creditors, even where
creditors are not paid in full.”). A “family farmer” and a “family fisherman”
with regular annual income may be a debtor under chapter 12. § 109(f). Each
definition includes a family-owned corporation or limited partnership through
which the family conducts the operation. § 101(18)(B), (19A)(B).
339 §§ 507(a)(8), 1222(a)(2)(A), 1225(a)(1), (4).
340 § 1222(a)(2)(A).
341 See §§ 1301–30.
342 See §§ 1322, 1325.
343 § 1325(b)(4)(A)(i)–(ii); see also Chapter 13—Bankruptcy Basics, U.S.
COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/bankruptcy/bankruptcy-basics
/chapter-13-bankruptcy-basics [https://perma.cc/Y7QY-Y6K9].
344 See § 1325; see also Chapter 13—Bankruptcy Basics, supra note 343.
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Section 1325(b) provides that the bankruptcy court shall confirm
a plan if the debtor’s projected disposable income “will be applied
to make payments to unsecured creditors under the plan.”345 The
debtor may retain his non-exempt property even if he does not
pay unsecured creditors in full,346 in clear contradiction of the result that would occur if the absolute priority rule applied. Though
a chapter 13 plan must provide for full payment of all section 507
priority claims in deferred cash payments over the term of the
three- to five-year plan,347 chapter 13 does not require the payment
of senior priority unsecured claims prior to payment of junior priority unsecured claims.348
F. Chapter 15 (Ancillary and Other Cross-Border Cases)—The
Absolute Priority Rule Does Not Apply
Congress enacted chapter 15 in 2005 as part of BAPCPA.349
Chapter 15 applies to international bankruptcies,350 when a “foreign court or foreign representative in connection with a foreign
[insolvency] proceeding” seeks assistance in the United States, or
“assistance is sought in a foreign country in connection with a
case under” the Bankruptcy Code.351
The absolute priority rule does not apply in chapter 15. Code
section 103(a), which enumerates the Code provisions applicable
to chapter 15, does not include section 507 (listing the unsecured
priority claims), section 726 (providing for distributional priorities
in chapter 7), or section 1129(b) (setting forth the absolute priority for purposes of confirmation of a cramdown plan).352 Nothing
11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1)(B).
Id. § 1325(b) (emphasis added); see Ayer, supra note 143, at 1020; TABB,
supra note 96, at 1202, 1246 (“[C]lasses of unsecured creditors in chapter 13
cannot invoke the absolute priority rule, meaning that the debtor is free to
retain her property and any equity interests therein.”).
347 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(2).
348 Though the plan must pay priority unsecured claims in full over the life
of the plan, there is “no additional requirement that those claims be paid temporally in the order of their priority. For example, the debtor could provide that
all eighth priority tax claims be paid first.” TABB, supra note 96, at 1227.
349 See id. at 118–19.
350 See 11 U.S.C. § 1501.
351 Id. § 1501(b)(1)–(2).
352 Id. §§ 103(a), 507(a), 726(a), 1129(b).
345
346
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in chapter 15 authorizes a United States bankruptcy court to impose the absolute priority rule on distributions in chapter 15.
G. Summary—The Absolute Priority Rule and the Bankruptcy
Code
The current text of the Code gives the absolute priority rule a
surprisingly narrow scope. The rule applies unequivocally in chapter
7. Outside of that chapter, the rule’s reach is weak.
The restriction against a debtor or its shareholders from retaining their ownership interests until all senior claims are paid
in full does not apply at all in chapters 9, 12, 13 or 15. Distributions
to priority unsecured claimants also have a limited application
under most chapters of the Code. Payments per those priorities:
(1) are not required at all in chapter 9 (except that administrative
expense claims must be paid), (2) are altered with respect to some
tax priorities and also may be temporally reordered in chapter 12,
(3) may be temporally reordered in 13, and (4) are not required in
chapter 15.353
In chapter 11, the absolute priority rule has no application to
a consensual plan that has been accepted by the requisite majorities in each impaired class.354 A consensual plan may permit equity to retain ownership of the reorganized debtor even if it does
not pay creditors in full; under an approved plan equity may also
pay priority unsecured claims on a deferred basis, after payment
of lower priority claims, even following the debtor’s discharge and
the closing of the case. The absolute priority rule applies only to
a chapter 11 cramdown plan and then, only to the holders of
claims or interests in a rejecting class.355 Dissenters in accepting
classes, whether under a consensual plan or a cramdown plan,
cannot invoke the rule.356 Other, more pervasive rules—including
the best interest of creditors test and the other requirements of
section 1129(a)—protect those dissenters.357
In sum, the absolute priority rule under the text of today’s
Code is more a special than a general rule. Its limited scope did not
result from legislative accident, clever lawyering, or creative judging.
See supra Part III.B.
11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(8).
355 See supra notes 51–52 and accompanying text.
356 TABB, supra note 96, at 733.
357 See supra Part III.C.3.
353
354
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Rather, Congress consistently and deliberately has limited the
reach of the rule.
IV. SETTLEMENTS AND COMPROMISES UNDER THE CODE
Bankruptcy Rule 9019 authorizes a bankruptcy court to approve a settlement or compromise.358 The Rule provides that, “after notice and a hearing, the court may approve a compromise or
settlement.”359 Nothing in the text of the current Code or Rules
expressly requires that settlements outside of a plan adhere to
the absolute priority rule or provide other criteria for the approval
of a compromise or settlement. Rather, Congress has left the development of the rules for approval of settlements to the courts.
A. Settlements and Compromises Under TMT
The bankruptcy case that set the standard for court approval
of a settlement is Protective Committee for Independent Stockholders of TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc. v. Anderson (“TMT ”).360 TMT
was a chapter X corporate reorganization case under the Bankruptcy Act.361
The Chandler Act, unlike the Code, contained an express provision regarding settlements.362 Section 27 of the Act authorized
the receiver or trustee, with the approval of the court, to “compromise
any … controversy arising in the administration of the estate
upon such terms as he may deem for the best interest of the estate.”363
The Supreme Court’s General Order 33 also governed approvals
FED. R. BANKR. P. 9019 (2012).
Id. 9019(a).
360 Protective Comm. for Indep. Stockholders of TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc. v.
Anderson, 390 U.S. 414, 418, 424 (1968).
361 Id. at 418. Justice White wrote for a 5–3 majority in TMT. The dissent
said nothing of the standard for approval of a settlement outside of a plan. The
dissent, instead, considered that “the only question which could be thought
even remotely to justify” the grant of certiorari was “whether the trustee, by
virtue of his office, was as a matter of law disqualified from being selected as
president of the reorganized company,” and would have dismissed the writ of
certiorari on the ground that it was improvidently granted. Id. at 454 (Harlan,
J., dissenting).
362 Chandler Act of 1938, ch. 575, § 27, 52 Stat. 840, 855 (1938); 2 MODERN
BANKRUPTCY MANUAL: LAW AND PRACTICE 1476 (1966).
363 See MODERN BANKRUPTCY MANUAL, supra note 362, at 1476.
358
359
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of settlements when TMT was decided in 1968.364 General Order
33 required the receiver, trustee, or debtor in possession who was
seeking approval of the compromise to set forth the reasons why
it was “proper and for the best interest of the estate that the controversy should be settled.”365 Neither section 27 nor General Order 33 expressly required a settlement to be “fair and equitable” or to
comply with the absolute priority rule.
The Court in TMT stated that it was necessary for it to consider
only two questions: whether it was error to affirm, first, “approval
of compromises of substantial claims against the debtor,” and,
second, the “District Court’s judgment that the debtor was insolvent, when that judgment was rendered without considering the
future estimated earnings of the reorganized company.”366 Two
settlements were at issue.
The first claim settled in TMT was in the face amount of
$330,000, though the holders of the claim had paid $280,500 for
it.367 Preferred ship mortgages against the debtor’s vessels allegedly secured the claim.368 The trustee proposed to settle the claim
for $280,500, payable in installments with interest.369 The trustee
proposed the settlement notwithstanding that the trustee’s own
report had concluded that the holders of the preferred ship mortgages, who were insiders, “had diverted corporate opportunities
through the flagrant abuse of their control, fiduciary or inside positions, and should be made to account for the profits they had
made.”370 Moreover, at the time the preferred ship mortgages
were executed, the insiders “were in a position to dictate terms
which TMT would be forced to accept.”371
Id.
Chandler Act of 1938, § 27; see also MODERN BANKRUPTCY MANUAL, supra
note 362, at 1476–77. Rule 919, which replaced General Order 33 in the mid1970s prior to enactment of the Code, said simply that “the court may approve a
compromise or settlement” on notice and a hearing. MODERN BANKRUPTCY
MANUAL, supra note 362, at 173. Rule 919 was strikingly similar to the present
Rule 9019, and provided that “after hearing on notice to the creditors as provided in Rule 203(a) and to such other persons as the court may designate, the
court may approve a compromise or settlement.” Id.
366 TMT, 390 U.S. at 423 (1938).
367 Id. at 425.
368 Id. at 419.
369 Id. at 426.
370 Id. at 427.
371 Id.
364
365
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The second claim settled was in the face amount of $1.6 million.372 Maritime liens against the debtor’s vessels allegedly secured
about $600,000 of the claim, though there were material questions regarding the validity of the liens.373 The trustee proposed
to allow this $1.6 million claim in full as a general unsecured
claim, and to issue common stock in the reorganized debtor to the
holder of the claim.374
The district court approved both settlements.375 The court of
appeals affirmed, emphasizing that the “litigation must at long
last be brought to an end” and that it reviewed the trial judge’s
determination for abuse of discretion and clearly erroneous determinations.376 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.377
Compromises are “‘a normal part of the process of reorganization’”
wrote Justice White.378 He continued, “In administering reorganization proceedings in an economical and practical manner it will
often be wise to arrange the settlement of claims as to which there
are substantial and reasonable doubts.”379
Yet, it remained “essential that every important determination
in reorganization proceedings receive the ‘informed, independent
judgment’ of the bankruptcy court.”380 The Court noted that the
requirement that a chapter X plan be “‘fair and equitable’” applied
to “compromises just as to other aspects of reorganizations.”381 A
court could not have an “informed and independent judgment as
to whether a proposed compromise [was] fair and equitable until
the bankruptcy judge ha[d] apprised himself of all facts necessary
for an intelligent and objective opinion of the probabilities of ultimate success should the claim be litigated.”382 This required the
judge to “form an educated estimate of the complexity, expense, and
Id. at 425.
Id.
374 Id. at 420.
375 Id. at 416.
376 Id.
377 Id. at 418.
378 Id. at 424 (citing Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106,
130 (1939)).
379 Id.
380 Id. (citing Nat’l Surety Co. v. Coriell, 289 U.S. 426, 436 (1933)).
381 Id.
382 Id.
372
373
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likely duration of such litigation, the possible difficulties of collecting on any judgment which might be obtained, and all other
factors relevant to a full and fair assessment of the wisdom of the
proposed compromise.”383 Basic to this process was “the need to
compare the terms of the compromise with the likely rewards of
litigation.”384 The Court said nothing of the absolute priority rule
in connection with the standard for court approval of a settlement.
The Court found the proceedings below lacking. The bankruptcy
court had tagged all the bases in a statement that the Supreme
Court quoted at length.385 The bankruptcy court, though, had
merely adopted the assertions of the trustee’s counsel: the compromise was the best available; the prospect of material reductions of the claims did not warrant extensive litigation, and the
likelihood of recoveries against the claimants beyond the amounts
of their claims was too remote for serious consideration.386 The alternative to approval of the compromises was extensive litigation at
heavy expense and “unnecessary delay in reorganization contrary
to the intent and purpose of chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act.”387
The bankruptcy court’s error was that it had accepted “the
bald conclusions of the trustee” without referring to any of the
objections filed or to the substantial facts in the record that cast
doubt upon the trustee’s claims.388 The bankruptcy court had casually approved the settlements “despite the fact that the trustee
had once concluded that the [ship’s] mortgage was null and void
and that TMT had sizeable setoffs against its holders.”389 The
trustee had once sought reference of the $1.6 million ship mortgage claim to a special master for investigation, and the trustee
“had never placed on the record any of the facts of his subsequent
investigation and had never provided any explanation of why he
had completely reversed his field on these claims.”390 Though the
bankruptcy court was understandably eager to end the protracted
proceedings, there was no adequate explanation for the trustee’s
Id.
Id. at 425.
385 Id. at 432–34.
386 Id.
387 Id. at 432–33.
388 Id. at 433.
389 Id.
390 Id. at 433–34.
383
384
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“cursory, conclusory recommendation of these ‘compromises,’ or
the perfunctory, almost offhand, manner in which the court accepted that recommendation.”391
It “would without question have been justifiable” to approve
the settlements if the bankruptcy court’s statement
had been the result of an adequate and intelligent consideration of the merits of the claims, the difficulties of pursuing
them, the potential harm to the debtor’s estate caused by delay,
and the fairness of the terms of settlement .... It [was] essential,
however, that a reviewing court have some basis for distinguishing between well-reasoned conclusions arrived at after a
comprehensive consideration of all relevant factors, and mere
boilerplate approval phrased in appropriate language but unsupported by evaluation of the facts or analysis of the law.392

The bankruptcy court had provided no explanation of how it
had evaluated the strengths or weaknesses of the debtor’s causes
of action or the probable outcomes of the litigation and had not
even offered an “educated estimate of the complexity, expense,
and likely duration of the litigation.”393
In the Supreme Court’s view, the court of appeals had done no
better, dealing with the compromises “in five sentences,” focusing
mostly on the fact that the committee and the SEC were the only
objectors.394 The Supreme Court held that it was error for the
bankruptcy court to approve the settlements and for the court of
appeals to affirm, and reversed.395
The TMT Court stated that a settlement must be “fair and equitable” for a court to approve it.396 It used the term “fair and equitable” for settlement approval to mean that a court must engage
in a sufficiently thorough analysis of the claim being settled; any
counterclaim that the estate might have against the claimant;
and the costs, risks, and benefits of pursuing the litigation compared with the terms of the settlement.397 The Court answered
Id. at 434.
Id.
393 Id.
394 Id. at 416.
395 Id. at 418.
396 Id. at 424–25.
397 Id.
391
392
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the first question—whether it was error for the district court to
approve the settlements—on consideration only of the bankruptcy
court’s inadequate examination of the “fairness of the terms of
compromise” and without any consideration of whether the settlement was at variance with the absolute priority rule.398 The
Court cited three courts of appeals cases in support of its holding
regarding approval of a compromise that similarly said nothing of
the absolute priority rule.399
Justice White, the authoring judge, referred to the absolute priority rule only when he turned to the second question that he had
framed at the outset: Whether it was error to affirm the bankruptcy
court’s judgment that the debtor was insolvent for the purposes
of plan confirmation. Justice White determined that the district
court’s determination of insolvency “was not made in accordance
with the proper standards of valuation,” and, thus, equity might
still be in the money.400 Confirmation of a plan that excluded
shareholders, thus, could not stand.401
In sum, Congress in section 27 of the Chandler Act authorized
a bankruptcy court to approve a compromise that was in the best
interest of the bankruptcy estate.402 Neither section 27 nor General Order 33 required that a settlement conform to an absolute
Id. at 434–35, 440.
Id. at 424 (citing Ashbach v. Kirtley, 289 F.2d 159 (8th Cir. 1961); In re
Chicago Rapid Transit Co., 196 F.2d 484 (7th Cir. 1952); Conway v. SilesianAmerican Corp., 186 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950)). Other pre-Code circuit court
cases, not cited by the court in TMT, had approved settlements or compromises
without requiring compliance with the absolute priority rule and had required
instead that the settlement or compromise be in the best interest of creditors
per section 27 of the Bankruptcy Act. See, e.g., Connecticut Ry. & Lighting Co.
v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 190 F.2d 305, 307–08 (2d Cir. 1951) (concerning
the Railroad Reorganization Act—a court may approve a compromise if it is
fair and in the best interest of the estate, and the order can be reversed only
on a clear showing of an abuse of discretion); Daniel Hamm Drayage Co. v.
Willson, 178 F.2d 633, 635 (8th Cir. 1949) (filing under chapter X, citing cases);
Fernow v. Gubser, 136 F.2d 971, 972 (10th Cir. 1943) (involving 77B corporate
reorganization, enforcing no requirement that settlement comply with the absolute priority rule; instead: “The approval of a compromise of this kind is addressed to the sound judicial discretion of the court, and its action thereon will
not be disturbed on appeal except in case of abuse of such discretion.”).
400 TMT, 390 U.S. at 441.
401 Id.
402 Chandler Act of 1938, ch. 575, § 27, 52 Stat. 840, 855 (1938).
398
399
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priority rule or even that it be “fair and equitable.”403 Though the
trustee reached the settlements in TMT in contemplation of a
plan of reorganization, the Court did not review the settlements
in terms of the absolute priority rule.404 It exhaustively considered instead whether the lower courts had rigorously examined
the risks and rewards of continuing the litigation as opposed to
approving the settlements.405
The Supreme Court in TMT did not extend the absolute priority rule to bankruptcy settlements—even those made in contemplation of a plan. Justice White of course used the term “fair and
equitable” in the first part of his TMT opinion in which he stated
the standard for approval of a compromise.406 Nowhere, did he
imply, though, that for such purposes the term was synonymous
with absolute distributional priority. This is not surprising. The
Bankruptcy Act used the term “fair and equitable” in several contexts having nothing to do with absolute priority.407 Only for confirmation of a chapter X plan did the term mean absolute priority, and
not by express statutory language, but only by Justice Douglas’s
holding in Los Angeles Lumber, the reach of which Congress already had severely limited. Post-TMT, pre-Code cases also did not
require that compromises comply with the absolute priority rule
in chapter X or under the Railroad Reorganization Act of 1935,
those chapters of the Bankruptcy Act to which the absolute priority rule still pertained after 1952.408
Id.; see also MODERN BANKRUPTCY MANUAL, supra note 362, at 1476–77.
See TMT, 390 U.S. at 424–41.
405 Id. at 433–35, 440–41.
406 Id. at 424.
407 See, e.g., Chandler Act of 1938, ch. 575, § 48(f)–(g), 52 Stat. 840, 862–63
(1938) (noting that compensation of marshal, receiver, or trustee under a confirmed arrangement or plan of reorganization is required to be “fair and equitable”); id. § 863 (explaining that a court may allow a claim against the debtor
that the claimant assigns to a third party in an amount that it determines to
be “fair and equitable,” upon consideration of the amount of the claim, the circumstances of the assignment, and the consideration paid for the assignment
of the claim); id. § 216(12) (holding that provisions of plan shall provide for a
“fair and equitable” distribution of voting powers among the shareholders of
the reorganized debtor).
408 See, e.g., In re Continental Inv. Corp., 642 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1981) (see
586 F.2d 241, 243, 246 for the court’s affirming transfer of the proceeding from
chapter XI to X); In re Jackson Brewing Co., 624 F.2d 599, 602 (5th Cir. 1980)
403
404
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B. Settlements and Compromises Under the Bankruptcy Code
The Code, unlike section 27 of the Chandler Act, said nothing
of a bankruptcy court’s settlement authority. Rule 9019, which
contains such authority, states only that, “after notice and a hearing, the court may approve a compromise or settlement.”409
Since the code became effective in 1978, the circuit courts have
continued to apply the TMT risk-benefit standard to decide
whether to approve a settlement, both in chapter 11 and chapter 7
bankruptcy cases—without any requirement settlements adhere
to the absolute priority rule410—as well as settlement outside of
(chapter X); In re Wonderbowl, Inc., 515 F.2d 18, 19 (9th Cir. 1975) (finding
under chapter X with no consideration of absolute priority rule: “trustee was
fully empowered, with court approval, … to compromise within or without a
reorganization plan.”), cert. denied, Fallon v. Jonas, 423 U.S. 869 (1975). Even
in cases in which approval of a compromise was in connection with a plan, the
courts flexibly applied the absolute priority rule to the resolution of the case or
applied the TMT factors without even considering the rule. See, e.g., In re Penn
Cent. Transp. Co., 596 F.2d 1127, 1146–48 (3d Cir. 1979) (concerning the Railroad Reorganization Act section 77, alluding to the “relativity” inherent in the
absolute priority rule and declining “to adopt a mechanical application of any
of the embellishments, clarifications, extensions, derivatives or off-shoots of
the rule” which were “so strenuously urged by the appellants”); In re Penn Cent.
Transp. Co., 596 F.2d 1102, 1113–14 (3d Cir. 1979) (concerning the Railroad Reorganization Act section 77: the “proposed compromise distribution” under and
“forming part of a reorganization plan” must be “fair and equitable” and the settlement “fairly equivalent to the value of the potential claim surrendered.”
Though the bankruptcy court must exercise its “informed, independent judgment”
in reaching its determination, “the weighing of claim against compensation cannot be an exact one.”); Am. Emp’rs’ Ins. Co. v. King Res. Co., 556 F.2d 471, 478–79
(10th Cir. 1977) (affirming compromise based on district court’s “discretionary
power to approve compromises involving claims and interests in reorganization
proceedings,” which “judgment will not be reversed except for abuse of discretion or if clearly erroneous,” and citing both TMT and Los Angeles Lumber); In
re Equity Funding Corp. of Am., 519 F.2d 1274, 1277–78 (9th Cir. 1975) (chapter
X). Further, the TMT rule was of sufficiently general applicability that courts
applied it to many other areas, outside of bankruptcy law, in which court approval of a compromise is required. See, e.g., Seigal v. Merrick, 590 F.2d 35, 38
n.2 (2d Cir. 1978); Cotton v. Hinton, 559 F.2d 1326, 1330 (5th Cir. 1977); In re
Equity Funding Corp. of Am., 519 F.2d at 1277; Flinn v. FMC Corp., 528 F.2d
1169, 1173 n.7 (4th Cir. 1975); Bryan v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. (PPG Industries, Inc.), 494 F.2d 799, 801, 804 (3d Cir. 1974).
409 FED. R. BANKR. P. 9019(a).
410 See, e.g., Ritchie Capital Mgmt., L.L.C. v. Kelley, 785 F.3d 273, 278–82
(8th Cir. 2015) (chapter 11); In re MQVP Inc., 477 F. App’x 310, 313 (6th Cir. 2012)
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bankruptcy.411 The present formulation of the TMT criteria requires the bankruptcy court to consider:
(a) [t]he probability of success in the litigation;
(b) the difficulties, if any, to be encountered in the matter of
collection;
(chapter 7); In re Am. Cartage, Inc., 656 F.3d 82, 91–92 (1st Cir. 2011) (chapter
7); In re Moore, 608 F.3d 253, 262–63 n.20 (5th Cir. 2010) (chapter 7); Saad v.
GE HFS Holdings, Inc., 366 F. App’x 593, 604 n.11 (6th Cir. 2010) (chapter 11);
In re Bodenheimer, Jones, Szwak, & Winchell, L.L.P., 592 F.3d 664, 675 (5th
Cir. 2009) (chapter 7); Tri-State Fin., LLC v. Lovald, 525 F.3d 649, 654–55 (8th
Cir. 2008) (chapter 7); In re Iridium Operating LLC, 478 F.3d 452, 463 (2d Cir.
2007) (chapter 11, discussed supra Part VIII below); In re Doctors Hosp. of
Hyde Park, Inc., 474 F.3d 421, 426–27 (7th Cir. 2007) (chapter 9); In re Arden,
176 F.3d 1226, 1228–31 (9th Cir. 1999) (chapter 9); In re Bay Area Material
Handling, Inc., 111 F.3d 137, 1997 WL 173922, at *1–2 (9th Cir. Apr. 9, 1997)
(chapter 7); In re Martin, 91 F.3d 389, 393 (3d Cir. 1996) (chapter 7); In re Foster
Mortg. Corp., 68 F.3d 914, 917 (5th Cir. 1995) (chapter 11); In re Bond, 16 F.3d
408, 1994 WL 20107, at *3 (4th Cir. 1994) (chapter 11); In re Energy Coop., Inc.,
886 F.2d 921, 929 (7th Cir. 1989) (chapter 11 converted to chapter 7); Reiss v.
Hagmann, 881 F.2d 890, 891–93 (10th Cir. 1989) (chapter 7); In re Texas Extrusion Corp., 844 F.2d 1142, 1158–59 (5th Cir. 1988) (chapter 11, citing TMT
and AWECO, affirmed settlement contained in plan because it was not an “abuse
of discretion” without mention of whether the settlement complied with the
absolute priority rule), aff’g 68 B.R. 712 (N.D. Tex. 1986); In re Emerald Oil Co.,
807 F.2d 1234, 1239 (5th Cir. 1987) (chapter 11, affirming settlement, citing
TMT and Matter of AWECO, also with no mention of whether the settlement
complied with the absolute priority rule). See also In re Energy Future Holdings Corp., 648 F. App’x 277, 280–81, 2016 WL 2343322, at *2 (3d Cir. 2016)
(following Jevic and Iridium, discussed in section VIII below); In re ICL Holding Co., Inc., 802 F.3d 547, 553–57 (3d Cir. 2015) (pursuant to settlement, the
payment of some administrative claims—but not others of equal priority—and
payment to unsecured creditors ahead of priority claim, by secured lenders who
also had purchased the debtor’s assets in the bankruptcy case, was approved because the funds used were the secured lenders’ and not the estate’s property).
411 Even the Supreme Court ultimately cited TMT, in a case involving an
employment discrimination claim settlement in a non-bankruptcy context, for
the principle that courts “judge the fairness of a proposed compromise by weighing
the plaintiff’s likelihood of success on the merits against the amount and form
of the relief offered in the settlement.” Carson v. Am. Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79,
88 n.14 (1981). See, e.g., New England Health Care Emps’ Pension Fund v.
Woodruff, 512 F.3d 1283, 1294–96 (10th Cir. 2008); Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp.,
150 F.3d 1011, 1026 (9th Cir. 1998); DeBoer v. Mellon Mortg. Co., 64 F.3d 1171,
1176–77 (8th Cir. 1995); Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., 787 F.2d 828, 833
(2d Cir. 1986); Piambino v. Bailey, 757 F.2d 1112, 1139 n.68 (11th Cir. 1985);
In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 643 F.2d 195, 212 (5th Cir. 1981);
Greenspun v. Bogan, 492 F.2d 375, 378 (1st Cir. 1974).
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(c) the complexity of the litigation involved, and the expense,
inconvenience and delay necessarily attending it; [and]
(d) the paramount interest of the creditors and a proper deference to their reasonable views in the premises.412

The vast majority of courts approving settlements under the
Code have emphasized the paramount or best interest of creditors—not absolute distributional priority.413
The exception is the Fifth Circuit’s 1984 decision, In re
AWECO.414 The court was persuaded that the “underlying policies” of bankruptcy law regarding absolute priority justified what
the court acknowledged was an “extension of the fair and equitable
standard” required for a cramdown plan to a settlement in chapter 11.415 This Article argues that AWECO was wrongly decided.
Congressional enactments since Los Angeles Lumber demonstrate
only a limited policy regarding the absolute priority rule. The
much stronger underlying policy is the best interest of creditors.
C. Summary—Settlements Under the Bankruptcy Code Do Not
Require Adherence to the Absolute Priority Rule
Congress has not called for a settlement to comply with the
absolute priority rule in order for the bankruptcy court to approve
it.416 Section 27 of the Chandler Act, the pre-Code law, expressly
gave the courts wide discretion, commanding only that the compromise or settlement serve the best interest of the estate.417
Decided under the Act, the Supreme Court in TMT directed
the courts to determine whether a proposed settlement was fair
and equitable by undertaking a rigorous risk-benefit analysis before
approving it.418 The Court did not refer at all to the absolute priority rule in the context of approval of the settlements at issue.
412 10 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 9019.02 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer
eds., 15th ed. rev. 2010).
413 See id.
414 See generally In re AWECO, Inc., 725 F.2d 293 (5th Cir. 1984).
415 Id. at 298.
416 Chandler Act of 1938, ch. 575, § 27, 52 Stat. 840, 855 (1938).
417 Id.
418 Protective Comm. for Indep. Stockholders of TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc. v.
Anderson, 390 U.S. 414, 424–25 (1968).
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Congress enacted the Code in 1978 and again said nothing of
the absolute priority rule in the context of settlements.419 Courts
continued to apply the TMT standard under the Code.420 Nearly
without exception, the opinions approving settlements in chapters 11 and 7 have made no mention of absolute distributional
priority and have focused on the paramount interest of creditors.421
AWECO, decided in 1984, where the Fifth Circuit explicitly acknowledged that it was extending the absolute priority rule to
settlements for policy reasons, has remained an outlier.422
No omnipresent congressional policy for absolute distributional
priority exists under the Code, whether with respect to settlements specifically or bankruptcy distributions generally.423 As argued above, any such policy under the current Code is far weaker and
more narrowly contained than AWECO suggests. The stronger argument is that the policy at present, shaped by congressional
bankruptcy enactments from 1952 to BAPCPA in 2005, favors negotiated resolutions evaluated by the courts determining the best
interest of creditors without reference to the absolute priority rule.
Critics of structured dismissals argue that courts’ authority is
or should be different when the settling parties are seeking dismissal of the case immediately following the approval of the settlement.424 The next section argues that these critics misconstrue
the provisions of the Code that govern dismissals.
V. DISMISSAL OF A CHAPTER 11 CASE AND OF CASES UNDER
OTHER CHAPTERS OF THE CODE
Critics of structured dismissals claim that such a resolution of
a chapter 11 case exceeds the bounds of the Bankruptcy Code. 425
This section argues that this position is weak. Rather, Congress
has given bankruptcy courts express authority to act in the best
interest of creditors regarding the dismissal of chapter 11 cases.
11 U.S.C. § 101 (1978).
See supra notes 410–11 and accompanying text.
421 See supra notes 410–11.
422 In re AWECO, Inc., 725 F.2d 293, 298 (5th Cir. 1984).
423 11 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
424 See, e.g., Frost, supra note 23, at 3 (citing In re Jevic Holding Co., Inc.,
Brief of Appellants, 2014 WL 3572018, at *45–46 (3d Cir. July 8, 2014)); Eitel
et al., supra note 27, at 20.
425 Eitel et al., supra note 27, at 1.
419
420
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A. The Code Does Not Limit Chapter 11 Resolution to a Confirmed
Plan, a Chapter 7 Liquidation, or a Plain Vanilla Dismissal Order
The Code does not state that the only three paths to concluding a chapter 11 case are plan confirmation, conversion to chapter
7, or a one page, plain vanilla order dismissing the case. The Code
does not require that, on dismissal of a chapter 11 case, distributions must follow the descending priorities listed in section 507 or
must be in accordance with the rule set forth in section 726 for
chapter 7. Indeed, neither section 1112 (regarding the court’s dismissal of a chapter 11 case) nor section 349 (which sets forth the
effects of such dismissal) refer at all to sections 507, 726, or 1129(b),
or to any other rule of distributional priority.426 The Code instead
expressly authorizes the court to act in the best interest of creditors
in resolving a case other than by confirmation of a plan.427
A debtor may obtain dismissal of its chapter 11 case under
Code section 1112. Section 1112 authorizes the court to make its
decision in furtherance of the “best interests of [the debtor’s] creditors and the estate.”428 The court is not a passive player with respect to the best course of action, and is not limited to granting or
denying the motion.429 Section 1112 provides instead that the court
may dismiss the chapter 11 case, may convert the case to chapter 7
or may appoint a chapter 11 trustee to replace the debtor in possession, whichever “is in the best interest of creditors and the estate.”430
11 U.S.C. §§ 349, 1112.
Id. § 1112(b)(1).
428 Id. A debtor is a “party in interest” in chapter 11, and a party in interest
may request dismissal of a chapter 11 case under section 1112(b). Id. § 1109(b).
429 Id. § 1112(b)(1).
430 Id. The 1977 House Report in its section-by-section analysis stated that
section 1112(b) “gives wide discretion to the court to make an appropriate disposition of the case when a party in interest requests. The court is permitted
to convert a reorganization case to a liquidation case or to dismiss the case,
whichever is in the best interest of creditors and the estate.” H.R. REP. NO. 95595 at 405 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6361. The 1978 Senate
Report contains similar commentary regarding the “wide discretion” given to
the court by section 1112(b) “to make an appropriate disposition.” S. REP. 95989, at 118 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5903. Both reports
refer to the ability of the court under section 1112(b) “to use its equitable powers
to reach an appropriate result in individual cases.” Id.; H.R. Rep. No. 95-595
at 406 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6362.
426
427
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Section 349 states the ordinary effects of dismissals of a case
in chapter 11, as well as chapters 9, 12, and 13.431 Section 349
expressly gives a bankruptcy court the discretion to alter those
effects and to decree terms in its dismissal orders that it determines appropriate “for cause.”432
The text and structure of the Code underscore the discretion
given by Congress to the courts to decree the best outcome in a
bad situation when a case must be resolved outside of a plan. The
Code’s text regarding plan filing is more permissive for chapter
11 than for chapters 9, 12, and 13. Chapter 11 provides that a
debtor “may file” a plan of reorganization or liquidation.433 Chapters 9, 12, and 13 provide that a debtor “shall file” a plan,434 yet
the debtor even in those chapters may move for and obtain an
order dismissing the case435 on terms that the court “for cause”
deems appropriate.436 Because chapters 9, 12, and 13 mandate the
filing of a plan, one most likely would find in those chapters any
congressional restrictions to courts entering something other than
a plain vanilla dismissal order. Yet, no such limitations exist.
No provision of the Code or the Bankruptcy Rules blocks the
path to a structured dismissal by prohibiting court approval of a
settlement followed by a dismissal. Rather, both section 1112(b)
and the “for cause” discretion afforded by section 349(b) authorize
a court to determine the best interest of the debtor’s creditors and
estate in determining a motion to dismiss a chapter 11 case,
whether in conjunction with a settlement or otherwise.437 The
dominant congressional directive given to the bankruptcy court is
11 U.S.C. § 349(b).
Id.
433 Id. § 1121 (emphasis added).
434 See id. § 941 (emphasis added); see also id. §§ 1221, 1321 (2012); ANTONIN
SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL
TEXTS 112 (2012) (“The traditional, commonly repeated rule is that shall is
mandatory and may is permissive.”). Scalia and Garner assert that “notoriously sloppy” drafting has resulted in a “morass of confusing decisions” on the
meaning of “shall,” but raise no semantical issue with the word “may.” Id. They
further claim that “[w]hen drafters use shall and may correctly, the traditional
rule holds—beautifully.” Id.
435 11 U.S.C. §§ 930(a), 1112(b), 1208(b), 1307(b) (2012).
436 Id. § 349(b).
437 Id. §§ 349(b)(3), 1112(b)(1).
431
432
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to pursue the best interest of the debtor’s creditors and estate,
and that directive includes the court’s authority to alter ordinary
outcomes in its discretion “for cause.”438
B. The Dismissal of a Chapter 11 Case Revests Only the Property in
the Estate at the Time of the Dismissal
Second, critics of structured dismissals misstate the normal
effects of dismissal and fail to recognize the continuing validity of
a settlement post-dismissal. The normal effects of a dismissal are
as follows. First, the dismissal “revests the property of the estate
in the entity in which such property was vested immediately before the commencement of the case.”439 Second, receiverships and
other custodianships that were superseded by the commencement
of the bankruptcy case are reinstated.440 Third, some transfers
and liens previously avoided over the course of the bankruptcy
case are reinstated.441
The first of these ordinary effects of a dismissal—the revesting—
is the most significant.442 An oft-cited statement in the legislative
history of the 1978 Code suggests that Congress proposed by section 349 to “undo” the bankruptcy and return parties to the status
quo that existed on the petition date.443
Yet the Code’s text does not expressly state whether the “property of the estate” that revests is that which existed on the date
on which the case commenced—by which construction the status
quo on the commencement date would be restored—or that which
exists in the estate on the date of the dismissal.444 The definition
Id. §§ 349(b), 1112(b).
Id. § 349(b)(3).
440 Id. § 349(b)(1). Upon commencement of a bankruptcy case, a receiver or
other court-appointed custodian in possession of property of the debtor case
ordinarily loses authority to act on account of that property and must turn the
property over to the bankruptcy trustee or debtor in possession. See id.
§ 543(a)–(b).
441 Id. § 349(b)(1)–(2).
442 Id. § 349(b)(3).
443 H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, H.R. REP.
NO. 95-595, at 338 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6294; see
also S. REP. 95-989, at 49 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5835.
444 11 U.S.C. § 349(b).
438
439
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of “property of the estate” in chapter 11 arguably fills this statutory gap in favor of the latter interpretation. 445 Property of the
estate in chapter 11 includes both the debtor’s property on the
commencement date and after-acquired property.446 A debtor in
possession completes numerous transactions prior to a dismissal.
An interpretation of the “property of the estate” that revests under
section 349(b)(3) is that existing on the dismissal date best harmonizes section 541, which provides that after-acquired property
is estate property, with section 349, because an interpretation of
section 349 that turns back the clock for revesting to the petition
date would “orphan” all property acquired postpetition.447 The more
harmonious reading of section 349(b) is that estate property on the
dismissal date revests in the party entitled to it on that date.448
Moreover, courts with good reason—more pragmatic than textual—have construed section 349(b)(3) to mean that only the
property of the estate determined as of the date of dismissal revests.449 They have not required time travel back to the petition
See id. § 541.
See id. § 541(b).
447 Id. §§ 349(b), 541(a).
448 The canons of textual interpretation provide that the “text must be interpreted as a whole,” which includes consideration of the entire language and
design of the statute. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 434, at 167. “The imperative of harmony among provisions is more categorical than most other canons
of construction because it is invariably true that intelligent drafters do not contradict themselves (in the absence of duress).” Id. at 180.
449 See, e.g., United States v. Standard State Bank, 91 B.R. 874, 879 (W.D.
Mo. 1988) (“Revesting ‘includes only that property left in the estate at the time
of dismissal.’”); In re Searles, 70 B.R. 266, 270 (D.R.I. 1987) (“The few cases
that mention subsection 349(b)(3) refer to its applicability only in the context
of property or property rights that have not passed out of the bankruptcy estate.”); In re Day, 292 B.R. 133, 137 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2003); In re Derrick, 190
B.R. 346, 352 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1995) (“However, to equate dismissal with
some form of time travel, unceremoniously dumping the parties where they
were the moment before the debtor made the fateful choice to file bankruptcy,
would be to say both too much and too little about the effect of § 349.”); In re
Tri-Glied, Ltd., 179 B.R. 1014, 1020–21 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding the
lease held by debtor at commencement of case, which was rejected during case,
does not revest in debtor on dismissal); In re Ethington, 150 B.R. 48, 50 (Bankr.
D. Idaho 1993) (“Were the Court to hold that dismissal of the case immediately
revested the property in the debtor, beyond the reach of the Court to order
payment of administrative fees, all parties who rendered postpetition services
445
446
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date. Rather they have held that the revesting applies to property
of the estate existing on the date of the dismissal, thus leaving
postpetition transactions intact.450 Section 349(b)(3) thus “undoes”
the bankruptcy only to a very limited extent.
Were it otherwise, section 349(b)(3) would result in an unraveling so extensive that the debtor’s creditors and other parties in interest would suffer losses unfairly, and their justifiable reliance
on the bankruptcy court’s orders would be defeated. In chapter 11,
for example, a revesting dating back to the commencement of the
case would reverse payments made to employees, taxing authorities, bankruptcy counsel, trade creditors, and other administrative
claimants over the course of the case. Liens and adequate protection given by the debtor in possession in connection with its obtaining postpetition financing or court approval of its use of cash
collateral would be undone. Sales, purchases, compromises, and
other transactions between the debtor in possession and third parties made during the bankruptcy proceeding, both in the ordinary
course451 and, outside the ordinary course of the debtor’s business
with court approval, would be nullified.452
A chapter 11 debtor in possession that operates its business in
bankruptcy will have entered into hundreds or even thousands of
such transactions between the commencement date of the bankruptcy case and a dismissal. All of these transactions and actions
will involve the debtor’s transferring or obtaining “property of the
would be at the mercy of the debtor’s decision to terminate the case and leave
those expenses unpaid.”); In re Kucera, 123 B.R. 852, 854–55 (Bankr. D. Neb.
1990) (determining that cash proceeds of after acquired property which was
sold during the pendency of the bankruptcy case are subject to the secured
creditor’s lien); In re Depew, 115 B.R. 965, 971–72 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1989) (“It
is noteworthy that § 349(b) does not mention or seek to reverse transfers out of
the bankruptcy estate, such as those which might be made pursuant to § 363,
§ 365(f), or § 726. This would seem to indicate that § 349(b) was designed to
deal only with the property that was still part of the estate on the date of dismissal.”); In re BSL Operating Corp., 57 B.R. 945, 952 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986)
(concluding that debtor’s lease rejected during the case does not revest in the
debtor on dismissal of the case); see also In re Marine Maint. Co., 169 F.2d 548,
551 (3d Cir. 1948) (finding that lease terminated by landlord pursuant to ipso
facto clause upon filing of involuntary case that subsequently was dismissed
cannot be reinstated notwithstanding the dismissal of the case).
450 In re Searles, 70 B.R. at 270.
451 11 U.S.C. § 363(c).
452 Id. § 363(b).
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estate.”453 A complex chapter 11 case that has gone on for months
or years prior to its dismissal, in which the debtor’s business may
have been sold and is now operating outside of bankruptcy as part
of the new owner’s business, makes any effort to unscramble the
egg a fool’s quest. The “property of the estate” that ordinarily revests on dismissal can only mean property of the estate at the
time of the dismissal, as the courts consistently have held.454
C. Congress Has Expressly Authorized the Bankruptcy Court “For
Cause” to Order Otherwise
Third, the critics of structured dismissals understate the
broad scope given by Congress to alter the ordinary results of a
dismissal “for cause” by ordering otherwise.455 The Bankruptcy
Code in many of its provisions gives the bankruptcy court little or
no flexibility.456 In other provisions though, including section
349(b), Congress has given the bankruptcy courts the discretion
to decide matters on a case-by-case basis, to develop rules of law
that are not specifically delineated under the Code, and to reach
beneficial results, including by authorizing the courts to approve
certain actions and alter ordinary outcomes “for cause.”457
The bankruptcy court’s “for cause” authority goes far beyond
section 349. Congress permits a bankruptcy court “for cause” to
Id. § 541(a)(1)–(2).
In re Searles, 70 B.R. 266 at 270.
455 11 U.S.C. § 349(b).
456 See, e.g., id. § 941.
457 Section 365 of the Code provides one of many examples of Code provisions that give the court “for cause” flexibility in some clauses but not in other
clauses of the same statutory section. See, e.g., id. § 365(b) (regarding the requirements that must be satisfied for a debtor in possession or trustee to assume a lease under which it has defaulted, which does not authorize the court
to alter those requirements “for cause”); id. § 365(c) (regarding the requirements that must be satisfied for a debtor in possession or trustee to assume
and/or assign a lease whether or not it is in default, which does not authorize
the court to alter those requirements “for cause”). Compare id. § 365(d)(1) (pursuant to which the court “for cause” may extend delay for up to 60 days the
requirement that the debtor “timely perform” its postpetition obligations under
a lease), with id. § 365(d) (which permits a debtor in possession or trustee to
extend “for cause” the 120-day period within which it must assume or reject a
lease, but does not permit an extension beyond 210 days even if there is cause,
unless each landlord has given its written consent).
453
454
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limit the public’s access to papers to protect an individual or her
property from injury.458 The court “for cause” may require that
petitioners in an involuntary case file a bond,459 may grant relief
from the automatic stay,460 and may limit a secured creditor’s
credit bid of its allowed secured claim at a sale.461 It may extend
“for cause” both the time for a trustee or debtor in possession to
assume or reject leases and executory contracts462 and the exclusive period within which a debtor in possession may file a plan
and seek acceptances of it.463 The court may oust a debtor in possession from authority to act for the estate by appointing “for
cause” a chapter 11 trustee with such authority.464 In all, there
appear to be more than forty instances in which Congress gave
the bankruptcy court the power to act “for cause.”465
Congress did not define “for cause” in the Code. In some instances, Congress has given guidance by providing non-exclusive
examples of what constitutes “cause.”466 Other sections of the
Code that permit entry of an order “for cause” say nothing about
what might constitute cause.467
Section 349(b) provides no illustrative examples regarding
what constitutes “cause” under that section. Courts have construed
the “for cause” provision of section 349(b) to give them the express
statutory authority, informed by and in furtherance of other Code
provisions and the policies of the Code, to act flexibly in dismissing
Id. § 107(c).
Id. § 303(e).
460 Id. § 362(d)(1).
461 Id. § 363(k).
462 Id. § 365(d)(4).
463 Id. § 1121(d)(1).
464 Id. § 1104(a)(1).
465 Id. §§ 107(c), 109(h)(3)(B), 303(e), 324(a), 341(e), 345(b)(2), 348(b), 349(a)–(b),
362(d)(1), 362(d)(3), 363(k), 365(d)(1), 365(d)(3), 365(d)(4)(b)(i), 502(j), 503(a),
505(b)(2)(A)(ii), 521(a)(2)(A)–(B), 524(m)(1), 557(c)(1), 707(a), 930(a), 1102(a)(3),
1104(a)(1), 1112(b)(1), 1121(d)(1), 1121(e)(1)(B), 1141(d)(5)(A), 1202(b)(2), 1204(a),
1208(c), 1222(c), 1224, 1229(c), 1307(c), 1322(d)(2), 1329(c); 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(d),
1441(d) (2012). The Rules also expressly authorize the court’s granting relief and
authorizing actions “for cause” in numerous instances. See, e.g., FED. R. BANKR.
P. 1017(e)(1), 1019(1)(B), 2002(p)(2)–(3), 2006(f), 2015(a)(6), 2015(d), 3002(c)(1),
3017(d)(4), 3018(a), 4003(b)(1), 4004(b)(1), 4007(c)–(d), 9033(c), 9037(d) (2012).
466 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1).
467 See, e.g., id. § 363(k).
458
459
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a bankruptcy case.468 Some courts have used the “for cause” authority of section 349(b) to protect rights acquired in reliance on
the bankruptcy case.469 Those and other courts have exercised
their “for cause” authority under section 349(b) to further the
Code’s purpose of equitable treatment to creditors.470
The Seventh Circuit has defined “cause” under section 349(b)
to mean “an acceptable reason,” 471 with the proviso that a
“[d]esire to make an end run around a statute is not an adequate
reason.”472 The same circuit in a subsequent case held that, in the
absence of an effort to make an “end run,” the court’s varying the
ordinary outcome of a dismissal “for cause” was within its discretion under section 349(b).473
Courts in numerous cases in chapters 12 and 13 have changed
the ordinary outcomes of section 349(b) “for cause.” On various
grounds, those courts have altered the revesting that would ordinarily occur on a dismissal “for cause.”474
In re Lewis, 346 B.R. 89, 111 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2006); see also In re Clements,
495 B.R. 74, 87, n.21 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2013) (“[O]n its face, the Code accords the
bankruptcy court more discretion to vary the statutory default treatment of
undistributed plan payments when a chapter 13 case is dismissed than upon
conversion to chapter 7.”).
469 Wiese v. Cmty. Bank of Cent. Wis., 552 F.3d 584, 590 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing
H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 338 (1977)); see also In re Keener, 268 B.R. 912, 919 (Bankr.
N.D. Tex. 2001); In re TNT Farms, 226 B.R. 436, 442 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1998).
470 Wiese, 552 F.3d at 590 (citing In re Derrick, 190 B.R. 346, 351 (Bankr.
W.D. Wis. 1995)); TNT Farms, 226 B.R. at 442.
471 In re Sadler, 935 F.2d 918, 921 (7th Cir. 1991).
472 Judge Easterbrook described his reasons for cutting off the “end run” in
Sadler as follows:
Congress specified that Chapter 13 cases pending on the effective date of Chapter 12 may not be converted. It would defeat
this express decision to treat as “cause” the debtors’ wish to file
a new Chapter 12 case with all dates relating back to the original Chapter 13 proceeding. That would be, as we remarked in
Sinclair, conversion by another name. It is not part of the judicial office to seek out creative ways to defeat statutes.
Id.
473 Wiese, 552 F.3d at 591–92.
474 For chapter 12, see Wiese, 552 F.3d at 590, 592, where the terms of confirmed chapter 12 plan, including debtor’s release of lender liability claims, remained binding on the parties. In re Fox, 140 B.R. 761, 764–65 (Bankr. D.S.D.
1992), holding estate funds would not revest in the debtor but would remain
available to pay counsel fees allowed post-dismissal. For chapter 13, see In re
468
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In chapter 11, courts have modified ordinary revesting “for
cause” by ordering that funds not be returned to the debtor on
dismissal because it would not be fair to a creditor of the debtor.475
A court has delayed for 180 days the revesting of property, to prevent an “imaginative” serial-filing debtor from obtaining the benefit of a subsequent stay by filing another bankruptcy case after
the dismissal.476 Courts “for cause” have denied a chapter 11 debtor’s
request for possession of premises under a prepetition lease that
Kee, 2015 WL 5860492, at *1 n.2 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2015), regarding some chapter 13 trustees’ practice of distributing debtor’s plan payments on hand on dismissal to creditors pursuant to confirmed plan pursuant to section 349(b); see
also In re Cusano, 431 B.R. 726, 730–31, 738 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2010) (ordering
that royalties payable to debtor be paid instead to the clerk of the court for
distribution in pursuant to pending non-bankruptcy litigation); In re Kirk, 537
B.R. 856, 860 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2015) (exercising discretion in furtherance of
section 1326(a)(2) directing chapter 13 trustee to deduct administrative expenses from funds held prior to returning funds to debtor); In re Hufford, 460
B.R. 172, 180 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2011) (finding that debtor’s motion to recover
funds from the chapter 13 trustee, on ground that dismissal had effectively
vacated confirmed plan resulting in the revesting of the funds with the debtor,
denied); In re Shields, 431 B.R. 446, 450 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 2010) (paying funds
on hand to administrative expense claimants; only remaining balance revests
in the debtor); In re Cox, 381 B.R. 525, 529 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2008) (ordering
debtor’s funds held by chapter 13 trustee on dismissal to be distributed in accordance with the confirmed plan); In re Lewis, 346 B.R. at 111, 115 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 2006) (exercising discretion in furtherance of section 1326(a)(2) directing chapter 13 trustee to deduct administrative expenses from funds held prior
to returning funds to debtor); In re Witte, 279 B.R. 585, 588 (Bankr. E.D. Cal.
2002) (ordering chapter 13 trustee to hold cash proceeds of sale of the debtors’
house court order determining whether lien holders were entitled to the proceeds); In re Prud’homme, 161 B.R. 747, 751 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1993) (ordering
that property would not revest in a chapter 13 debtor for eighteen months to
protect against the debtor’s repeated bankruptcy filings); In re DeLuca, 142
B.R. 687, 688, 691 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1992) (ordering chapter 13 trustee to hold funds
on hand at dismissal pending the court’s consideration of fee applications filed
by the debtor’s counsel, voiding a post-dismissal tax levy against those funds in
order to enable the payment of those counsel fees); In re Torres, 2000 WL 1515170,
at *2–3 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2000) (ordering debtor’s funds held by chapter 13
trustee on dismissal to be distributed in accordance with the confirmed plan).
475 In re Gonic Realty Tr., 909 F.2d 624, 627 (1st Cir. 1990).
476 In re Halpern, 229 B.R. 67, 76–77 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1999) (delaying 180
days for the purpose of restraining debtor from “betting with the other guy’s
money,” in the hope of delaying liquidation until “the market will turn and he
will be able to salvage something out of a sale after payment of his obligation
to his partners”).
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had been rejected in its prior chapter 11 case that was dismissed.477 Courts “for cause” under section 349(b) have ordered
payments to some creditors other than in the order listed in section 507 and have approved a structured dismissal as the “least
bad alternative” when compared with a “nihilistic” exercise that
would result in nothing for unsecured creditors.478
D. Summary—Congress Has Directed Bankruptcy Courts
to Pursue the Best Interest of Creditors and Not Absolute
Distributional Priority in Determining to Dismiss a
Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Case
In sum, if a chapter 11 plan is not confirmable or for other
“cause,” the Code authorizes the bankruptcy court to convert the
chapter 11 case to chapter 7, to cause the appointment of a chapter 11 trustee, or to dismiss the case.479 Congress expressly has authorized the courts to determine which of these alternatives is in
the best interest of the debtor’s creditors and estate.480 Further,
the strongest textual interpretation of section 349 is that the property that revests is that existing on the date of the dismissal.481
The courts are not required to turn back the clock to the petition
date and undo all of the transactions that occurred prior to dismissal.482 The courts have so held, mostly on pragmatic rather than
textual grounds.483 On this construction, a settlement approved
In re BSL Operating Corp., 57 B.R. 945, 952 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986) (concluding that lease rejection in prior, dismissed chapter 11 case occurred by operation of law pursuant to section 365(d)(4), because the debtor had not timely
assumed the lease; construing section 349 to revest the lease in the debtor “would
utterly defeat the intent of section 365(d)(4),” which the court harmonized with
§ 365(d)(4) by using the “flexibility inherent” in section 349 “to prevent a lessee’s bankruptcy from holding a nondebtor lessor hostage to repeated filings.”).
478 See In re Jevic Holding Corp., 787 F.3d 173, 185 (3d Cir. 2015). See also
the list of unpublished cases in Hon. Kevin J. Carey et al., Delaware Views from
the Bench: Structured Dismissals, AM. BANKR. INST., at 52–53 (2013), http://
www.abi.org/education-events/sessions/structured-dismissals [https://perma.cc
/6GXM-736Y].
479 See supra notes 476–78 and accompanying text.
480 See 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (2012).
481 See supra notes 445–49 and accompanying text.
482 See supra notes 477–50 and accompanying text.
483 See supra notes 477–50 and accompanying text.
477
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by the court survives the dismissal of the case. Moreover, Congress
has given courts broad discretion to alter normal revesting “for
cause.”484 In sharp contrast to these statutory provisions, the
Code says nothing of the absolute priority rule on a dismissal.
VI. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT: JEVIC, IRIDIUM, AND AWECO
The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Jevic485 on the
question of whether a bankruptcy court may authorize the distribution of settlement proceeds in a manner that violates the statutory priority scheme.486 Three circuit courts have considered the
issue: the Third Circuit in In re Jevic Holding Corp. in 2015;487
the Second Circuit in In re Iridium Operating LLC in 2007;488 and
the Fifth Circuit in In re Matter of AWECO, Inc. in 1984.489 Both
Jevic and Iridium allowed for bankruptcy court approval of a preplan settlement in chapter 11 if it was in the best interest of creditors, even if it was not in accord with the absolute priority rule.490 In
contrast, AWECO applied a per se rule by which any distributions
pursuant to a settlement in chapter 11 must be in the order of
absolute priority.491 A summary of each of Jevic, Iridium, and
AWECO follows.
A. In re Jevic Holding Corp.
Little was left of the Jevic debtors or their property more than
four years after the debtor commenced its chapter 11 case.492 The
See 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1).
Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 787 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 2015), petition
for cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 2541 (2016) (No. 15-649).
486 Id.
487 In re Jevic Holding Corp., 787 F.3d 173, 175 (3d Cir. 2015).
488 In re Iridium Operating LLC, 478 F.3d 452, 466 (2007) (finding that settlements that result in distributions to unsecured creditors other than in accordance with the priorities of the Code section 507 may be approved in a narrow
band of circumstances in which there are specific and credible grounds to justify the deviation).
489 In re AWECO, Inc., 725 F.2d 293, 298 (5th Cir. 1984) (noting that settlements outside of a plan must comply with the “absolute priority rule”).
490 In re Jevic Holding Corp., 787 F.3d at 183–84; In re Iridium Operating
LLC, 478 F.3d at 466.
491 In re AWECO, Inc., 725 F.2d at 298.
492 In re Jevic Holding Corp., 2014 WL 268613, at *4 (D. Del. Jan. 24, 2014).
484
485
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debtors had sold their property and used the proceeds to pay a
group of secured lenders headed by CIT Group (“CIT”).493 Another
secured lender, Sun Capital Partners, had a lien against the debtors’ $1.7 million in cash, and a claim that exceeded that amount.494 A
subsidiary of Sun also owned the equity in the debtors, having
acquired the debtors two years before the bankruptcy filing in a
leveraged buyout financed by CIT.495
The debtors’ only remaining asset was a suit that the official
committee of unsecured creditors had brought against CIT and
Sun on a derivative basis.496 The committee claimed that Sun had
used virtually none of its own money to acquire the debtors.497
Instead, with CIT’s assistance, it had leveraged the debtors’ assets to make the acquisition, saddling the debtors with debt they
could not service and hastening their demise.498 Accordingly, the
committee alleged that the transaction was an avoidable fraudulent transfer.499 Though the committee’s suit had survived a motion
to dismiss, the bankruptcy court found that the action was “far
from compelling, especially in view of CIT’s and Sun’s substantial
resources” and the committee’s having none.500
The structured dismissal in Jevic involved a $3.7 million settlement of the committee’s action.501 CIT would pay $2 million into
an account earmarked for professional fees and other priority administrative expenses, and Sun would assign its lien in the debtors’
$1.7 million of cash to a trust that would pay in full the remaining
priority administrative expense claims and priority taxes, and the
balance of the $3.7 million pro rata to general unsecured creditors.502 The settling parties requested the court to approve the
settlement and immediately thereafter dismiss the case.503
Id. at *1.
In re Jevic Holding Corp., 787 F.3d at 177.
495 Id. at 176–77.
496 Code section 1102 provides that the United States Trustee shall appoint
an official committee of unsecured creditors in a chapter 11 bankruptcy case.
11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) (2012).
497 In re Jevic Holding Corp., 787 F.3d at 176.
498 Id.
499 Id.
500 Id. at 180.
501 Id. at 188.
502 Id. at 176–77.
503 Id. at 180; see also 11 U.S.C. § 1112(e) (2012).
493
494
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Other unsecured creditors in Jevic, who were not parties to the
settlement and who would receive nothing under it, and the
United States Trustee, opposed the motion.504 The objecting creditors were a class of truck drivers formerly employed by the debtors
who were pursuing Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification (WARN) Act claims against both the debtors and Sun.505
Their collective claim was in the amount of $12.4 million by their
own estimation, $8.3 million of which they asserted as an unsecured
priority wage claim under Bankruptcy Code section 507(a)(4).506
Though the drivers were not barred from participating in the settlement negotiations, they ultimately were not parties to the settlement because they did not reach an agreement providing for
the dismissal of the WARN claims against Sun.507 So long as the
WARN litigation continued, Sun, which was contributing $1.7
million toward the settlement, was unwilling to pay the drivers
without being given a release because it “did not want to fund
litigation against itself.”508
The drivers and the United States Trustee argued that the
proposed settlement and dismissal violated the absolute priority
rule.509 They further asserted that the Code “does not permit
structured dismissals.”510
The bankruptcy court found that there was “no realistic prospect” of confirming a plan or of a “meaningful distribution” to any
unsecured creditor unless it approved the settlement.511 A conversion to chapter 7 would be “unavailing” because the chapter 7
trustee would have no funds with which to litigate the committee’s claims and “the secured creditors had ‘stated unequivocally
and credibly that they would not do this deal in a Chapter 7.’”512
The court held that while chapter 11 plans must comply with
the Code’s distributional priority scheme, settlements do not.513 The
In re Jevic Holding Corp., 787 F.3d at 178.
Id. at 176.
506 Id. at 177.
507 Id.
508 Id.
509 Id. at 178.
510 Id.
511 Id.
512 Id. (citation omitted).
513 Id.
504
505
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settlement did not prejudice the drivers because the debtor had
no unencumbered assets or funds with which to pay the drivers.514
The drivers’ claims were “effectively worthless.”515
Finally, the court determined that the settlement was fair and
equitable under Bankruptcy Rule 9019,516 given the low possibility that the committee would win on the merits, the complexity of
the case, and the high costs of proceeding.517 Faced with the “dire”
outcome of either “a meaningful return or zero,” the “‘paramount
interest of the creditors mandate[d] approval of the settlement’
and nothing in the Bankruptcy Code dictated otherwise.”518
The district court affirmed, including because the settlement
“was in the best interest of the estate and of resolving the pending
Chapter 11 cases.”519 The drivers and the United States Trustee
appealed.520
The Third Circuit emphasized that none of the objectors contended that the bankruptcy court had erred in determining that
the settlement was fair and equitable under the TMT standard.521
Further, cause existed under section 1112(b)(1) to convert the
case to chapter 7 or dismiss the case, “whichever [was] in the best
interests of creditors and the estate.”522
The objectors argued that there were only three avenues available
to the debtors: convert to chapter 7, confirm a plan, or dismiss
“with no strings attached.”523 The Third Circuit characterized a
structured dismissal as simply a dismissal “preceded by other orders
Id.
Id.
516 FED. R. BANKR. P. 9019. See supra notes 11–12 and accompanying text.
517 In re Jevic Holding Corp., 787 F.3d at 178–79 (citing In re Martin, 91
F.3d 389 (3d Cir. 1996) (setting forth the multifactor test for evaluating settlements under Bankruptcy Rule 9019)). The Third Circuit in Martin followed Protective Comm. for Indep. Stockholders of TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc. v. Anderson, 390
U.S. 414 (1968), considered at greater length above. See supra notes 14–15, 361 and
accompanying text. See also In re Martin, 91 F.3d at 393; TMT, 390 U.S. at
424–25; In re Iridium Operating LLC, 478 F.3d 452, 461–62 (2d Cir. 2007).
518 In re Jevic Holding Corp., 787 F.3d at 179.
519 In re Jevic Holding Corp., 2014 WL 268613, at *3 (D. Del. Jan. 24, 2014).
520 In re Jevic Holding Corp., 787 F.3d at 179.
521 Id. at 179–80.
522 Id. at 180 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(1), (b)(4)(A) (2010)); see also 11 U.S.C.
§ 1112(b)(1) (2012).
523 In re Jevic Holding Corp., 787 F.3d at 180.
514
515
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of the bankruptcy court (e.g., orders approving settlements, granting releases, and so forth) that remain in effect after dismissal.”524
Further, revesting under section 349(b) did not require a “hard
reset” but authorized the court “for cause” to order otherwise.525
The drivers urged that a bankruptcy court’s broad power to
approve settlements and structured dismissals that do not strictly
comply with the priorities listed in section 507 could “render …
superfluous” the plan confirmation process set forth in chapter
11.526 The court reasoned that, even if that were true, the Code
forbade only a structured dismissal contrived to circumvent or
evade the protections of the plan confirmation or conversion process.527 Since there was no prospect of a confirmable plan, and
conversion to chapter 7 “was a bridge to nowhere,” that issue was
not before it.528
Rather, the court reasoned, settlements are favored in bankruptcy, and the Code and the Rules left bankruptcy courts “more
flexibility in approving settlements than in confirming plans of reorganization.”529 Compliance with the Code’s priorities “will usually
be dispositive of whether a proposed settlement is fair and equitable.”530 “Settlements that skip objecting creditors in distributing
estate assets raise justifiable concerns about collusion.”531 The
court held nonetheless that a bankruptcy court may approve a settlement in chapter 11 that deviates from the absolute priority rule if
there are “specific and credible grounds to justify [the] deviation.”532
The Third Circuit in Jevic acknowledged that the case before it
was “a close call,” but concluded that the bankruptcy court “had sufficient reason to approve the settlement and structured dismissal.”533
“This disposition, unsatisfying as it was, remained the least bad
alternative since there was ‘no prospect’ of a plan being confirmed
Id. at 181.
Id.
526 Id.
527 Id.
528 Id. at 181–82.
529 Id. at 184.
530 Id. (citing In re Iridium Operating LLC, 478 F.3d 452, 455 (2d Cir. 2007)).
531 Id. (citing In re Iridium Operating LLC, 478 F.3d at 464).
532 Id. (alteration in original) (citing In re Iridium Operating LLC, 478 F.3d
at 466).
533 Id. at 184–85.
524
525
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and conversion to Chapter 7 would have resulted in the secured
creditors taking all that remained of the estate in ‘short order.’”534
B. In re Iridium Operating LLC
The situation in In re Iridium Operating LLC was equally
bleak. The debtor’s secured lenders “asserted liens over much of
what [was] left of Iridium.”535 The official committee of unsecured
creditors contested the liens.536 The committee also sought to pursue claims against the debtor’s former sole shareholder, Motorola,
Inc., but lacked the funds to do so.537 The committee “decided to
seek a settlement with the [secured] [l]enders and to focus its litigation efforts on Motorola.”538
The committee and the lenders reached a settlement one and
a half years into the bankruptcy case.539 The settlement acknowledged the lenders’ security interest in the estate’s remaining
cash, but provided for the distribution of only part of that cash to
the lenders.540 The $37.5 million balance of the cash would fund
a litigation trust and be used by the committee to sue Motorola.541
The secured lenders and the estate would split any recoveries
from the Motorola suit.542
Litigation recoveries would go to the estate and pay the priority administrative claims first, and then general unsecured
claims under a liquidating plan “according to the Bankruptcy
Code’s priority scheme.”543 The trust would pay any unused portion of the $37.5 million that remained at the end of the litigation
directly to general unsecured creditors.544
Motorola, which asserted a priority administrative expense
claim against the debtor in addition to its equity ownership interest
Id. at 185.
In re Iridium Operating LLC, 478 F.3d at 456.
536 Id.
537 Id.
538 Id. at 458.
539 Id. at 458–59.
540 Id. at 459.
541 Id.
542 Id.
543 Id.
544 Id.
534
535
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in the debtor, objected to the settlement.545 It argued that under
one outcome, estate property would be distributed to lower priority creditors (the general unsecured creditors) before any payments
to Motorola on account of its priority claim.546
The bankruptcy court approved the settlement and the district
court affirmed.547 Motorola appealed.548 The Second Circuit held
that a settlement outside of a plan does not necessarily implicate
the absolute priority rule,549 and declined to apply the per se rule
formulated by the Fifth Circuit in AWECO.550 Nonetheless, the most
important factor for approval of a pre-plan settlement was whether
distributions under it complied with the Code’s priority scheme.551
The Second Circuit held that, if the committee in pursuit of its
duty to maximize creditor recoveries reached a settlement “that
in some way impair[ed] the rule of priorities, it must come before
the bankruptcy court with specific and credible grounds to justify
that deviation and the court must carefully articulate its reasons
for approval of the agreement.”552 Since the committee had not
done so, the court remanded to the bankruptcy court for it to assess the justification.553
C. In re AWECO, Inc.
The debtor in In re AWECO, Inc. filed its chapter 11 case after
commencement of a $27 million breach of contract claim against
it.554 Several months later, the debtor filed its plan of reorganization but never solicited acceptances from its creditors. 555 The
debtor subsequently settled the contract claim for $5.3 million
and sought bankruptcy court approval of the settlement.556
Id. at 456.
Id.
547 Id. at 460.
548 Id.
549 Id. at 463 (citing Protective Comm. For Indep. Stockholders of TMT Trailer
Ferry, Inc. v. Anderson, 390 U.S. 414, 424 (1968)).
550 Id. at 464 (citing In re AWECO, Inc., 725 F.2d 293, 298 (5th Cir. 1984)).
551 Id. at 463.
552 Id. at 466.
553 Id.
554 See In re AWECO, Inc., 725 F.2d at 295.
555 Id.
556 Id. at 295–96.
545
546

2017]

STRUCTURED DISMISSALS

525

Several creditors objected, including a judgment creditor
whose lien extended to certain of the debtor’s assets, the IRS that
asserted priority tax claims, and the Department of Energy that
held an unsecured claim.557 The bankruptcy court found that the
settlement was “fair and equitable” and in the best interest of the
debtor, its estate, and creditors, and approved it.558 The IRS and
the Department of Energy appealed.559 The district court concluded
that the settlement benefitted all creditors because it would give
the debtor its only chance at reorganization, and affirmed.560 The
IRS appealed.561
The Fifth Circuit found convincing the policy arguments in
support of some extension of the “fair and equitable standard” to
settlements outside of a plan and reversed.562 The court reasoned
that the goal of absolute distributional priority arises when the
bankruptcy case commences.563 Based on the “bankruptcy law’s
underlying policies,” it made “a limited extension of the fair and
equitable standard: a bankruptcy court abuses its discretion in
approving a settlement with a junior creditor unless the court
concludes that priority of payment will be respected as to objecting senior creditors.”564
VII. THE CASE FOR STRUCTURED DISMISSALS
A debtor and its stakeholders confront a bleak reality when
seeking the best resolution in a chapter 11 case in which a plan is
not confirmable. The bankruptcy court in Jevic had the unenviable
task of determining whether to approve a negotiated resolution and
structured dismissal that salvaged some value for creditors, but
Id. at 296.
Id. at 297.
559 Id.
560 Id.
561 Id.
562 Id. at 298.
563 Id.
564 Id. The Fifth Circuit has not adhered to the AWECO rule in later bankruptcy cases in which it considered court-approved settlements. Rather, in both
chapter 11 and chapter 7 bankruptcy cases decided after AWECO, that court
continued to apply the TMT risk-benefit standard to settlement approval without regard to whether the settlement complied with the absolute priority rule.
See supra note 410.
557
558
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did not adhere to the absolute priority rule. The Supreme Court
in Jevic is expected to decide whether bankruptcy courts have the
authority to approve such a settlement.
The case for structured dismissals begins with the Code’s text.
The absence of a reasonable likelihood of rehabilitation or the failure to file or obtain confirmation of a plan by the time required by
the Code or the court constitutes cause for the court to dismiss or
convert the case.565 Once the bankruptcy court finds cause to dismiss, Congress gives the court broad discretion to dismiss the case
or convert it to chapter 7, “whichever is in the best interests of
creditors and the estate.”566 The Code provisions that address the
effects of a dismissal do not require an “undo” of settlements or
any of the numerous other transactions that occurred during the
proceeding prior to the dismissal. Even if they did, Congress has
given the bankruptcy court broad discretion to order otherwise for
cause.567 The bankruptcy court’s authority to approve a settlement similarly is broad and based on long-standing precedent
that Congress has not constrained in the Code.568
Textual support is lacking for the requirement that all negotiated
resolutions and dismissals comply with the absolute priority rule.
Moreover, the role of the absolute priority rule is highly circumscribed by the text of the current Code, contrary to the assertions of
the critics of structured dismissals.569 Congressional enactments in
the years since Los Angeles Lumber make clear that the limited
reach of the absolute priority rule in chapter 11 and under the present Code is no accident.570
A structured dismissal, such as that approved by the court in
Jevic, is the result of negotiations that typically conclude with a
settlement that gives something to some unsecured creditors.571
The alternative in Jevic, as in many such cases, was a conversion
to chapter 7 in which unsecured creditors would receive nothing.572
11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(4)(A), (J) (2012).
Id. § 1112(b)(1).
567 Id. § 349(b)(3).
568 See In re Jevic Holding Corp., 787 F.3d 173, 180 (3d Cir. 2015).
569 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii); see also H. COMM. ON JUDICIARY, Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 412–18 (1978), as reprinted
in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6356.
570 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b).
571 See In re Jevic Holding Corp., 787 F.3d at 176–77.
572 Id. at 185.
565
566
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The structured dismissal in Jevic was in the best interest of the
unsecured creditors and thus the court was correct in approving it.
Critics expressly or by inference raise a number of concerns
with a rule that permits settlements that do not adhere to the
absolute priority rule. They assert that a structured dismissal,
such as was approved in Jevic, is nothing more than an end run
around the absolute priority rule.573 They claim that such settlements often result from and encourage collusive behavior that deprives middle priority claimants of their due.574 They argue that
higher priority claims, such as the workers’ claims in Jevic, remain
unpaid though more junior claims are paid.575 This Article addresses these arguments in turn.
A structured dismissal is not an end run around the process
for obtaining plan confirmation or the distributional priorities
that apply to a rejecting class under a chapter 11 cramdown plan
if, as in Jevic, a plan is not confirmable. Rather, in a case in which
a chapter 11 plan is not confirmable, Congress has authorized the
bankruptcy court to decide whether and how to dismiss or convert
the case based on the court’s determination of what is in the best
interest of the debtor’s creditors and estate.576 The Code’s provisions governing dismissal do not require adherence to distributional priorities.
Even so, the end run critique might find some traction if the
absolute priority rule pervaded the Code or chapter 11, but it does
not. The absolute priority rule reached its zenith by a judicial
launch in Los Angeles Lumber. Since then, Congress has brought
the rule much closer to earth, so that today it has a far smaller
and very specific, if important, role in chapter 11 and the Code.
The very reorganization plan, a consensual plan, that the Supreme
Court held was not confirmable in Los Angeles Lumber would be
confirmable since 1979 under the Code.577 Other protections shield
creditors in chapter 11.578 Under the Code, acting in the best interest of creditors is a stronger, expressly stated policy.
Id. at 181.
See In re Iridium Operating LLC., 478 F.3d 452, 464 (2d Cir. 2007).
575 See In re AWECO, Inc., 725 F.2d 293, 298 (5th Cir. 1984).
576 See In re Jevic Holding Corp., 787 F.3d at 184.
577 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) (2012).
578 See id. § 1129(c).
573
574
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A settlement negotiated by the parties at arm’s length that
benefits creditors and the estate is distinguishable from a settlement that results from collusion and does not. The bankruptcy
courts must regularly make such a distinction with respect to settlements, sales, and other transactions brought to the court for
approval, both outside of and in connection with, a plan.579 The
court made such a determination in Jevic. The WARN claimants
in Jevic participated in the negotiations that resulted in a settlement.580 The reason that the settlement provided nothing for the
WARN claimants was not collusion. Rather, they would not agree
to release their claims in consideration of the settlement amount,
which is the fundamental exchange in any monetary settlement.581
Not surprisingly, the party funding the settlement was not willing
to pay settlement funds to the non-releasing WARN claimants, because the latter would just use those funds to pursue their litigation
against the former.
Determining whether a proposed settlement resulted from collusion among the settling parties is a fact-intensive undertaking.
Requiring adherence to the absolute priority rule will not flush
out or prevent such collusion. The debt and capital structures of
distressed companies have evolved since the days of equity receiverships and since the enactment of the Code. In Jevic, the settling
party asserted both a senior secured claim and a junior ownership
interest.582 In Iridium, the objecting party, Motorola, asserted
both a high priority administrative expense claim and a junior
ownership interest.583 Even the WARN claimants in Jevic asserted both a priority unsecured claim and a lower priority general
unsecured claim.584 Which hat was each of these parties wearing
at the time of the settlement negotiations?
Moreover, in none of Jevic, Iridium, or AWECO, did the debtors’ managers or shareholders, in concert with the secured creditors,
walk off with the residual value of the company at the expense of
unsecured creditors.585 Facts such as these have nothing in common
See In re Jevic Holding Corp., 787 F.3d at 184.
Id. at 176–77.
581 Id. at 177–78.
582 See id. at 175–76.
583 See In re Iridium Operating LLC, 478 F.3d 452, 456, 459, 465 (2d Cir. 2007).
584 See In re Jevic Holding Corp., 787 F.3d at 177.
585 See id. at 176; see also In re Iridium Operating LLC, 478 F.3d at 459; In
re AWECO, Inc., 725 F.2d 293, 296–97 (5th Cir. 1984).
579
580
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with the practices that gave rise to the rule that shareholders could
not retain the residual value of a business enterprise by colluding
with the senior creditors to give other creditors nothing, as was the
case in the equity receiverships which preceded the Chandler Act
and the Code. The bankruptcy court in Jevic correctly found that
the settlement was reached not by collusion, but as the result of negotiations in which the WARN claimants had a seat at the table.586
That and other facts regarding the course of the negotiations are
better indicators of whether the settlement and structured dismissal resulted from collusion or from arm’s length negotiations
based on the strengths and weaknesses of the parties’ positions as
well as their willingness to compromise.
Further, it is not appropriate to evaluate a structured dismissal
based on whether the unpaid stakeholder is more, or less appealing
than the stakeholder who is paid from the settlement that resulted
from the negotiations. Congress, by directing that a dismissal accord
with the best interest of creditors and by authorizing a bankruptcy
court “for cause” to decree appropriate terms in the dismissal order,
expressly allowed for some “play in the joints” of the Code.587 That
flexibility gives bankruptcy judges the authority and discretion to
approve a settlement and structured dismissal that provides the
greatest good to the greatest number.588 In Jevic those who benefitted included general unsecured creditors who, but for the settlement, would have received nothing, and excluded the holders
of senior WARN claims who would not agree to give a release in
exchange for the terms of the settlement.589 In the next case, those
who benefit might include employees, who but for the settlement
would receive nothing, and might exclude certain senior administrative expense claimants such as, estate professionals who do not
agree to give a release in exchange for the settlement terms. In
the case after that, both parties might agree to give releases and
thus share in a settlement fund that would not be available absent such releases. The Code’s text expressly enables this process
when a plan is not confirmable, and in such a case authorizes the
court to approve the negotiated resolution if it is in the best interest of creditors.590
See In re Jevic Holding Corp., 787 F.3d at 176–78.
11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(1) (2012).
588 Id.
589 See In re Jevic Holding Corp., 787 F.3d at 179, 185.
590 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(1).
586
587
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The elephant in the room, of course, is whether there are any
limiting factors on a bankruptcy court’s dismissing a case and decreeing terms of the dismissal that do not comply with the absolute priority rule. Both Congress and the courts in Jevic and Iridium
addressed this reasonable concern by requiring that a structured
dismissal must be in the best interest of creditors.591
Congress, in the Code, directs bankruptcy courts to resolve a
chapter 11 case in which a plan is not confirmable based on a determination of what is in the best interest of creditors. 592 It has
given the courts the discretionary authority to enter a dismissal
order that contains terms that alter the ordinary effect of a dismissal for cause.593 This express congressional grant of authority
and discretion to the bankruptcy courts is not unique to the resolution of a chapter 11 case in which a plan is not confirmable, and
applies to many other decisions made by the bankruptcy courts.594
Congress could easily have limited the bankruptcy courts’ authority
and discretion with respect to a dismissal, and could have made
the absolute priority rule applicable to a dismissal. It did not do
so. The congressional direction is clear.
Moreover, the courts in their exercise of this authority have
not abused it. Both Iridium and Jevic were decided on narrow
grounds.595 Each court considered both the best interest of creditors as a whole and the specific interest of creditors who were not
part of the settlement.596 The Second Circuit in Iridium required
that settling parties “come before the bankruptcy court with specific
and credible grounds to justify [a] deviation” from the priorities
applicable in chapter 7 so it could carefully formulate and articulate its reasons for approving the settlement.597 Since the creditors’
committee had not established those grounds, the court remanded
Id. § 1112(b)(1); see also In re Jevic Holding Corp., 787 F.3d at 182, 186;
In re Iridium Operating LLC, 478 F.3d 452, 456, 466–67 (2d Cir. 2007).
592 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(1).
593 Id. § 349.
594 See supra notes 437–38 and accompanying text; see also supra note 450
and accompanying text.
595 See In re Jevic Holding Corp., 787 F.3d at 184–85; In re Iridium Operating LLC, 487 F.3d at 461–62, 464–66.
596 See In re Jevic Holding Corp., 787 F.3d at 177, 180, 186; In re Iridium
Operating LLC, 487 F.3d at 461, 465.
597 In re Iridium Operating LLC, 487 F.3d at 466.
591
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to the bankruptcy court for it to assess the justification for approval.598 The bankruptcy court in Jevic found that a plan was not
confirmable. It found that the WARN claimants had a seat at the
negotiating table.599 They were not part of the ultimate settlement because they would not release their claims in exchange for
the payment being made by the secured creditors, and the secured
creditors were not willing to make the settlement payments unless they received the release from the WARN claimants.600 Further, a conversion to chapter 7 would result in no distribution to any
unsecured creditors, whether priority or otherwise.601 Neither the
Third Circuit in Jevic nor the Second Circuit in Iridium casually
disregarded the distributional priorities applicable in chapter 7
or to a chapter 11 cramdown plan, or the interests of those claimants who were not part of the settlement. Each court required
specific and credible grounds for a deviation from the priorities
applicable in chapter 7 and under a cramdown plan. The Jevic
court held, rightfully, that such deviation was justified because a
plan was not confirmable and the settlement and structured dismissal provided the greatest distribution to the greatest number
of unsecured creditors.
CONCLUSION
Congress has not enthroned absolute priority or a policy that
favors it atop the Bankruptcy Code. Rather, it has lowered the
doctrine’s place, severely and consistently, since 1952.
The rule was never as absolute in application in the equity receiverships as it was in courts’ pronouncements in the dozen years
following the Chandler Act. The Supreme Court in Los Angeles
Lumber nonetheless exalted the rule and the policy behind it
shortly after the Chandler Act became law, by making absolute
priority synonymous with the term “fair and equitable.”602 For a
very few years thereafter the federal courts, following Los Angeles
Lumber, extended the rule to plans under chapters X, XI, and XII
of the Chandler Act.603
Id.
See In re Jevic Holding Corp., 787 F.3d at 177–78.
600 See id. at 177.
601 Id. at 185.
602 See Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106, 117–19 (1939).
603 See supra notes 200–02 and accompanying text.
598
599
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Congress, beginning a dozen years after Los Angeles Lumber
and repeatedly and unwaveringly in the six decades since, has
contracted the reach of the absolute priority rule. The assertion
by the AWECO court and certain commentators of a congressional
policy favoring a pervasive rule requiring absolute distributional
priority in bankruptcy generally, and in chapter 11 specifically, is
simply inaccurate.
The justification for extending the reach of the absolute priority rule to a structured dismissal is especially weak if a plan is
not confirmable and equity will receive nothing or will receive
only a release in exchange for its contribution of cash used to
make a distribution to other creditors. The primary purpose of the
absolute priority rule was always to keep managers and shareholders from misappropriating the enterprise’s residual value in
a reorganization, unless unsecured creditors received a reasonable
value for their claims.604
Has Congress in all bankruptcy cases required payment to priority unsecured creditors in the order listed in section 507, prior
to any payment to general unsecured creditors? The answer,
simply, is no. In chapter 9, a plan must provide for payment of
administrative expense claims.605 The other unsecured priorities
do not apply.606 In chapter 12, the Code does not require payment
of specified priority tax claims on a priority basis at all, and transforms those claims into general unsecured claims.607 Both chapters 12 and 13 allow a debtor to retain equity in its property though
unsecured creditors are not paid in full, and allow payment to
general unsecured creditors before priority unsecured claims, so
long as the plan provides for the ultimate payment of those priority claims in full.608 In both a consensual plan and a cramdown
plan in chapter 11, the majority in an accepting class of employee
wage and benefit plan claims, agricultural supplier claims, and
consumer deposit claims, all of which are priority claims, can bind
dissenters within that class to accept deferred payments that are
subordinate in time of payment to lower priority claims.609 Those
See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
11 U.S.C. § 943(b) (2012).
606 See id. § 943(b).
607 Id. § 1222(a)(2).
608 See supra notes 346–47 and accompanying text.
609 See supra Part III.C.2.
604
605
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priority claims held by dissenters may be paid even after junior
unsecured claims are paid in full, equity has received interest in
the reorganized debtor, the debtor has received its discharge and
the court has closed the case.610 In a consensual chapter 11 plan
approved by the requisite majorities of all voting classes, the absolute priority rule does not apply at all, and shareholders can retain their interests though creditors are not paid in full.611
Most significantly, Congress has directed the bankruptcy courts
to resolve a case in which a plan is not confirmable based on the
best interest of creditors, not adherence to absolute distributional
priorities.612 The Code gives the court broad discretion to approve
a settlement that will facilitate such an outcome.
A chapter 11 case in which the court finds that a plan is not
confirmable and unsecured creditors will receive nothing, but in
which a structured dismissal will provide some distribution to creditors, should not present a quandary. Approving a structured dismissal upon such findings is the correct result. If the structured
dismissal will result in the greatest good to the greatest number
and is not the result of collusion, then the court should approve
it. Congress, by a consistent course of enactments over more than
sixty years, has made absolute priority a special, but limited, rule.
The current Code does not prescribe adherence to the absolute priority rule in a chapter 11 case in which a plan is not confirmable
and a structured dismissal pays something to creditors. The Code
requires instead that a bankruptcy court approve a structured dismissal that is in the best interest of creditors.

See supra Part III.C.2.
See supra Part III.C.2.
612 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(1).
610
611
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EPILOGUE—THE SUPREME COURT’S
DECISION IN JEVIC
The Supreme Court entered its opinion in Czyzewski v. Jevic
Holding Corp. on March 22, 2017,613 when the publication of the
print version of this issue of the William & Mary Business Law
Review was imminent. This epilogue by the Author briefly summarizes the opinion, its reach, and its likely effects.
The Supreme Court in Jevic framed the question before it as
whether, “in connection with a Chapter 11 dismissal,” a bankruptcy court has the legal power to order the “priority-skipping
kind of distribution scheme” that the bankruptcy court approved
in the structured dismissal in Jevic.614
The Court held that: “a bankruptcy court does not have such
a power. A distribution scheme ordered in connection with the
dismissal of a chapter 11 case cannot, without the consent of the
affected parties, deviate from the basic priority rules that apply
under the primary mechanisms the Code establishes for final distributions of estate value in business bankruptcies,” 615 i.e., the
rules that govern distributions in a chapter 7 liquidation or under
a confirmed chapter 11 plan, respectively.
Chapter 11 “foresees three possible outcomes,” the Court continued.616 The first is a confirmed chapter 11 plan.617 The second—
which “in effect confesses an inability to find a plan”—is conversion
of the case to a chapter 7 proceeding for the liquidation and distribution of the debtor’s remaining assets.618 The third is a dismissal of the case that “aims to return to the prepetition financial
status quo.”619
The Court briefly considered the distributional scheme in a
chapter 7 case, in which rigid adherence to the absolute priority
rule is required. Distributions in chapter 7 must be made: first, to
Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 787 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 2015), cert.
granted, 136 S. Ct. 2541 (2016) (No. 15-649, 2016 October Term), 2017 WL
1066259.
614 Id. at *3 (emphasis in original).
615 Id. at *4.
616 Id.
617 Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 1123, 1129, 1141 (2012)).
618 Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 1112(a)–(b), 726).
619 Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 1112(b), 349(b)(3)).
613
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each secured creditor on account of its claim up to the extent of the
value of its collateral;620 second, to the holders of priority unsecured
claims (such as for administrative expenses, wages, and taxes) in
the order of the priorities for those claims listed in section 507;621
next to the holders of non-priority, general unsecured claims;622 and
finally to the holders of equity in the enterprise.623 The Court acknowledged that the Code provides somewhat more flexibility for
distributions under chapter 11, but emphasized that “a bankruptcy
court cannot confirm a plan that contains priority-violating distributions over the objection of an impaired creditor class.”624
The question of whether the structured dismissal in Jevic was
permissible concerned “the interplay between the Code’s priority
rules and a Chapter 11 dismissal.”625 The Court stated that the
Code does not explicitly address distributions made at the time of
the dismissal of a chapter 11 case, and asked: “Can a bankruptcy
court approve a structured dismissal that provides for distributions that do not follow ordinary priority rules without the affected
creditors’ consent?”626
The Court’s “simple answer to this complicated question” was
“no.”627 In reaching its conclusion, the Court emphasized its view
Id. at *5 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 725). Section 725 provides only that “the
trustee, after notice and a hearing, shall dispose of any property in which an
entity other than the estate has an interest, such as a lien, and that has not
been disposed of,” and the Court’s citation to this section for the proposition
stated is imprecise. Nonetheless, the proposition stated—that each secured
creditor is entitled to payment of its claim up to the extent of the value of its
collateral—is both true and well-established, pursuant to Supreme Court opinions that generally preserve in bankruptcy a creditor’s lien created under state
law, and section 506(a), which limits the distribution to the secured creditor to
the value of its collateral. See supra notes 281–82, 284 and accompanying text.
621 Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 507, 726(a)(1)).
622 Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(2)).
623 Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(6)).
624 Id. at *5.
625 Id.
626 Id. at *10.
627 Id. Prior to turning to this substantive question, the Court considered
the respondents’ contention that the petitioning WARN claimants lacked
standing. Id. at *8–9. The Court determined that the petitioners had standing
because the bankruptcy court’s “approval of the structured dismissal cost petitioners something. They lost a chance to obtain a settlement that respected
their priority. Or, if not that, they lost the power to bring their own lawsuit on
620
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that the Code’s “priority system constitutes a basic underpinning
of business bankruptcy law,” and “has long been considered fundamental to the Bankruptcy Code’s operation.”628 The importance
of the priority system led the Court “to expect more than a simple
statutory silence if, and when, Congress were to intend a major
departure” that would authorize a structured dismissal that provided for priority-skipping distributions.629
The Court found nothing in the statute that evinced this intent.
Section 1112(b) authorizes the bankruptcy court to dismiss a chapter 11 case. The Court noted:
But the word, ‘dismiss’ itself says nothing about the power to
make nonconsensual priority-violating distributions of estate
value. Neither the word ‘structured,’ nor the word ‘conditions,’
nor anything else about distributing estate value to creditors pursuant to a dismissal appears in any relevant part of the Code.630

The Court further emphasized its view that the dismissal provisions of section 1112(b) and section 349(b), which govern the effect of the dismissal of a chapter 11 case, “seek a restoration of
the prepetition financial status quo.”631 The Court considered the
bankruptcy court’s statutory authority to “for cause, orde[r] otherwise,” to be “designed to give courts the flexibility to ‘make the
a claim that had a settlement value of $3.7 million. For standing purposes, a
loss of even a small amount of money is ordinarily an ‘injury.’” Id. at *9 (citing
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 430–31 (1961)).
628 Id. at *10.
629 Id. (“Congress … does not, one might say, hide elephants in mouseholes.”)
(quoting Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001)). Two
elephants are in the room, rather than in the mousehole, in the Author’s view.
The first is Congress’s persistent dissatisfaction with the Court’s expansive
view in Los Angeles Lumber (and now in Jevic) of the absolute priority rule.
Congress acted on this dissatisfaction in its 1952, 1978, 1986, and 2005 enactments, which severely restricted the reach of the rule and negated most of Los
Angeles Lumber. The second is the text of section 1112(b), which comes into
play when a chapter 11 plan cannot be confirmed. That provision expressly
directs a bankruptcy court to make its determination based on the “best interest of creditors and the estate,” and not on the absolute priority rule. 11 U.S.C.
§ 1112(e) (2012). The elephant occupying the mousehole, the Author argues, is the
notion that the absolute priority rule applies to the resolution of a chapter 11
case in which a plan is not confirmable.
630 Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)).
631 Id. at *11.
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appropriate orders to protect rights acquired in reliance on the
bankruptcy case.’”632
The Court did not extend its ruling to structured dismissals regarding which creditors did not object (and thus tacitly consented)
to a priority-skipping structured dismissal. It “express[ed] no view
about the legality of structured dismissals in general.”633 The
Court also distinguished Iridium, the Second Circuit case upon
which the Third Circuit had relied in part in Jevic.634 The Court
noted that Iridium “did not involve a structured dismissal. It addressed an interim distribution of settlement proceeds to fund a
litigation trust that would press claims on the estate’s behalf.”635
The Court also recognized that many other interim distributions made in a chapter 11 case—including those made pursuant
to “first-day” orders such as wage, critical vendor, and financing
orders that provide for a “roll-up” of a lender’s prepetition claim—
also are “priority-violating.”636 The Court emphasized that these
Id. (citing H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 338 (1978)). A settlement approved
by the bankruptcy court pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9019 clearly implicates
rights acquired in reliance on the bankruptcy case. FED. R. BANKR. P. 9019.
Under the Court’s interpretation of the temporal scope of section 349(b), the
rights acquired under a settlement reached and approved at some time prior
to the dismissal of the chapter 11 case would be entitled to protection under
section 349(b). Yet, those same rights acquired under a settlement reached and
approved immediately prior to, and in contemplation of, such dismissal would
not be entitled to protection under section 349(b). 11 U.S.C. § 349(b). The Jevic
Court did not adopt the per se rule advanced by AWECO, pursuant to which a
settlement reached at any time after the commencement of the bankruptcy
case must comply with the absolute priority rule. Thus the question of how long
before dismissal a settlement must be reached to be entitled to protection under
section 349(b) remains unanswered.
633 Jevic, 2017 WL 1066259 at *12 (citing In re Buffet Partners, L.P., 2014
WL 3735804 (Bankr. N.D. Tex., July 28, 2014)). The Third Circuit cited that
same case in its decision affirming the bankruptcy court’s approval of the structured dismissal in Jevic. See In re Jevic Holding Corp., 787 F.3d 173, 182 (3d
Cir. 2015).
634 Jevic, 2017 WL 1066259 at *12 (citing In re Iridium Operating LLC, 478
F.3d 452 (2d Cir. 2007)).
635 Id. (citing In re Iridium Operating LLC, 478 F.3d at 459–460).
636 Id. “First day” motions are those filed early in the case, typically with
the chapter 11 bankruptcy petition, which request the immediate relief that
the chapter 11 debtor in possession asserts that it requires to continue to operate in chapter 11. “First day” orders are those entered on those motions in
the first few business days of a case, normally immediately following the court’s
632
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and other interim distributions typically are founded on the goal of
making “even the disfavored creditors better off,” including enabling
reorganizations and thus maximizing the value of the estate.637 It
suggested that the distributions under the Jevic settlement “more
closely resemble[d] proposed transactions that lower courts have
refused to allow on the ground that they circumvent the Code’s procedural safeguards.”638
The Court acknowledged that the Third Circuit in Jevic “did not
approve nonconsensual priority-violating structured dismissals in
general,” but had limited its ruling to the “rare case” in which the
court found “sufficient reasons” to disregard priority.639 The Court
rejected this approach because it was “difficult to give precise content to the concept “sufficient reasons,” which threatened to turn
first hearing in the case. Examples include “first day” orders that authorize a
chapter 11 debtor in possession to obtain new, post-bankruptcy financing
and/or use its cash that is subject to a pre-bankruptcy lien. Many “first day”
orders are priority-skipping, and authorize a chapter 11 debtor in possession
to pay certain pre-bankruptcy claims, which it otherwise could not pay until
the effective debt of its plan or other conclusion of the case. A “first day” wage
order, for example, authorizes the payment of the pre-bankruptcy portion of
payroll and employee benefits, absent which payment the employees are more
likely to quit. A critical vendor order authorizes the payment early in the case of
the pre-bankruptcy claims of certain key suppliers of goods or services—such as
a supplier that provides a component part that is critical to the debtor’s manufacturing operation and cannot be reasonably obtained elsewhere—absent
which payment the supplier is more likely to stop supplying such critical good or
service. A “roll-up” is a new financing extended by the debtor’s pre-bankruptcy
lender—under which the lender’s pre-bankruptcy claim is paid off with the proceeds of the new, post-bankruptcy loan, and only the amount of the new loan
in excess of the lender’s pre-bankruptcy loan balance is actually advanced to
the debtor—absent which the lender is less likely to extend the new loan. All
of these “first day” orders, and others, can result in payments that are priorityskipping and favor certain creditors over others, enabling the favored creditors
to receive more than they would under a confirmed chapter 11 plan or, if the
case is converted to chapter 7, on the distribution at the conclusion of the chapter 7 case.
637 Id. (citing In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d 866, 872 (7th Cir. 2004); Toibb v.
Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 163–64 (1991)).
638 Id. at *13 (citing In re Braniff Airways, Inc., 700 F.2d 935, 940 (5th Cir.
1983); In re Lionel Corp., 722 F.2d 1063, 1069 (2d Cir. 1983); In re Biolitec,
Inc., 528 B.R. 261, 269 (Bankr. N.J. 2014); In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d 108,
118 (2d Cir. 2009)).
639 Id. (citing In re Jevic Holding Corp., 787 F.3d 173, 175, 186 (3d Cir. 2015)).
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a “rare case” exception into a more general rule.640 In the Court’s
view, allowing the “rare case” exception would be the opening of the
floodgates—resulting in uncertainty, the loss of protections given
to priority claimants, collusion among insiders and senior and
junior creditors to the detriment of those in the middle, increased
litigation, and fewer settlements.641
The Court concluded that Congress had not authorized the
“rare case” exception.642 The courts could not “alter the balance
struck by the statute.”643 The Court reversed and remanded for
further proceedings consistent with its opinion.644
The dissent was founded on one of the most peculiar aspects of
the path that the Jevic case took from the Court’s grant of certiorari through briefing and oral argument to decision.645 The Court
had granted certiorari on the following issue: “[w]hether a bankruptcy court may authorize the distribution of settlement proceeds
in a manner that violates the statutory priority scheme.”646
According to the petition, the Third Circuit’s decision in Jevic
deepened an existing split among the courts of appeals.647 The
Second Circuit had held in Iridium that a settlement outside of a
plan does not necessarily implicate the absolute priority rule, and
may be approved if it maximizes creditor recoveries and there are
specific and credible grounds for any deviation from the absolute
priority rule.648 The Fifth Circuit in AWECO established, to the
contrary, a per se rule, pursuant to which all settlements outside
of a plan, reached at any time in the case, must comply with the
absolute priority rule.649
The dissent found dispositive that, after the Court granted certiorari, the petitioners had “recast the question” to whether a
chapter 11 case may be terminated by a structured dismissal that
Id.
Id. at *13–14.
642 Id. at *14.
643 Id. (citing Law v. Siegel, 134 S. Ct. 1188, 1198 (2014)).
644 Id. at *14.
645 Id. at *15 (Thomas, J., joined by Alito, J.).
646 Id.
647 Id.
648 See supra notes 4, 487–91, 535–53, 583–85, 591–601 and accompanying
text.
649 See supra notes 5, 414–15, 491, 555–64 and accompanying text.
640
641
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distributes estate property in violation of the Bankruptcy Code’s
priority scheme.650
This question, the dissent asserted, was “narrower—and different”—than the one on which it had granted certiorari.651 It also
was not the subject of a circuit conflict, because neither Iridium
nor AWECO involved a structured dismissal.652 The respondents,
relying on the Court’s Rules prohibiting the parties from changing
the substance of the question presented, declined to brief the recast question that the majority decided.653 The Court did not have
the benefit of a full, adversarial briefing. It further would have
“greatly benefit[ed] from the views of additional courts of appeals”
on this “‘novel question of bankruptcy law’ arising in the rapidly
developing field of structured dismissals.”654 The dissent would
not have rewarded such “bait-and-switch tactics,” and would have
dismissed the writ as improvidently granted.655
So where are the parties in Jevic left after the Supreme
Court’s decision? And where does Jevic leave future parties with
respect to settlements and distributions in chapter 11 that are outside of a plan?
First, the petitioners in Jevic may or may not fair better on remand. The Court’s ruling may reopen negotiations in Jevic, which
may or may not result in a global settlement of the case. It may
result in nothing more than a smaller settlement, all of which will
go to administrative claimants (whose claims have distributional
priority over those of the WARN claimants), or a larger settlement
which will result in some distribution to the WARN claimants, or
even no settlement at all and a conversion to chapter 7. In that
latter case, the chapter 7 trustee may or may not decide to pursue
the estate’s fraudulent conveyance claims against CIT and/or Sun,
and if she decides to pursue those claims, may or may not prevail.
The WARN claimants may or may not decide to pursue, as creditors, their state law fraudulent conveyance claims against CIT
and/or Sun, and if they decide to pursue those claims, may or may
Id. at *15.
Id.
652 Id.
653 Id. (citing SUP. CT. RS. 24.1(a), 14.1(a)).
654 Id. (quoting In re Jevic Holding Corp., 787 F.3d 173, 175 (2d Cir. 2015)).
655 Id. (quoting S.F. v. Sheehan, 575 U.S. 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1779, (2015) (Scalia,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
650
651
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not prevail. If they prevail, their recovery may or may not be in an
amount in excess of their legal fees and costs.
One outcome, though, is clear. The WARN claimants cannot
settle and by a structured dismissal obtain a distribution of their
fourth priority unsecured employee claims that is prior to full payment of the second priority administrative expense claims in the
case (which include the claims of the debtor’s and the creditors committee’s counsel and other professionals for their fees and expenses),
unless those second priority claimants consent (see “Second” below).
Second, a bankruptcy court may approve a structured dismissal
the distributions under which are in accordance with section 726
priorities, and a priority-skipping structured dismissal to which the
adversely affected creditors have consented. The Court in Jevic appears to have accepted that a creditor’s tacit or constructive consent, such as that arising from its failure to object to the proposed
structured dismissal, is sufficient.656
Third, a bankruptcy court may order distributions under “first
day” orders, provided that those orders further the goal of enabling
reorganizations and maximizing the value of the estate, and thus
might increase distributions even to the disfavored creditors. 657
The bankruptcy court is not required to engage in an absolute priority analysis in connection with “first day” motions, except to this
extenuated and fairly speculative extent.
Fourth, pre-plan settlements authorized under Bankruptcy Rule
9019 remain subject to the rule established by the Court in TMT.658
That rule authorizes a bankruptcy court to approve a settlement if
it is in the best interest of the estate based on “an educated estimate
of the complexity, expense, and likely duration of such litigation,
the possible difficulties of collecting on any judgment which might
be obtained, and all other factors relevant to a full and fair assessment of the wisdom of the proposed compromise.”659 The Court in
Jevic did not adopt AWECO’s per se rule requiring the bankruptcy court in a chapter 11 case to approve a pre-plan settlement
Id. at *12.
Id. at *12.
658 See supra Part IV.
659 Protective Comm. for Indep. Stockholders of TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc. v.
Anderson, 390 U.S. 414, 424 (1968).
656
657
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and the distributions under it only if it complies with the absolute
priority rule.660
Fifth, the Court did not prohibit a Rule 9019 settlement in accordance with TMT, followed by a “conversion of the case to a Chapter 7 proceeding for liquidation of the business and a distribution
of its remaining assets,” rather than by a structured dismissal of
the case. Such conversion to chapter 7 is one of the three ways by
which a chapter 11 case can be resolved under the Supreme Court’s
opinion in Jevic.661
Sixth, the Jevic Court did not rule out “gifting,” whereby a secured creditor or other senior creditor entitled to distributional priority agrees to give some or all of its property to a junior creditor,
usually to settle a claim against it or resolve the chapter 11 case,
skipping over creditors having intermediate priority.662
Seventh, and finally, Congress may roll back—yet again—the
reach of the absolute priority rule established by the Court in Los
Angeles Lumber, as it did in 1952, 1978, 1986, and 2005. If Congress
does so, it likely will be because it has determined that, if a chapter 11 plan cannot be confirmed, the debtor’s creditors are best
served not by a rigid rule of absolute distributional priority, but
by the Code’s leaving some “play in the joints” and authorizing
other resolutions that are in the best interests of those creditors.

660 The Court also did not reject the Second Circuit’s Iridium rule, which
provides that a settlement outside of a plan does not necessarily implicate the
absolute priority rule, and may be approved if it maximizes creditor recoveries
and there are specific and credible grounds for any deviation from the absolute
priority rule. Jevic, 2017 WL 1066259 at *12–13.
661 Id. at *4.
662 See, e.g., Official, Unsecured Creditors’ Comm. v. Stern (In re SPM Mfg.
Corp.), 984 F.2d 1305 (1st Cir. 1993).

